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Abstract 
The aim of my dissertation is to provide new insights into corporate bond markets from 
empirical corporate finance and bond market microstructure vintage points.  The first 
chapter introduces the topic. The second chapter (Bondholder Wealth Effects 
surrounding Bond Offering Announcements: Theory and Evidence) investigates how 
and why prices of existing bonds respond to announcements of new debt issues. The 
third chapter (The Wealth Effects of Dividend Announcements on Bondholders: New 
Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market) examines the announcement effect of 
dividend changes on bondholders using the over-the-counter bond transaction data from 
TRACE. The fourth chapter (Pre-Trade Transparency in Over-the-Counter Markets) 
explores the impact of NYSE pre-trade transparency on U.S corporate bond markets 
where the majority of trading is happened in over-the-counter markets.
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, I explore how and why prices of existing bonds respond to 
announcements of new bond issues. This topic is important and interesting for several 
reasons. First, given the increasing size and significance of corporate debt in capital 
markets, the impact that new debt offerings have on existing bondholders is of 
particular importance. The scarce extant literature provides inconclusive evidence on 
how the announcement of a new bond issue impacts the prices of the firm’s existing 
bonds, which is primarily attributed to poor quality and availability of bond price data 
in the past; Second, an investigation of the impact of issuing new debt on existing 
bondholders can also help answer whether and, if so, how existing creditors react to 
increases in leverage. This is particularly important since, based on Lemmon, Roberts 
and Zender (2008), we know that firms choose to actively manage leverage ratios 
through debt rather than equity policies. Finally, no prior studies have examined how 
bond price reactions depend on characteristics of the new and existing bonds and the 
planned use of the new funds, which can provide more insights into which theory 
(wealth transfer or signaling) best explains bond returns surrounding bond offering 
announcements.  
I use the Merton model as a theoretical framework to assess 1) the expected 
impact of a new bond offering on existing bond and stock prices, and 2) how the bond 
and stock price reactions are conditioned on characteristics of the new and old bonds 
and the planned use of the new funds. Most of my results are more consistent with the 
 2 
 
 
 
wealth transfer hypothesis than the signaling hypotheses. Using a sample of 1,356 new 
bond offering announcements by U.S. corporate bonds from 2005 to 2011, I find 
negative and significant average abnormal returns of issuers’ existing bonds over a 
three-day event window surrounding the first announcement of the planned bond issues. 
In contrast, average abnormal stock returns of the issuing firms are positive but 
insignificant. Consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis, bond market 
announcement returns estimated using daily corporate bond data from TRACE are more 
negative for a) longer-term outstanding bonds, b) when the new bonds are senior to 
existing bonds, and c) when the newly issued bonds mature before existing bonds. My 
finding that the bond price reaction (stock price reaction) is more negative (less 
positive) when funds are to be used for expansion than when they are to be used to 
repurchase stock suggests that there is also a signaling effect.  
The evidence on the issue of whether paying out dividend will harm 
bondholders’ interest or to what extent dividend policy will hurt existing creditors is 
limited, which is attributed to historical deficiencies in the quality and availability of 
bond price data. In Chapter 3, I investigate the announcement effect of dividend 
changes on bondholders using bond transaction data from the over-the-counter market. 
Most of my results are consistent with the signaling hypothesis. Abnormal bond returns 
over a three-day event window surrounding an increased (omitted) dividend 
announcement are positive (negative) and statistically significant. The bond market 
reaction to the dividend increases announcement is more positive for larger percentage 
dividend increases, speculative grade bonds, and the period from 2008 to 2010. My 
findings of insignificant (significantly negative) bond (stock) market price reaction to 
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dividend decreases announcements suggest that there is a combination of signaling and 
wealth transfer effect surrounding dividend decreases announcements. 
The availability of quote information, which is defined as pre-trade 
transparency, is very limited to investors in OTC markets. Consequently, the search 
process can be potentially costly to investors in OTC markets because of the sequential 
search and bilateral bargaining that characterizes consummation of trades (see Duffie 
(2010, 2012)). While working on corporate bond markets, I realized that bond markets 
are less pre-trade transparent than equity markets, and justify more pre-trade 
transparency given the bilateral trading nature in the market. Chapter 4 investigates the 
impact of pre-trade transparency on over-the-counter markets, and finds that NYSE pre-
trade transparency reduces US corporate bond transaction costs by 10 basis points. In 
addition, pre-trade transparency tends to favor traders rather than dealers by enhancing 
traders’ bargaining capability. Pre-trade transparency also increases a bond’s value 
since bonds exhibiting NYSE pre-trade transparency have significantly lower bond 
yields than bonds without pre-trade transparency (6.27% vs. 7.89%). 
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Chapter 2: Bondholder Wealth Effects surrounding Bond Offering 
Announcements: Theory and Evidence 
 
During the period from 1997 to 2006, US companies raised funds totaling $4.6 
trillion from the corporate debt market. During the same period, US firms only raised 
$1.5 trillion from common equity issuances, approximately less than one third of the 
new capital acquired through debt issuances.
1
 Moreover, the Securities Industry and 
Financial Markets Association reported that from 1996 to 2012 corporate debt issuances 
increased from $344 billion to $1.36 trillion, annually.
2  
This
 
significant increase in 
volume of publicly issued debt has increased securities regulators’ concern about 
investors’ interest in the newly issued debt. For example, on February 28, 2014, the 
Securities and Exchange Commission probed Goldman Sachs, Citigroup and other 
banks on how the institutions divvied up new bond issues among investors.
3
 Provided 
the increased preference of firms to acquire additional capital through debt issuances 
and regulators’ increased interest in investors’ wealth effects surrounding new bond 
issues, it is pertinent to investigate the impact of newly issued debt on existing 
bondholder wealth. Bond offerings may lead to a transfer of wealth from existing 
bondholders to stockholders. This wealth transfer might be experienced as new bond 
issues decrease the amount of collateral associated with the firm’s outstanding bonds, 
therefore, increasing the default risk of the firm. Moreover, if the newly raised funds are 
employed to finance risky investment projects or make dividend payments, a firm’s 
                                                 
1
 If the stock repurchase is considered as negative equity issuance, the net equity issuance is negative in 
most years during the same period. 
2
 Includes all non-convertible debt, Medium-Term Notes (MTNs) and Yankee bonds, but excludes CDs 
and federal agency debt. 
3
 http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304026804579410711208114586?mg=reno64-
wsj 
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default risk increases more. As stockholders have a residual claim on a firm’s 
assets/earnings after bondholders are repaid, additional debt further incentivizes firms 
(or management) to pursue risky projects since if the projects are successful, 
shareholders will be entitled to receive any profits in excess of those used for the 
repayment of debt.  
I examine the impact of new debt offering announcements on bondholder wealth 
in a sample of 1,356 issue-level bond offerings during the period from 2005 to 2011. In 
sharp contrast to previous studies, I find evidence of a wealth transfer from existing 
bondholders to stockholders. Over a three-day event window, I find negative and 
statistically significant bond market reactions to new bond offerings. By contrast, stock 
markets react positively to the announcement of new bond issues. To the best of my 
knowledge, I also provide the first evidence on the determinants of the magnitude of the 
wealth transfer from existing bondholders to stockholders surrounding a new bond 
issue. Consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis, existing bondholders’ losses are 
greater when the new bond is senior to existing bonds and existing bondholders actually 
experience positive returns when the new bond is junior to the existing bonds. 
Moreover, consistent with the view that bonds with shorter maturities are defacto senior 
to longer-term bonds, given that they must be redeemed sooner, I document smaller 
losses for shorter-term bondholders and larger losses for longer-term bondholders. In 
addition, stockholder gains are positively related to the maturity of existing bonds. 
Consistent with the view that potential uses of newly raised funds can lead to an 
increased wealth transfer from existing bondholders to stockholders, I find negative 
bondholder returns and positive stockholder returns surrounding a new bond issuance 
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when the firm plans to use the newly borrowed money to repurchase stocks. While the 
wealth transfer hypothesis predicts a greater negative bond price reaction when the 
funds are used to repurchase stock than to expand the size of the firm, I find the 
opposite.  This suggests that the new bond issue and its intended use have a signaling 
impact.  The larger positive stock price reaction when the funds are used to repurchase 
stock is also consistent with a combination of the wealth transfer and signaling 
hypotheses.  
One essential feature of risky-debt valuation models is a direct relation between 
default risk and the probability that debt values will exceed asset values (e.g. Merton 
(1974) and Galai and Masulis (1976)). My work explores how bond and stock prices 
react to new bond issues employing the Merton model as a theoretical framework for 
assessing the expected impact of a new bond offering on existing debt and stock values. 
According to the Merton model, a firm’s equity can be considered as a call option on 
the assets of the firm, and the payoff on the firm’s debt as equivalent to a default-risk-
free loan plus a short position in a put option on the assets of the firm.
4
  Thus the 
predicted impact of the new debt on existing equity and debt price is conditional on the 
relative seniority and maturity of the new and existing debt and on the intended uses of 
the newly raised funds.  
A handful of studies examine the impact of new bond offerings on existing 
bondholders, yet the evidence is conflicting and inconclusive. Using monthly corporate 
bond returns, Kolodny and Suhler (1988) find that a new debt offering announcement 
has a positive effect on existing bondholders’ returns, while Akhigbe, Easterwood and 
                                                 
4
 This is a model that began with Merton (1974) and Galai and Masulis (1976) and is a general model 
used in the extant literature. I refer to the model as the Merton model in the present paper. 
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Pettit (1997) document insignificant bond market reactions in the week following the 
announcements of new debt offerings.
5
 The conflicting evidence is possibly due to the 
past quality and availability of bond price data.
6
 Kolodny and Suhler (1988) manually 
collect bond price data from Moody’s Bond Record. Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit 
(1997) employ bond price data from NYSE bond market, which is a small, odd-lot 
market characterized by infrequent trading. The infrequent trading on the NYSE could 
lead to severe bid-ask bounce when estimating bond returns. Since these researchers 
were forced to use hand collected data, their sample sizes tended to be small and include 
only heavily traded bonds.
7
 Additionally, the aforementioned and most prior bond 
market event studies on various corporate events tended to use large event windows on 
the order of a month or a week, which can be attributed to a lack of daily bond data.  
A contribution of this paper over previous studies is employing comprehensive 
data on over-the-counter (OTC) corporate bond transactions from Trade Reporting and 
Compliance Engine (TRACE), which provides greater precision and accuracy in 
estimating bond market price reactions to new debt offering announcements. TRACE is 
the first to collect and disseminate comprehensive information on OTC corporate bond 
trades by making bond transaction prices publicly available 15 minutes following the 
                                                 
5
 Kolodny and Suhler (1988) find that the equity market returns surrounding new debt offering 
announcements are slightly positive and Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit (1997) document negative 
equity market reactions to new debt offering announcements. However, both equity market returns are 
not significantly different from zero. 
6
 Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit (1997) obtain Friday bond transaction price information from the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, and from Dow-Jones News Retrieval. This bond price information 
is for bonds traded on the NYSE. 
7
 Kolodny and Suhler (1988) estimate monthly bond returns for 66 debt offerings during 1973-1981 and 
Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit (1997) calculate weekly bond returns for 399 debt offerings during 1980-
1992. 
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transaction.
8
 By the end of January 2005, the transaction data available in TRACE is 
representative of approximately 99 percent of trades equaling 95 percent of the market 
value. Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu (2009) and Ederington, Guan and Yang 
(2012) document that studies using daily bond transaction data from TRACE offer more 
accurate inference due to the increased specification and power of test statistics. In this 
paper, I calculate daily abnormal standardized bond returns (ABSR) for the window 
spanning from one day before to one day after a new debt offering announcement. The 
power of typical event study statistics is diminished because of the substantial 
heteroskedasticity caused by term-to-maturity, rating and other bond characteristics. 
Standardizing bond returns by their time-series standard deviations leads to more 
powerful tests since it helps address the heteroskedasticity concerns in bond returns. In 
robustness checks, I find qualitatively similar results using the three-day cumulative 
abnormal bond return to measure bond market reactions. 
An investigation of bondholder wealth effects in bond offerings provides a new 
perspective into the creditor wealth effects associated with changes in a firm’s capital 
structure.
9
 Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008) find that firms actively manage 
leverage ratios through debt policy rather than equity policy.
10
 An offering of new 
                                                 
8
 See SEC Release No. 34-49920; File No. SR-NASD-2004-094. The trades of the Rule 144a market, 
which is still opaque, are not included in this figure. 
9
 The wealth effects of new debt offering announcements on existing bondholders or stockholders could 
also be due to the deviation from the optimal capital structure (the best debt-to-equity ratio). Bondholders 
and stockholders may experience positive (negative) returns if a firm’s capital structure is closer to (more 
deviated from) the optimal level after the new debt issuance. I also examine this alternative explanation in 
the paper. 
10
 Leary and Roberts (2005) and Hovakimian (2006) also suggest that capital structure rebalancing plays 
a vital role in a firm’s debt policy. 
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bonds increases a firm’s leverage ratio.11 Previous literature finds that stock market 
reactions are positively correlated with the change in a firm’s leverage ratio. For 
instance, the empirical finance literature documents positive stock price responses to 
stock repurchase announcements and negative responses to seasoned equity offerings 
(SEOs).
12
 Evidence on the bond market’s response to the change in leverage is mixed. 
Dann (1981) finds no bond market reaction while Maxwell and Stephens (2003) find 
negative excess bond returns surrounding the announcement of stock repurchases. For 
SEOs announcements, Kalay and Shimrat (1987) document negative bond market 
reactions but Elliot, Prevost and Rao (2009) find positive returns to bondholders. 
However, evidence on the relationship between the bond market’s responses and the 
change in a firm’s leverage ratio caused by bond offerings is limited. My evidence 
shows that, existing bondholders react negatively while stockholders react positively to 
the increase in the leverage caused by new debt offerings.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 2 describes the data and gives details about 
the empirical method utilized to estimate abnormal bond standardized returns. Section 3 
presents my empirical results, and Section 4 concludes the paper. 
 
 
                                                 
11
 My untabulated descriptive statistics suggest that the average firm’s financial leverage increases 
significantly at the fiscal year of the new bond offerings. The average (median) increase in leverage ratio 
after the issuance in my sample is 15.78% (6.94%) and statistically significant at the level of 0.01. 
12
 For stock repurchases, see Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1995), Ikenberry, 
Lakonishok, and Vermaelan (1995), and Stephens and Weisbach (1998). Eckbo and Masulis (1995) 
provide a survey on SEOs studies and document an average of -3% common stock returns are associated 
with SEOs.  
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1. Literature and Hypotheses Development 
 1.1. Effects of New Bond Offerings on Existing Bond and Stock Market Returns 
The Merton model provides some insight into how new bond offerings should 
influence stocks and existing bond prices differently. Throughout the following 
equations (1) to (8), and (15) to (20), I make the following assumptions:
13
 1) each firm 
issues a single new bond, 2) each firm has only a single class of existing bonds (zero-
coupon bonds) and non-dividend paying stocks, 3) the new and existing bonds have the 
same seniority and maturity, 4) no additional investments, no new debt offerings or 
bond redemptions occur between time t (t=0 when a firm issues a new debt) and T 
(existing debts’ maturity), 5) a firm’s asset risk, σ, is unchanged by the new bond issue 
and 6) newly raised funds are used for expansions. Represent the time T values of the 
assets of the firm, the debt, and the equity as AT, VT, and ET. D is the face value of the 
firm’s debt maturing at time T. The value of the debt and stock at time T will depend on 
the value of the firm’s assets AT. Stockholders are the legal owner of the firm and 
bondholders are the creditor of the firm. In order to possess the firm’s assets, 
stockholders must pay bondholders D at time T. If AT>D, stockholders will pay D to the 
bondholders and they own the remaining assets: AT-D>0. However, if AT<D, 
stockholders cannot fully pay off the debt. Stockholders would give up the ownership 
by declaring bankruptcy and permit the bondholders to own the assets. Therefore, a 
firm’s equity can be considered as a call option on the assets of the firm. The value of 
the equity at time T, ET, is 
ET=max (0, AT-D)                                                                                         (1) 
                                                 
13
 Other needed assumptions can be found in Merton (1974). 
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max (0, AT-D) is the time T payoff on a call with strike D and underlying AT so 
time 0 value of equity can be modeled as call:  
E0=Call0 (Strike=D, Underlying= AT)                                                          (2) 
Suppose the number of shares is a constant C between time 0 and T. The stock 
value per share is Ps0=E0/C=Call0/C. Since a firm’s value is equal to the sum of equity 
and debt value, the value of the debt at time T, VT, is 
 VT=AT-ET= AT-max (0, AT-D)                                                                     (3) 
If the firm is solvent, i.e., if AT>=D, the bondholders receive D. If the firm is 
bankrupt, i.e., if AT<D, the bondholders receive AT. The expression can also be written 
as: 
VT=D- max (0, D- AT)                                                                                   (4) 
max (0, D-AT) is the time T payoff on a put with strike D and underlying AT. So 
the payoff on the firm’s bond is equivalent to a default-risk-free loan plus a short 
position in a put option on the assets of the firm.
14
 Therefore, the debt value on the new 
debt issuance date, V0, can be calculated as:
15
 
       V0=A0-E0= De
-rT
-Put0 (Strike=D, Underlying= AT)                                      (5) 
The bond value per bond with face value $1,000 at time 0 is: 
          Pb0= V0/D = [(De
-rT
-Put0)/D] ×1000                                                            (6) 
                                                 
14
 It can also be expressed as the payoff of a bond is equivalent to the payoff of the assets of the firm plus 
a short position in a call option on the assets of the firm. 
15
 Put-call parity: s(t)-c(t)= ke
-rT
-p(t). s(t) is the spot price of the underlying asset at time t; c(t) is the 
value of the call at time t. p(t) is the value of the put at time t; and ke
-rT
 is the present value of a zero-
coupon bond with a face value of k maturing at time T. 
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             When a firm issues a new bond, the firm’s asset and debt values both 
increase.
16
 However, they pose different effects on bondholders’ interests. The 
protection of existing debts may be enhanced since the newly raised funds, whether or 
not they are used for new investment, implicitly provide an additional asset guarantee 
for the existing debts. On the other hand, newly issued debt results in an increase of the 
firm’s debt level, and thus leads to increased default risks to existing debts. Therefore, 
the impact of new bond offerings on stock (F0) and bond prices (L0) at time 0 will 
depend on changes in both asset (A0) and total debt level (D). The reason that asset 
(A0) impacts call option value is due to the increase in debt (D), so it is an indirect 
influence of debt on the call option value through A0. Using the Merton model, I am 
able to document that a new debt offering impacts a firm’s stock and bond prices 
differently: 
 (8)                                            since  ,0
)()(1000
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            Proofs can be seen in Appendix A
 
           Therefore, the wealth transfer hypothesis posits a positive stockholder reaction 
and a negative bondholder reaction to announcements of new bond offerings.
17
 In 
                                                 
16
 This may not be the case when a firm intends to use the newly raised funds for stock repurchases where 
a firm’s debts increase but assets do not, or refinancing current debt where neither assets nor debts rise. 
17
 These predictions are based on the assumption that the intended use of newly borrowed funds is 
expansions. In my following analysis, I show that the wealth transfer hypothesis also predicts that an 
intended use of newly raised funds for stock repurchases is associated with negative bond returns and 
positive stock returns. In contrast, negligible bond and stock market reactions to new debt offering 
announcements are expected when the newly raised funds are used to refinance existing debt. On average, 
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addition, the wealth transfer hypothesis predicts that the sum of changes in equity and 
existing debt values is zero when a pure wealth transfer from existing bondholders to 
stockholders occurs.
18
 
Miller and Rock (1985) assume that managers convey information to markets 
through their financing decisions. Specifically, in their model, a firm’s decision to raise 
external capital conveys information to the market that current cash flows are lower 
than expected. As a result, with no distinction among different financing sources, a 
negative market reaction for both existing debt and equity would be expected. 
Consistent with the equity half of expectation, Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) 
document a significant negative long-term stock market response at the announcement 
of new straight debt offerings and find that the underperformance is more severe in 
periods with high debt issue volume. They conclude that debt offerings, like stock 
offerings, signal that the firm is overvalued. Consequently, this theory predicts that 
bond and stock market participants will react negatively to firms’ new bond offerings, 
and that bond and stock market reactions should be positively correlated. While both the 
wealth transfer and negative signaling hypotheses predict a negative bond market 
response to a new bond offering, their predictions for the stock market differ as 
summarized in Panel A of Table 1. 
                                                                                                                                               
new debt offering announcements will be associated with negative abnormal bond returns and positive 
abnormal stock returns for different intended uses of newly raised funds. Accordingly, the prediction of 
the wealth transfer hypothesis in the first row, Panel A of Table 1 can be viewed as the universal sample. 
18
 Taking derivatives of equation (2) with respect to D (A0 is also a function of D), yields the impact of 
new debt offering on existing stocks’ value (not per share): N(d1)- e
-rT
N(d2)>0 since N(d2)< N(d1).Taking 
derivatives of equation (5) with respect to D, I obtain the impact of new debt offering on a firm’s debt 
value (including new and existing debts), not per bond value, is 1- N(d1)+ e
-rT
N(d2)>0 provided that 
N(d1)<1. Since the new bonds will sell for their value, new bonds’ value will equal the change in firm 
assets and the impact on a firm’s new debt value should equal 1. Therefore, the impact of new debt 
offering on existing debt value is 1- N(d1)+ e
-rT
N(d2)-1=e
-rT
N(d2)-N(d1)<0 since 0<N(d2)< N(d1). 
Consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis, changes in equity and existing debt values are negatively 
correlated and the sum of the changes is 0. The proofs are upon request.  
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In the Ross (1977) model, managers of good firms distinguish their firms from 
bad firms by issuing debt since the issuance of debt signals that their firms’ expected 
future cash flows can cover the debt repayment. On the other hand, an issue of new debt 
is costly for bad firms’ managers to follow since the bankruptcy penalty will be 
imposed on managers when firms cannot repay the new debt when it expires. 
Additionally, Jensen (1986) suggests that firms with more free cash flow choose to 
maintain a high leverage ratio as a credible pre-commitment to pay out the excess cash, 
thereby reducing the possibility of wasting cash to meet their own interests. Debt 
commits a firm to pay out cash which also prevents managers from investing in 
negative net present value projects. Downes and Heinkel (1982) show that more 
valuable firms use greater amounts of debt financing. Leland and Pyle (1977) also 
conclude that a firm’s value and debt level are positively correlated. Managers hold a 
large fraction of equity in an effort to signal the good quality of their firms, and thus 
prefer to issue more debt to retain their large ownership stake in the firm.  Graham and 
Harvey’s (2001) survey finds that “managers attempt to time interest rates by issuing 
debt when they feel that market interest rates are particularly low.” Barry, Mann, 
Mihov, and Rodriguez (2008) show that firms issue more debt when interest rates are 
low relative to historical rates. Accordingly, a new debt issuance could also signal a 
lowering cost of capital which will benefit both existing bondholders and stockholders. 
 
1.2. Effects of Bond Offerings on the Price of Multiple Debt Classes 
Extant stock market studies on bond offerings lump all bonds together since 
equity is subordinated to all bonds. However, the wealth implications can differ for 
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senior and subordinated debts in a bond market event study.  If the new debt is 
subordinated and the existing is senior, then the wealth transfer hypothesis would imply 
a positive reaction since the new issue increases the quantity of assets available to 
service the existing senior debt.  If the new debt is senior, then the reaction of the firm’s 
subordinated debt should be stronger than the reaction of its existing senior debt 
according to the wealth transfer hypothesis. To verify this argument, I use the Merton 
model to examine the impact of new debt offerings on the value of multiple debt 
classes. Throughout the following equations (9) to (14), I make the following 
assumptions: 1) each firm issues a single new bond, 2) there are two debt tranches: 
senior and junior debts in a firm with the same maturity and their face values are Ds and 
Dj, respectively, 3) the new debt and two existing debts mature at the same time, 4) no 
additional investments, no new debt offerings or bond redemptions occur between time 
t (t=0 when a firm issues a new debt) and T (existing debts’ maturity), 5) a firm’s asset 
risk, σ, is unchanged by the new bond issue, and 6) newly raised funds are used for 
expansions. I refer to values of the two tranches as senior Vbs and junior Vbj, 
respectively. By definition, senior debt has priority in the event of bankruptcy (and 
hence, is less risky) since junior bondholders are paid only after the claims of senior 
bondholders are satisfied in full. Senior bondholders are the first to be paid at maturity 
T. Represent the time T value of the firm’s assets as AT If AT<Ds, stockholders would 
declare bankruptcy, permitting the bondholders to own the firm’s assets. Senior 
bondholders will receive AT. If AT>Ds, senior bondholders will receive Ds. Thus, the 
total senior debt value at maturity T, VbsT, can be expressed as: 
VbsT= AT-max (0, AT-Ds)=Ds-max(0, Ds-AT)                       (9) 
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max(0, Ds-AT) is the time T payoff on a put with strike Ds and underlying AT so 
time 0 value of senior debt, Vbs0, can be modeled as: 
Vbs0= Dse
-rT 
- Put0 (Strike=Ds, Underlying= AT)                 (10) 
              From the expression, a firm’s senior debt value is equal to the value of a risk-
free debt plus a short position in a put on the firm’s asset AT with strike Ds at time 0. 
The senior bond value per bond with face value of $1,000 is: Pbs0= (Vbs0/ Ds) ×1000.   
Junior bondholders are the next to be paid. If AT< Ds, senior bondholders 
receive AT but junior bondholders receive 0 since AT-Ds<0. If AT>Ds, and AT< Ds+Dj, 
stockholders would still declare bankruptcy, allowing the senior and junior bondholders 
to possess the assets, and junior bondholders receive the amount of the assets less the 
payment to senior bondholders, or AT-Ds>0. If AT>Ds+Dj, stockholders will pay off 
senior bondholders Ds and junior bondholders Dj in order to possess the firm’s assets. 
Thus, the total junior debt value at maturity T, VbjT, is given by: 
VbjT=max (0, AT- Ds)-max(0, AT- Ds- Dj)                         (11) 
max(0, AT- Ds) is the time T payoff on a call with strike AT and underlying Ds so 
time 0 value of junior debt, Vbj0, can be modeled as: 
Vbj0=Call0 (Strike=Ds, Underlying= AT)-Call0 (Strike= Ds+Dj, Underlying= AT)    (12) 
Junior bondholders own a call option permitting them to buy the firm at time 0 
for Ds, and have written a call option permitting the stock holders to buy the firm for 
Ds+Dj. The junior bond value per bond with face value of $1,000 at time 0 is: Pbj0= (Vbj0 
/ Dj) ×1000 
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When the new bond is subordinated to existing bonds, the newly issued bonds 
will increase a firm’s asset value but not affect senior debt’s principal value. Therefore, 
the impact of new debt offerings on existing bond prices is: 
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Proofs can be seen in Appendix A. 
When the new bond has the same seniority as existing bonds, the newly issued 
bonds will influence both asset value and debt principal value. Let us assume that all 
bonds are senior bonds, given that a majority of debt offerings in my sample are senior 
debt issuances. The proof is the same as the general case equation (8), and existing bond 
prices will go down. 
When the new bond is senior to existing bonds, existing bonds become 
subordinated to the new bond. In addition to the change in asset value, the offering also 
causes the principal value of senior debt in equation (11) to change.
19
 Therefore, the 
impact of new debt offerings on existing bond prices is:
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             Proofs can be seen in Appendix A. 
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 When the intended use of newly borrowed funds is stock repurchases, a firm’s asset value will not 
change. Accordingly, the value of equation (13) will be zero and equation (14) will become:  
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 Smith and Warner (1979) predict that the issuance of debt with higher priority will expropriate wealth 
from current bondholders. 
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When a new bond has a shorter maturity than existing bonds, then the existing 
bonds effectively become subordinated to the new bond. This subordination effect, 
since the new bond will be redeemed before existing bonds, is expected to lead to a 
negative wealth effect at the offering announcement for existing bonds. This is 
hypothesized to be comparable to firms issuing a new bond senior to existing bonds. In 
equation (14), I find that the impact of the issuance of a more senior bond on existing 
bonds’ values is negative. I hypothesize a comparable negative effect when a bond with 
shorter maturity is issued. When a new bond has the same maturity as existing bonds, 
the impact of new bond offerings on existing bonds is negative as modeled in equation 
(8). When a new bond has a longer maturity than the existing bonds, the existing bonds 
effectively become senior to the new bond. This valuable seniority effect should help to 
reduce existing bondholders’ losses. Existing bond prices should still go down, given 
the average effect of bond offerings depicted in equation (8).  However, the decreasing 
level of bond prices should be smaller in the situation when a new bond's maturity is 
longer than existing bonds’ maturities.  
Implications of the signaling hypotheses for the relation between issue maturity 
and bond price reactions are less clear. On one hand, choosing a shorter maturity may 
indicate that the issuer is able to repay the newly issued debt in a short period of time, 
which would be a more positive signal. On the other hand, if an announcement of newly 
issued bonds signals a pessimistic future for the firm, the negative implication might be 
stronger for longer maturity existing bonds. I summarize the predicted signs of the 
relationship between relative variables and bond market reactions surrounding the debt 
issue in Panel B of Table 1. 
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1.3. Debt Maturity, and Debt Credit Ratings Relationships 
Previous studies find that the bond market response to corporate events may 
vary with the maturities of bonds and rating of bonds. Billett, King and Mauer (2004) 
show that in mergers and acquisitions, target firms’ bonds experience larger positive 
returns when the target bonds have a shorter maturity than do acquirer bonds.  They also 
find that target bonds earn greater positive returns when the target’s bond rating is 
below the acquirer’s, which is consistent with co-insurance benefits on target bonds. No 
evidence has been provided on how bond returns vary due to bond credit ratings and 
maturities surrounding debt offering announcements. This study will fill this gap. I 
intend to examine how stock and bond returns vary in relation to existing bonds’ 
maturities and credit ratings, which can provide more insight into which theory best 
explains stock and bond returns surrounding bond offering announcements. For 
instance, as shown below, the wealth transfer hypothesis predicts that firms’ existing 
debt maturity should be negatively related to bond market reactions but positively 
related to stock market reactions.  In contrast, the negative signaling hypothesis predicts 
firms’ existing debt maturity should be negatively related to both bond and stock market 
reactions. Based on the Merton model as expressed in equations (7) and (8), I derive the 
following predictions for the wealth transfer hypothesis:
21
  
                                                 
21
 Taking derivatives of equations (7) and (8) with respect to the asset risk, σ, yields the relationship 
between a firm’s asset volatility and the impact of new bond offerings on stock (F0) and bond (L0) prices 
(Proofs can be seen in  Appendix A.): 
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Taking derivatives of equations (7) and (8) with respect to time to maturity, T, 
yields the relationship between existing bonds maturities and the impact of new bond 
offerings on stock (F0) and bond (L0) prices: 
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Proofs can be seen in Appendix A. 
The negative (positive) signaling hypothesis predicts a pessimistic (prosperous) 
future for the firm. Accordingly, this hypothesis would imply that longer maturity bonds 
could suffer (benefit) more than shorter maturity bonds if the increased (decreased) 
default risk is more detrimental (beneficial) for bonds maturing further out in time.
23
 
Lower rated bonds that may not be secured or have a lower priority claim over assets 
                                                 
22
 The assumption of ln (A0/D)>(r+σ
2
/2)T holds in my sample. I use my empirical data to check the 
validity. D (A0) is measured as a firm’s total long-term debt outstanding (asset) at the preceding fiscal 
year of the announcement. I use 3-month Treasury bill interest rate at the announcement month to proxy 
for the risk-free interest rate r. Asset risk, σ2 , is the standard deviation of unlevered stock returns (std. 
dev.), which is estimated using daily stock returns over the window -240 to -40 prior to the event date. 
Unlevered returns are computed by multiplying the stock returns by (1 − Leverage), where Leverage is 
the ratio of the book value of total debt to the sum of the book value of total debt and market value of 
equity at the end of the corresponding fiscal year.  A firm’s debt maturity, T, is defined as the weighted 
average of the existing bonds’ maturities, using the principal of each existing bond relative to the total 
debt outstanding as weights. Then I calculate the difference between the value of ln (A0/D) and (r+σ
2
/2)T. 
In my sample, only 8 out of 859 debt offerings have negative differences. 
23
 Merton (1974) suggests that long-term bonds are riskier than short-term bonds. 
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and their returns surrounding the new debt issue should be impacted more strongly by 
lower (higher) future earnings prospects. Consistent with this, Hite and Warga (1997), 
Plummer and Tse (1999), Billet, King and Mauer (2004), Downing, Underwood and 
Xing (2009), Elliott, Prevost and Rao (2009), Easton, Monahan and Vasvari (2009), and 
May (2010) find that bond market reactions are stronger for lower rated bonds than for 
higher rated bonds surrounding various corporate events.
24
 Consequently, the negative 
(positive) signaling hypothesis would predict that the negative (positive) reaction to 
bondholders should be stronger for longer maturity bonds, and lower rated bonds. The 
wealth transfer hypothesis draws the same implication. However, the difference 
between these two hypotheses lies in their predictions about stock market reactions. The 
negative signaling hypothesis also predicts a negative effect on stock prices while the 
wealth transfer hypothesis predicts a positive effect. According to the negative signaling 
hypothesis, any factor that negatively impacts bond prices will negatively influence 
stock prices. In direct contrast, the wealth transfer hypothesis predicts that any factor 
that is detrimental to bondholders will have a favorable effect on stockholders. The 
above model implications in equations (15) and (16) support this prediction. I 
summarize the predictions of the above competing hypotheses concerning the signs of 
relevant variables in Panels B of Table 1. 
 
                                                 
24
 Hite and Warga (1997) and May (2010) study the bond market reactions surrounding bond credit rating 
changes. Billet, King and Mauer (2004) study the bond market responses to the announcement of mergers 
and acquisitions. Elliott, Prevost and Rao (2009) investigate bond price changes to seasoned equity 
offerings.  Plummer and Tse (1999), and Easton, Monahan and Vasvari (2009) examine how earnings 
announcements influence bond market prices. Downing, Underwood and Xing (2009) conduct an 
intraday analysis of bond returns to changes in treasury returns. 
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1.4. The Intended Uses of Newly Raised Funds and Security Market Reactions 
surrounding New Debt Offering Announcements 
My paper also contributes to the literature by examining how security market 
price reactions to new debt offering announcements vary according to the intended use 
of these newly raised funds. Previous sections and equations assume that firms use 
newly raised funds for expansions. In this section, I extend the study by investigating 
how existing security prices change as a function of two other intended uses: stock 
repurchases and debt refinancing. A wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders 
may arise when firms use newly raised funds to fund share repurchases. Existing studies 
regarding the wealth transfer hypothesis of repurchase announcements offer mixed 
evidence. Dann (1981) finds no evidence of wealth transfer surrounding stock 
repurchases. Using a large sample of firms, Maxwell and Stephens (2003) document 
negative abnormal bond returns and positive abnormal stock returns around the 
announcement of share repurchases. Stock repurchases distribute cash to stockholders, 
and thus reduce the cash available to service debt.  If this reduction is significant, 
bonds’ default risks should increase and a wealth transfer from bondholders to 
shareholders should ensue. In addition, if stock repurchases are financed through the 
issuance of new debt, wealth transfers become increasingly more likely. Firms may 
issue new debt merely to refinance existing debt.  Since proceeds from this type of issue 
are substituting existing debt dollar-for-dollar, refinancing current debt does not create 
or destroy value to firms compared to the intended uses of expansions or stock 
repurchases. Accordingly, the refinancing uses should have a negligible wealth impact 
on a firm’s existing securities. 
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Collecting debt offering announcement information from Factiva, I identify 
firms’ intended uses of newly raised funds. In section 1.1, the stock value per share is 
expressed as Ps0=E0/C=Call0 (Strike=D, Underlying= AT)/C, and the bond value per 
bond with face value $1,000 at time 0 is Pb0= [(De
-rT
-Put0 (Strike=D, Underlying= 
AT))/D] ×1000. The Merton model yields implications for how a firm’s intention to use 
newly borrowed funds impacts outstanding bond and stock prices: 
1). When a company plans to use the newly raised money to buy back stock, 
debt (D) increases but assets (A0) do not. In addition, the firm’s amount of outstanding 
stock (C) is expected to decrease after the repurchase. Taking derivatives of Ps0 with 
respect to D, yields the relationship between the intended use of newly raised funds for 
stock repurchases and the change in stock prices. Holding a firm’s total stock market 
value constant, the negative relationship between stock prices and shares outstanding 
implies a reduction in the quantity of stock outstanding and an accompanying positive 
effect on stock prices.  Suppose, p represents the stock price at the time of stock 
repurchases. Therefore, 
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             Taking derivatives of Pb0 with respect to D, yields the relationship between the 
intended use of newly raised funds for stock repurchases and the change in bond prices:
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              Proofs can be seen in Appendix A
 2). A firm’s intention to use the borrowed funds for expansions leads to 
increases in both assets (A0) and debt (D). Taking derivatives of Ps0 (Pb0) with respect to 
D yields the relationship between the intended use of newly raised funds for expansions 
and the change in stock (bond) prices. The derivatives are the same as the predictions in 
equations (7) and (8).
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 3). In the case of debt refinancing uses, neither assets (A0) nor debt (D) rises. 
Accordingly, the derivative of Ps0 (Pb0) with respect to D is 0. 
By comparing the relative magnitude of the above equations, I can predict the 
relative size of bond and stock market reactions for firms’ different intended uses of 
funds surrounding a debt offering announcement. Specifically, taking the difference 
between equations (19) and (7) yields the relative magnitude of stock market reactions 
for the use of stock repurchases versus expansions: 
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Taking the difference between equations (20) and (8), yields the relative 
magnitude of bond market reactions for the use of stock repurchases versus expansions: 
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Accordingly, the wealth transfer hypothesis predicts bond and stock market 
reactions to be strongest when the intended use is a stock repurchase and weakest when 
the intended use is to refinance existing debt. 
The empirical finance literature finds that investors tend to view the 
announcement of stock repurchases favorably.
25
 Accordingly, the positive signaling 
hypothesis predicts that both bond and stock prices should increase when a firm intends 
to use the newly borrowed money to buy back stocks. If a firm’s security investors view 
the expansion uses of bond proceeds as unwise (negative signals), the investors will 
react negatively to the expansion use announcements. The intended use of debt 
refinancing may signal that a firm cannot refinance its expiring debt internally, and thus 
both bond and stock prices should experience negative returns around the 
announcement. However, signaling hypotheses do not predict the relative size of bond 
and stock market reactions for firms’ different intended uses of funds surrounding a 
debt offering announcement. I summarize predictions regarding the sign of the 
relationship between firms’ intended use of newly raised funds and security market 
reactions surrounding the new bond issue in Panel C of Table 1. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
I collect straight debt offerings made by public firms between January 1, 2005 
and December 31, 2011 from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) Global New 
Issues database. Bond price data are gathered from the Trade Reporting and 
                                                 
25
 Positive abnormal stock returns surrounding the announcement of stock repurchases are well 
documented in the literature. For example, Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), Comment and Jarrell (1995), 
Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelan (1995), and Stephens and Weisbach (1998). 
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Compliance Engine (TRACE), which provides comprehensive coverage of bond trades 
beginning in February 2005.
26
 I require that: 1) stock price data be available from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), 2) bond price data be available on 
TRACE, 3) firm accounting information be available from the Compustat Fundamentals 
Annual dataset, and 4) bond-specific information be obtainable from the Mergent Fixed 
Income Security Database (FISD). My final sample consists of 1,356 debt offerings, 
which (since 352 offerings involve multiple debt issuances on the same announcement 
day) yields 859 firm-level debt offerings.
27
  For multiple debt offerings issued by the 
same firm on the same day, I calculate an average maturity, rating and seniority level as 
the weighted average of each component offering’s maturity, rating and seniority level 
in these cases, where the component weights are the proceeds of each bond issuance 
relative to  total offering proceeds.
28
 
 
2.1. Identification of Announcement Dates of Straight Debt Offerings 
Prior studies of straight debt offerings use various sources to identify  debt 
offering announcement dates as there is no one universal dataset that provides reliable 
date information.
29
 I use four datasets to verify the first announcement date of new debt 
                                                 
26
 TRACE began providing bond transaction data for AAA, AA, A, BBB bonds with issue size greater 
than $1 billion in July 2002. Since that time, data pertaining to other grades of bonds have been 
disseminated. TRACE’s dissemination of bond transactions in the OTC market was not comprehensive 
until 2005.   
27
 In untabulated results, I exclude 26 firm-level debt offerings issued by utility firms (SIC codes 4900-
4999) and 12 offerings issued by financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999). The results are qualitatively 
similar to results reported in the paper. 
28
 As a robustness test, I find consistent results when treating each firm’s multiple debt offerings as 
independent debt offerings. However, this method likely results in high correlation between returns of 
bonds issued by the same firm, which would inflate t-statistics of estimated coefficients. 
29
 Dann and Mikkelson (1984), Eckbo (1986) and Mikkelson and Partch (1986) use the earliest date of the 
issuances reported in the Wall Street Journal as the debt offering announcement date. Kolodny and Suhler 
(1988) define the announcement date as one day before the announcement appearing in the Wall Street 
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offerings: SDC, FISD, Bloomberg and Factiva. SDC and FISD report the new debt 
issue date, while Bloomberg reports what it calls the “announcement date”. I match 
sample observations from SDC with Bloomberg, using each debt offering’s 9-digit 
CUSIP, coupon payment, and the principal value.
30
 After merging these datasets, I find 
that most SDC and FISD issue dates, also known as offering dates, are equivalent to the 
Bloomberg “announcement date”.  Apparently, Bloomberg uses the issuance date as its 
“announcement date”.  Since it is possible that the firm publicly announced the offering 
prior to the actual offering, I use Factiva to identify the first announcement date for new 
debt offerings. In the window from one month before to one month after the date of a 
new debt issue date (collected from SDC), I manually check the following dates using 
Factiva: 1) the first time the company or its underwriter announced the new bond issue; 
2) the rating agencies’ press release date; and 3) the first time the announcement is 
released on Reuters.  
SDC issuance dates and Factiva announcement dates coincide for 686 firm-level 
debt offering observations. Factiva announcement dates fall earlier than the SDC 
issuance dates for 120 of the observations of which 63 of the observations are only one 
trading day before the announcement date. 52 firm-level debt offering announcement 
                                                                                                                                               
Journal. Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit (1997) define the announcement date as the filing date in the 
Securities and Exchange Commission's Registered Offerings Statistics file and Moody’s Bond Survey. 
Dutordoir and Hodrick (2012) identify the debt offering announcement date as the earliest of the filing 
date reported in SDC and the date at which the issuance is first mentioned in Factiva. 
30
 One concern with using the FISD and Bloomberg databases is that these two datasets only report the 
number of current total outstanding, not the historical issuance volume. Therefore, I rely on SDC for 
identifying each new bond’s principal values, and for new bond ratings. 
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dates cannot be identified using Factiva, and therefore the issue date in SDC is used as 
the debt offering announcement date.
31
  
 In most cases, bond issues are preceded by a registration and in many cases a 
firm files a registration for multiple debts and then issues at different times over 
following years.
32
 For example, the debts AT&T issued on August 28, 2007, December 
3, 2007 and January 29, 2008 were all covered by the registration filed on May 23, 
2007. On average the difference between the SEC filing dates and Factiva 
announcement dates is 478 calendar days.  
 
2.2. Descriptive Statistics  
Since new debt offering announcements may be accompanied  by other 
important company specific news and I wish to measure the impact of the debt offering 
announcement only, I use Factiva to search for other company specific news during the 
three-day event window, from one day before the announcement through one day 
following the announcement. If the news published in this period includes information 
that can be considered as contaminating the announcement, I record it as contaminated. 
Contaminating news pertains to informational items such as quarterly earnings, 
dividend declarations, mergers or acquisitions, equity offerings and stock repurchases. 
The Factiva search reveals that 193 firm-level debt offering announcements are 
                                                 
31
 For the one case in which the Factiva announcement date appears later than the SDC issuance date, I 
employ the SDC issuance date.   
32
 Before a firm issues debt, it needs to file a Form S-3ASR (Form S-3 registration under the Securities 
Act of 1933). Most S-3ASR files only indicate that the firm may issue debt or other securities but do not 
give details about the number and type of debt that a firm will sell. The date at which a firm files the form 
on SEC is the filing date reported in the SDC. When a firm decides to issue the number and type of debt, 
the firm will submit a prospectus supplement: FWP (Free Writing Prospectus). The date at which a firm 
submits the FWP to the SEC is the issue date in SDC. Form S-3ASR and FWP are downloadable from 
the EDGAR in SEC: http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html. 
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“contaminated” by companies’ other relevant news. Consistent with Dutordoir and 
Hodrick (2012) finding that a majority of contaminated straight debt and equity offering 
announcements are combined with earnings disclosures, 97 of my contaminated 
announcements are accompanied by quarterly earnings disclosures. After eliminating 
contaminated observations, the uncontaminated sample includes 1,044 debt offering 
announcements at the issue level that represent 666 debt offering announcements at the 
firm level. Below, I report results for both the total and uncontaminated samples. 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the number of new bond offerings at the issue and 
firm levels per sample year. At the issue level, the number of new debt offerings 
increases from 92 in 2005 to 249 in 2011.  In particular, the number of debt offerings 
has increased significantly since the global financial crisis in 2008. This is likely due to 
the low interest rates in effect since the financial crisis which likely enticed companies 
to borrow record amounts in the bond market.
33
 Panel B presents descriptive statistics 
on the new debt offerings and issuing firms. The average issuance size at the firm-level 
is $ 1,112 million. The average ratio of issuance size to total assets is 0.06, while the 
average ratio of issuance size to total long-term debt outstanding is 0.28. On average, 
the new bond’s maturity is three years longer than the existing debt’s maturity. The 
median rating for the new bonds is BBB or Baa. There is no significant difference in 
credit ratings between the new and existing bonds.  
Using hand-collected data regarding new bond offering announcements from 
Factiva, I identify firms’ intended uses of newly raised funds. 8% of new debt offerings 
                                                 
33
 See, for example, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703377504575650514192556880.html. 
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are used to fund debt incurred by stock repurchases, 14% are used for expansions,
34
 and 
31% are used for debt refinancing. An intended use is identified as unclear if the news 
announcement lists multiple possible intended uses or otherwise does not clearly 
specify a single intended use. Debt offerings with unclear intended uses account for 
47% of the total debt offerings. Firms in my sample tend to be large, consistent with the 
notion that publicly-traded debts are issued by large corporations. The 859 firm-level 
bond offerings affect 3,738 existing bonds. Firms are more likely to issue new debt with 
the same seniority as their existing debt, as evidenced by only 3.67% of existing debt 
having a different debt priority than new debt offerings. 2.84% of the existing bonds are 
subordinated to new bonds, and only 0.83% of the existing bonds are senior to new 
bonds. The ratio of outstanding bonds having a shorter maturity than newly issued 
bonds is 67.92%. 
 
2.3. Abnormal Standardized Bond and Stock Returns 
Measuring abnormal bond returns presents several challenges which are either 
not present, or less serious, in stock market event studies.  Most notably, bonds trade 
much less frequently; indeed on the average day, the average bond does not trade.   
Second, firms generally have only one class of common equity but may have multiple 
bonds which must be combined into a single firm-bond return.  Third, prices on long-
term and low rated bonds are much more sensitive or volatile than prices on short-term 
and high rated bonds so there is considerable heteroskedasticity.  The heteroskedasticity 
                                                 
34
 For example, on March 20, 2006, Home Depot Inc. issued $4 billion of debt to finance its acquisition 
of Hughes Supply Inc., a distributor of construction, repair and maintenance products. Another example 
is, on October 24, 2007, the wireless phone company America Movil sold $1 billion of long-term bonds 
to use the proceeds to upgrade their networks to third-generation technology, expanding its network in 
Brazil, and switching its Puerto Rico network to GSM from CDMA technology. 
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in bond returns is likely much more severe than for stocks since individual bonds’ 
characteristics, such as term-to-maturity, credit ratings and liquidity, vary  and prices 
are much more volatile on low rated, long maturity, and illiquid bonds than on high 
rated, short maturity, and liquid bonds. Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012) find 
dramatic improvement in the power of tests when this heteroskedasticity is corrected by 
standardizing bond returns by time-series standard deviations, based on returns 50 days 
before and after the event.  Consequently, I measure firm-bond returns following the 
procedures outlined in Bessembinder et al. (2009) and Ederington et al. (2012).  
Following Bessembinder et al. (2009), and Ederington et al. (2012), I restrict my 
sample to industrial, non-convertible, non-putable, and non-zero coupon bonds. In 
addition, I require that bonds: 1) be denominated in US dollars; 2) have a par value of 
$1,000, 3) make semi-annual coupon payments, 4) mature in 50 years or less and 
greater than one year, 5) be rated by Moody’s and/or S&P, and 6) neither be in default 
nor have a tender offer outstanding.  For bond transactions data in TRACE, I restrict my 
sample to bonds traded at least 100 times and that have two-day returns available at 
least 10 times over the 2005-2011 period.
35
 Using the bond transactions data from 
TRACE, average daily bond prices are calculated with the “trade-weighted price”, 
where the trades are weighted by the square root of trade size.
36
  Raw returns on each 
individual bond (RR (-1, +1)) are equal to the change in the logarithmic price on day 
t+1 relative to the price on day t-1: 
                                                 
35
 More requirements on bond transactions data can be seen in Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). 
36
 I use the clean price, which is reported in TRACE, to compute bond returns in equation (23). A bond 
buyer pays the “dirty” price which is the clean price plus accrued interest since the last coupon date, so 
the dirty price reflects what the bond buyer pays and receives. However, the dirty price tends to decrease 
by the amount of the coupon payment on the coupon payment date, and thus bond raw returns calculated 
utilizing the dirty price tend to be large and negative on the date of the coupon payment. 
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)ln()ln( 11   tt PP1) 1,RR(                                                                         (23) 
where Pt-1 indicates the daily “trade-weighted price” of the bond on day t-1.  
Standardizing each RR(-1,+1)  by its estimated standard deviation over the (-25,+25) 
period σi yields the standardized raw return, SRR(-1, +1)= RR(-1,+1)/σi.
37
 Normally, 
default risk (proxied by bond ratings) and time to maturity are two of the most salient 
risk factors considered in estimating abnormal bond returns. Thus, portfolios matched 
by bond rating and time to maturities are used to proxy for the expected return on the 
bond in the absence of the new offering. Following Ederington et al. (2012), I partition 
bonds into 24 benchmark portfolios by six Moody’s rating classifications (Aaa and Aa, 
A, Baa, Ba, B, and below B) and four maturity classes (1 to 3 years, 3+ to 5 years, 5+ to 
10 years, and over 10 years).
38
 For each benchmark portfolio on the same day, a 
standardized benchmark return, SBM (-1, +1), is calculated by dividing a benchmark 
portfolio return, BM (-1, +1), by the standard deviation of the benchmark portfolio 
return over the (-25, +25) period. Consequently, abnormal standardized bond returns, 
ABSR (-1, +1) are defined by first calculating standardized raw returns, SRR (-1, +1), 
recalculating a standardized rating-maturity benchmark SBM (-1,+1) and finally 
computing the abnormal standardized return as  
ABSR(-1,+1) = SRR(-1,+1) - SBM(-1,+1)                                                                (24) 
For multiple bond issues by the same firm, firm bond returns are computed as 
equally weighted averages of the abnormal standardized bond returns. A firm’s 
                                                 
37
 Specifically, the standard deviation of three-day returns for bond n around day t from t-25 to t+25 
excluding returns across event day t is used. At least six return observations over the 50-day period 
should be available. 
38
 To be able to calculate the benchmark return for each group, Ederington et al. (2012) require that at 
least five bonds be traded in each rating/maturity group on day t-1 and t+1. 
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unstandardized abnormal returns tend to be dominated by its most volatile bonds. 
Averaging standardized returns effectively puts more weight on the firm’s less volatile 
bonds.  Expanded event windows are also used in the paper. Ederington et al. (2012) 
find much more powerful tests and an improvement of the representativeness of the 
sample using an expanded window. For instance, within the (-3,+3) window, it is 
possible to compute abnormal returns over several windows, including t-3 to t+3, t-3 to 
t+2, t-3 to t+1, t-2 to t+3, t-2 to t+2, t-2 to t+1, t-1 to t+3, t-1 to t+2, and t-1 to t+1. 
Composite returns, ABSR{-3,+3} and ABSR {-5, +5}, are averages of all ABSR from 
day -3 to +3 and day -5 to +5 respectively, are also used to investigate the bond market 
reaction to the announcement of new debt offerings. Composite ABSRs afford more 
powerful tests both because there are more observations (since bonds may not trade on 
days -1 and/or +1) and because single days’ prices contain considerable noise.  
Bessembinder et al. (2009) find that non-parametric test statistics (signed-rank test for 
median value) are better specified and more powerful than parametric test statistics (t-
test for mean value) in detecting corporate events influencing bonds equally. 
Additionally, mean returns reflect the aggregate experience of investors. Therefore, it is 
important to investigate both parametric and non-parametric tests when examining bond 
market reactions to corporate events. Accordingly, I present both parametric and non-
parametric tests of existing bond returns surrounding new debt offering announcements.  
To detect the stock price response, standardized cumulative abnormal returns 
during the same event window stretching from day -1 to +1, SCAR (-1, +1), are 
computed as cumulative abnormal market adjusted returns, CAR(-1, +1), divided by the 
time series standard deviation of abnormal returns over the window (-300, -46) relative 
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to the announcement date σi, SCAR(-1,+1)=CAR(-1,+1)/σi
39
 I use value weighted 
market index to proxy for the market return. Event windows of stock price responses 
are also expanded to day -3 to +3 and day -5 to +5 to match corresponding bond return 
event windows.  
 
3. Empirical Results 
 3.1. Abnormal Standardized Bond and Stock Returns 
To test the three hypotheses outlined in Panel A of Table 1, Table 3 reports 
mean and median abnormal returns of existing bonds and stocks surrounding the 
announcement of new debt offerings.
40
 This calculation is carried out for three separate 
event windows ranging from 3 to 11 days in length, with the 11-day window capturing a 
total of 859 announcements of new debt offerings. Over a three-day event window in 
the total sample of Panel A, I find an abnormal standardized bond return of -0.16 
(median of -0.20) for existing bondholders where both the t-statistics and Wilcoxon 
sign-rank tests are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. I also find negative and 
statistically significant abnormal standardized bond returns when contaminated 
observations are excluded in the uncontaminated sample. Across the other event 
windows analyzed in Panel A, I consistently find that both the mean and median 
abnormal standardized bond returns are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. In Table 10 results of the total (uncontaminated) sample, the mean and median 
values of abnormal bond returns over the three-day event window are -28 (-25) and -25 
                                                 
39
 In unreported results, I use the time series standard deviation of abnormal returns over the window (-25, 
0) to standardize stock abnormal returns and find qualitatively similar results. 
40
 I also calculate abnormal standardized bond and stock returns surrounding new debt filing dates. In 
contrast with the significantly negative bond returns noted surrounding bond offering announcements, I 
do not find significant evidence of a bond (stock) market reaction to the filing announcement. 
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(-23) basis points, respectively. Both the mean and median values are statistically 
significant with p-values less than 0.01. 
Stock market standardized returns in Panel B of Table 3 are positive but not 
statistically significant over the three-day event window. When the event windows are 
broadened, the stock market returns are positive and become statistically significant. In 
the total and uncontaminated samples, the abnormal standardized stock return over the 
(-3, +3) window is positive and statistically significant at the 0.01 level for tests based 
on both mean (0.1027 and 0.0890) and median (0.0837 and 0.0707) values. The finding 
that existing bondholders experience negative abnormal returns surrounding new debt 
offering announcements while stockholders experience positive abnormal returns is 
consistent with the wealth transfer predictions by the Merton model. However, I do not 
find significant evidence of the negative correlation between stockholder gains and 
bondholder losses implied by the wealth transfer hypothesis in unreported results for 
both total and uncontaminated samples.
41
  
Panels A and B in Table 4 present abnormal standardized bond returns 
surrounding the following two groups of offerings: 1) offerings in which the new bonds 
are subordinated to existing bonds, and 2) offerings in which the new bonds are senior 
to existing bonds.
42
 Unfortunately, there are few observations where seniority differs 
                                                 
41
 Given that most firm news impacts stock and bond returns in the same direction, the correlation is 
likely positively biased. The correlation in the uncontaminated sample is more negative than the total 
sample but not statistically significant. 
42
 For each new debt offering, I compare the seniority of the new bond to the seniorities of all existing 
bonds.  As an example, suppose a firm issues a senior unsecured bond.  Further suppose that this 
company had five bonds outstanding prior to the issuance, two are senior secured bonds and the 
remaining three are junior bonds.  The abnormal bond standardized returns of the former two bonds 
would be reported in the “New < Existing” category and the latter three in the “New > Existing” category. 
Within each category, the firm’s abnormal returns to existing bonds are computed on an equal-weighted 
basis. I employ the same method when examining the abnormal bond returns based on the maturities of 
new and existing debt in Panels C and D. 
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which could limit the power of the tests. Consistent with the Merton model implication in 
equation (13), Panel A in Table 4 shows that the three-day event window is 
accompanied by positive and significant abnormal standardized bond returns when 
newly issued bonds are subordinated to existing bonds.  Also, as predicted by the 
Merton model, when newly issued bonds are senior to outstanding bonds, abnormal 
standardized bond returns are negative though insignificant. This difference in bond 
reactions over the event window (-1, +1) is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
based on both parametric and nonparametric tests.  Over the other event windows and in 
the uncontaminated sample in Panel B, the difference in bond price reactions when the 
new bond is senior to the existing and when it is subordinated has the predicted sign but 
is insignificant.  In summary, I find weak evidence that existing bonds react more 
positively when the new bond issue is subordinated to, and therefore increases the 
protection enjoyed by, existing bonds and more negatively when it is senior to, and thus 
decreases the protection enjoyed by, existing bonds. 
As discussed in section 1.2, even if new and existing bonds have the same 
priority, if the new bonds' maturity is shorter than the existing, they may have de facto 
seniority since they will be redeemed first. In Panels C and D of Table 4, I report 
abnormal standardized bond returns surrounding the following two groups of offerings: 
43
 1) offerings where the new bonds’ maturity is shorter than existing bonds, and 2) 
offerings where the new bonds’ maturity is longer than existing bonds. Across both 
groups of bonds, abnormal standardized bond returns over the three-day event window 
                                                 
43
 In unreported results, I partition the sample, where new bonds and existing bonds have the same 
seniority, into the same three groups and the results are qualitatively the same as reported in Panels C and 
D in Table 4. 
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are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. However, I find existing bonds 
experiencing more negative abnormal standardized returns surrounding the new debt 
issue when a new bond has a shorter maturity than existing bonds. When a new bond’s 
maturity is longer than existing bonds, the existing bond standardized returns are also 
significantly negative, but the returns are statistically less negative than offerings where 
a new bond’s maturity is shorter than existing bonds. In both total and uncontaminated 
samples, the mean (-0.13 and -0.13) and median (-0.16 and -0.16) of ABSR (-1, +1) are 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level for the group of new bonds having 
a longer maturity than existing bonds. For the group of new bonds with a shorter 
maturity than existing bonds, the mean (-0.37 and -0.36) and median (-0.33 and -0.32) 
are smaller and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. These findings are consistent 
with the theoretical implications of the Merton model in section 1.2, that bondholders 
suffer greater (smaller) losses in the situation when a new bond's maturity is shorter 
(longer) than existing bonds’ maturities.  
To test whether the reaction depends on the riskiness of the existing bonds, in 
Table 5, I stratify the sample by whether the existing bonds are rated investment or 
speculative grade.  Inconsistent with both the prediction of wealth transfer hypothesis 
and the existing literature, I find weak evidence that bonds rated investment grade 
(bond’s rating above Ba1 or BB+) suffer greater losses than speculative rated bonds 
surrounding a new debt issue. Over the three-day event window, investment-grade rated 
bonds experience significantly negative mean (median) abnormal standardized returns 
of -0.20 (-0.21). On the contrary, speculative rated bonds have small negative but 
insignificant mean (median) abnormal standardized returns of -0.06 (-0.13). The 
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difference in means of -0.14 is not significant but the difference in medians of -0.08 is 
marginally significant. In the uncontaminated sample, the difference in mean (median) 
bond returns between investment and speculative rating bonds across different event 
windows is not statistically significant.  
As discussed in section 1.4, security market price reactions to new bond offering 
announcements vary depending on the announced intended uses of newly raised funds. 
Using hand-collected media news reports regarding new bond offering announcements 
from Factiva, I identify firms’ intended uses of newly raised funds. As depicted in Panel 
B of Table 4, 47% of new debt offerings do not clearly specify a single intended use or 
list several potential intended uses. Panels A and B of Table 6 present announcement 
period evidence with regard to how the abnormal standardized returns to existing 
bondholders differ depending on the firm’s intended use of the newly borrowed funds. 
Consistent with the Merton model prediction and inconsistent with the signaling 
hypothesis, existing bonds experience an average (a median) standardized return of -
0.22 (-0.15) over a three-day event window in the total sample when the intended use of 
newly borrowed money is a stock repurchase.  Also consistent with the Merton model, 
the bond price reaction is negative when the firm intends to use the funds for an asset 
expansion.  However, inconsistent with the Merton model, the bond price reaction 
appears more negative when the funds are to be used for an expansion than when they 
are used to repurchase stock and there is a negative (though small) bond price reaction 
when the funds are to be used to refinance existing debt.  Panel A of Table 6 
demonstrates that a firm’s intention to use the funds for expansions is associated with a 
mean (median) standardized bond return of -0.32 (-0.44) on day -1 to +1 and the return 
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is significantly more negative than the bond return accompanying the announcement 
that the debt proceeds will be used to repurchase stock (column: (1)-(2)) or refinance 
debt (column (2)-(3)).  
While the relative sizes of the bond price reactions when the funds are to be 
used for expansions versus stock repurchases are inconsistent with the wealth transfer 
hypothesis and the negative reaction to bond issues for stock repurchase purposes is 
inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis, the results in Table 6 are what would be 
expected if both hypotheses hold.  As summarized in Panel C of Table 1, while the 
wealth transfer and signaling effects on bond prices tend to cancel out for bond issues 
used to repurchase stock, they tend to reinforce each other for bond issues associated 
with expansions.   Thus, the findings of a negative reaction for issues associated with 
both expansions and stock repurchases but larger negative reaction for bond issues 
associated with expansions is consistent with a wealth-transfer-signaling combination.
 44
    
Moreover the small negative reaction to bond issues used to refinance existing 
debt is what one would expect if the bond issue signals that the old bonds could not be 
retired from internal sources. Whereas the wealth transfer hypothesis predicts no bond 
market reaction to bond refinancings, the signaling hypothesis predicts negative bond 
market reactions when the newly borrowed money is to be used to refinance existing 
debt. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis, I observe in Panel A of Table 6 a mean 
(median) standardized return of -0.09 (-0.18) when a firm intends to use newly raised 
funds for debt refinancing. Additionally, both mean and median composite returns 
                                                 
44 
Maxwell and Stephens (2003) examine monthly bond and stock returns around the announcements of 
repurchase programs and find evidence consistent with both signaling and wealth transfer hypotheses.
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across the 7- and 11-day event windows in Panel A are negative and statistically 
significant at the 0.01 level. 
45
 
Panels C and D of Table 6 document abnormal standardized stock returns 
surrounding new debt issues, segmented by a firm’s different intended uses.  As with 
the bond price reactions, the relative stock price reactions, depending on whether the 
new funds are to be used to expand the firm or repurchase stock, are consistent with a 
combination of the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses.  Both hypotheses predict a 
positive stock price reaction when the funds are to be used for stock repurchases and the 
stock price reaction in Column (1) of Panels C and D is indeed large, positive, and 
significant in these cases.  Whereas the wealth transfer hypothesis also predicts a 
positive (though smaller) stock price reaction when the funds are to be used to expand 
the size of the firm, the signaling hypothesis predicts a negative reaction if it signals that 
the expansion could not be financed internally or if it signals management puts growth 
ahead of profits.  While the insignificant stock price reactions reported in Column (2) in 
this case are inconsistent with either hypothesis individually, they are consistent with a 
wealth-transfer-signaling combination.
46 
 
Somewhat surprising are the positive stock price reactions observed when the 
funds are to be used to refinance existing debt.  Since firm leverage and size are 
unchanged, the wealth transfer hypothesis implies no reaction.  The signaling 
hypothesis and bond price reaction results imply a negative stock price reaction but a 
small positive stock price reaction is observed.  Perhaps the fact that the firm issued 
                                                 
45 
Difference in seniority and maturity between newly issued bonds and existing bonds may also impact 
existing bond returns when the intended use of newly borrowed money is a debt refinancing, and thus I 
will control for the difference of seniority and maturity in the multiple regression analysis.
 
46 
Extant studies on stock returns surrounding merger and acquisitions announcements (see, for example, 
Billet, King and Mauer (2004)) find that stocks experience insignificantly positive returns. 
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bonds rather than stock for this refinancing signals that management feels the equity is 
undervalued.  
 
3.2. Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Bond and Stock Price 
Responses to Debt Offering Announcements 
Conclusions from univariate analysis may be tentative, as the results could be 
confounded by other factors such as a firm’s profitability or size and one cannot test 
which factors have incremental explanatory power. Accordingly, multivariate analyses 
are now used to further examine the hypotheses. I use composite returns during a seven-
day event window, ABSR {-3, +3}, as the dependent variable in the bond regressions. 
Extant studies of stock offerings use a two-day (or three-day) return surrounding the 
offering announcement date as dependent variable but to calculate a two-day event 
window return requires price observations on both days 0 and +1. For my sample period 
2005-2011, Ederington et al. (2012) shows that a mere 31.3% of two-day bond returns 
from day 0 to day +1 are actually calculable due to infrequent trading. Ederington et al. 
(2012) suggest using an expanded event window, such as from three days before the 
event through three days after.  This both increases the number of bond observations 
and the power of the tests, while not increasing the Type I error rate (i.e., the false 
rejection rate). In stock regression analyses, I use three-day standardized cumulative 
abnormal returns, SCAR (-1, +1) as the dependent variable. 
Some firms have multiple existing bond issues outstanding, as evidenced by an 
average (median) number of bonds per firm of 4.35 (3.00) in the sample. There are two 
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methods to deal with multiple bond outstanding issues.
47
 First, a few bond market event 
studies have considered each existing bond as an independent observation.
48
 Given the 
likely high correlation between returns of bonds issued by the same firm, this method 
likely inflates the t-statistics and more heavily weights firms with multiple outstanding 
issues in the sample. Second, each firm can be treated as a separate observation 
averaging together the returns on all the firm’s bonds. I treat each existing bond as a 
separate observation when examining how bond returns differ due to bond 
characteristics, such as existing bonds’ credit ratings and the difference of seniorities 
(maturities) between new bonds and existing bonds.
49
 To avoid underestimating the 
standard deviation associated with the potential correlation in bond returns within the 
same firm,
50
 I estimate the regressions using firm clustered residuals. When 
investigating how bond and stock returns surrounding new debt offering announcements 
vary due to debt offering and firm characteristics, I estimate regressions treating each 
firm as a separate observation. 
 I control for other factors that may influence the bond and stock market’s 
reaction to the announcement of a new bond issuance. All control variables (except high 
volume issues) discussed are measured in the fiscal year immediately preceding the new 
                                                 
47
 More discussions on the issues associated with these two methods can be seen in Eberhart and Siddique 
(2002). 
48
 These studies include Jayaraman and Shastri (1988), Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989), Hand, 
Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992), Warga and Welch (1993), and Cook and Easterwood (1994). 
49
 As discussed in section 1.2, a new debt offering could impact a firm’s senior and junior debt prices 
differently. When the new bond is subordinated to existing senior bonds, the existing senior bonds should 
experience a positive wealth effect surrounding the new debt offering announcement. In contrast, the new 
debt offering would pose negative wealth effects on existing junior bonds since the new debt has the same 
or higher seniority than the junior bonds. Moreover, an equal-weighted average of a firm’s senior and 
junior bond returns could indicate that the debt issuance causes no impact to a firm’s bond returns. This 
“null result” may also arise when computing the average of a firm’s abnormal event-window standardized 
returns based on existing bonds’ ratings and the maturities of new and existing debt. 
50
 As robustness tests, I re-estimate the regressions by treating each firm as a separate observation. The 
results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 7. 
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debt offering announcement year. Definitions of variables can be seen in Appendix B. 
The wealth effects of new debt offering announcements on existing bondholders and 
stockholders could be attributed to the deviation from the target capital structure 
(historical average book leverage in Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008)). 
Accordingly, both bondholders and stockholders would experience negative (positive) 
returns if a firm’s leverage ratio is more deviated from (closer to) a firm’s target 
leverage ratio after the new debt issuance. I use an indicator variable to denote whether 
a firm is overleveraged or not. I predict negative signs of coefficients for the 
overleveraged firms since both firms’ bondholders and stockholders would suffer losses 
surrounding new debt offering announcements when firms’ leverage ratios deviate from 
the target level.  
Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999) document more severe stock 
underperformance around the debt offering announcements in high-volume years. 
Following Spiess and Affleck-Graves (1999), I define high-volume issues as those 
occurring in a month in which the total number of issues is greater than or equal to the 
median number of issues each month in my sample period of January 2005 through 
December 2011.
51
 A firm’s decision to secure outstanding debt with tangible assets 
helps to reduce the potential that existing bondholders will suffer from an increase in 
default risk when additional debt is issued. This benefit to existing bondholders 
increases with the amount of tangible assets a firm holds. A higher effective tax rate 
reduces the amount of internal cash flow available to service the payment of interest and 
principal. Hence, I expect bondholders of a firm with a large effective tax rate to suffer 
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more due to increased default risk. Except for debt refinancings, a new debt issue 
increases the firm’s leverage and therefore the risk faced by bondholders. This impact 
likely depends on the firm’s growth opportunities. When additional debt is issued, 
bondholders’ claims in a profitable firm are more valuable than those in a less profitable 
firm. The profitability of a firm can serve as a signal that the firm is able to make timely 
payments of interest and principal. Therefore, bondholders of a profitable firm should 
suffer less when faced with greater default risk.  
In Table 4 and section 2.1, I found weak univariate evidence supporting the 
Merton model prediction that the reaction of existing debt prices is more positive when 
the new bonds are subordinated to the existing.  The difference in the ABSR (-1, +1) 
was significant at the 0.10 level but the ABSR (-3, +3) difference was not.  In Table 7, I 
find that after controlling for other factors, the ABSR (-3, +3) difference is also 
significant at the 0.10 level.
 52
 However, the difference becomes insignificant in Column 
(5) when contaminated offering announcements are eliminated. This could be due to the 
small number of cases in which the new bond is senior or subordinated to the existing 
bond as shown in Panel B of Table 4. 
Coefficients for most control variables are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that any possible confounding relationships are not a concern. Coefficients 
for the indicator variable of the overleveraged firms are not significantly different from 
zero. Coefficients for a firm’s tangibility ratio are negative and significant, but become 
insignificant when the dependent variable is ABSR (-1, +1) in unreported regression 
results. In contrast to the expectation that a large firm’s bondholders should suffer 
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dependent variable. 
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smaller losses surrounding the new debt issuance, the large firm’s existing bondholders 
actually seem to experience more negative returns. The coefficients for a firm’s size are 
negative and statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
The finding of Table 4 that the bond price reaction is more negative when the 
new bonds mature before the existing bonds (thus giving the new bonds de facto 
seniority) is reconfirmed after controlling for other factors. Column (2) of Table 7 
shows that the difference of ABSR {-3, +3} surrounding the new debt issue when the 
new bonds’ maturity is shorter than existing bonds’ maturity and when the new bonds’ 
maturity is longer than existing bonds’ maturity is statistically significant at the 0.01 
level.
53
 These findings suggest that a debt offering could negatively impact existing 
bondholders due to asset claim dilution, as their claims on the firm’s assets become 
subordinated to those of the new bondholders and leads to greater losses to existing 
bondholders. 
To examine the incremental effects of the difference of maturity and seniority on 
existing bond returns, Columns (3) and (7) present regression results when considering 
both the difference of maturity and seniority between new and existing bonds in the 
regressions.  The sign and significance level of coefficients on the indicator variables 
for the difference of maturity and seniority are qualitatively similar to the regressions 
considering the impact of the difference of maturity or seniority alone. Therefore, both 
the differences of maturity and seniority have explanatory power on existing bond 
returns surrounding new bond offering announcements. However, the difference of 
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New<Existing indicates the significance of the difference of abnormal standardized bond returns between 
a group of bonds when the new bonds’ maturity is shorter than existing bonds’ maturity and when the 
new bonds’ maturity is longer than existing bonds’ maturity. 
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maturity between new and existing bonds seems more important than the difference of 
seniority in explaining existing bond returns, as evidenced by the more significant 
coefficients on the indicator variables for the difference of maturity than the difference 
of seniority. This could be due to the greater number of cases in which new and existing 
bonds have different maturities than new and existing bonds have different seniorities, 
as depicted in Table 4. 
In Table 7, I incorporate a binary variable, “investment”, which assumes a value 
of 1 if an existing bond’s rating belongs to an investment grade rated category and is 0 
otherwise. In contrast to the wealth transfer hypothesis prediction as summarized in 
Panel B of Table 1, coefficients on the investment grade rating indicator variables in 
Table 7 are negative and not significantly different from zero controlling for other 
factors. This result is consistent with the univariate results reported in Table 5, where 
the difference in abnormal standardized bond returns between investment and 
speculative rated bonds is insignificant. However, bond maturity, defined as the 
logarithm of a firm’s existing bonds’ maturity, is another important dimension of bond 
default risk.   The coefficients for existing bonds’ maturities in Columns (4) and (8) of 
Table 7 are negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This evidence 
suggests that existing bondholders’ losses surrounding the issuance of new debt are 
positively related to bond maturities. In particular, a longer maturity indicates greater 
risk relative to a shorter maturity, and thus existing holders of long-term debt suffer 
greater losses surrounding new debt offering announcements. 
Table 8 presents firm-level regression results on how the bond and stock market 
reactions depend on the intended uses of newly raised funds controlling for other 
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factors. Consistent with the univariate results in Panels A and B of Table 6, the bond 
price reaction appears strongest (but not significantly different in most cases) when the 
funds are used for expansion controlling for other factors. This is inconsistent with the 
wealth hypothesis alone but consistent with a combination of wealth transfer and 
signaling hypotheses. Results in bond specifications show that coefficients for 
expansion use are more negative than the coefficients for stock repurchases or debt 
refinancing use, but the differences of estimated coefficients for different intended uses 
are not significant according to the F-tests in the bottom rows. 
In Panels C and D of Table 6, I found strongest stock market reactions for 
intended use of newly borrowed funds for stock repurchases, and negligible stock 
market reactions when a firm uses the funds to expand the firm. These findings are 
inconsistent with either hypothesis individually, but are consistent with a wealth-
transfer-signaling combination. Consistent with the univariate finding, the stock price 
reaction is strongest when funds are used for stock repurchases, and not significantly 
different from zero when funds are used for expansions controlling for other factors in 
Columns (3) and (4). 
For firms with long-term existing bonds, abnormal standardized bond returns are 
more negative and statistically significant, as depicted in Columns (2) and (6), while 
abnormal standardized stock returns are more positive and statistically significant, as 
shown in Columns (4) and (8). This is consistent with a greater expropriation of wealth 
from existing bondholders to existing stockholders for firms with longer-term existing 
bonds.  
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In Table 9, I re-estimate the models from Tables 7 and 8 using the three-day 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR (-1, +1)) as the dependent variable in Panels A and 
B. I calculate daily bond prices from the TRACE transaction data using the “trade-
weighted price, all trades” method established in Bessembinder et al. (2009). Following 
Bessembinder et al. (2009), I use a matching portfolio approach to compute abnormal 
bond returns by subtracting the return of a value-weighted index of matched corporate 
bonds. The results reported in Table 9 pertain only to the sub-sample of uncontaminated 
observations. The results are consistent with the previous finding that bond market 
announcement returns are more positive when the newly issued bonds are subordinated 
to the outstanding bonds, as evident by  the positive and significant (p-value of 0.03) 
difference in bond CAR (-1, +1) in Column (1) of Table 9. Column (2) of Panel A 
provides further support of the finding that the reaction of existing debt prices is more 
negative when the new bonds mature prior to existing bonds. As expected I find 
evidence that existing long-term bondholders experience more negative abnormal bond 
returns surrounding the new debt issue, as supported by the negative and statistically 
significant coefficients for existing bond’s maturity in Column (4). Panel B supports the 
finding from Table 8 for the differences of bond and stock market reactions for various 
intended uses. However, the significance level of difference is marginally diminished, 
which could be attributable to the heteroskedasticity in bond abnormal returns within 
the same firm. 
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4. Conclusions 
Given the increasing importance and significance of debt in capital markets, the 
impact of new debt offerings on existing bondholders is particularly intriguing. There is 
a large existing body of literature studying how stock prices react to new bond issues, 
but empirical research on the impact of new debt offering announcements on existing 
bondholders yields inconclusive results, which can be attributed to difficulties 
associated with obtaining bond price data. In addition, no prior studies have examined 
how the bond price reactions depend on characteristics of the old and new bond issues.  
An investigation of the impact of issuing new debt on existing bondholders can also 
help answer whether and, if so, how existing creditors react to this increase in the 
leverage. My paper helps to fill these gaps. 
I employ comprehensive daily corporate bond data from TRACE to estimate 
daily abnormal standardized bond returns surrounding the new debt offering 
announcements. Using the Merton model, I am able to derive and test several 
hypotheses concerning the relationship between a firm’s security price changes and new 
debt offerings. Using a sample of 1,356 new debt issuance announcements made by 
firms with both bond and stock transactions data, I examine the wealth transfer 
hypothesis along with both the negative and positive signaling hypotheses. Most of my 
results are more consistent with the wealth transfer hypothesis than the signaling 
hypotheses though some suggest a signaling effect as well. 
I also investigate the various factors that might impact relative wealth changes 
for bondholders and stockholders. The evidence indicates that bondholder losses are a 
function of the dilution in asset claims, existing debts’ default risk, and the potential 
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uses of newly raised funds. Specifically, I find more negative abnormal standardized 
bond returns: 1) when the new bond is senior to the existing bonds, 2) when the newly 
issued bonds’ maturity is shorter than the existing bonds’ maturity (which confers 
defacto seniority on the new bonds), 3) for longer-term outstanding bonds, and 4) when 
managers intend to use the newly raised funds for expansions. Consistent with a 
combination of wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses, I find a greater negative bond 
market reaction and a negligible stock market reaction to new debt offering 
announcements when the intended use of newly borrowed money is expansions than 
when it will be used to repurchase stock or refinance old debt.  
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Chapter 3: The Wealth Effects of Dividend Announcements on 
Bondholders: New Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Markets 
 
“Sixteen of the banks have now repaid TARP. Most are eager to resume paying 
dividends and have asked permission to do so from the Federal Reserve. … Preventing 
profitable banks from paying reasonable dividends impedes bank lending and economic 
growth. It tilts the balance away from the issuance of new capital towards a slow-
growth approach.” William Isaac, chairman of LECG Global Financial Services and a 
former chairman of the US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Financial Times, 
February 9, 2011.
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“But this too seems to call for dividend preservation for those firms vulnerable to 
systemic stress (rather than based on their Basel risk-weighted assets).” Viral Acharya, 
NYU Stern on February 14, 2011.
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“A dollar paid out to shareholders through either dividends or share repurchases is a 
dollar that would not be accessible to creditors in a situation of financial distress. For 
this reason, and to prevent the shifting of value from debt holders to equity holders, debt 
covenants typically restrict dividend payments when leverage is high.” Anat R. Admati, 
Eugene F. Fama and others. Financial Times, February 15, 2011.
56
  
 
The statements above represent two opposite views about dividend policies of 
banks that received government bailout money in 2008. To raise new capital later, 
William Isaac argues that firms need to pay out dividends now. Put another way, firms 
need to issue dividends to signal firms’ profitability or attract stockholders so that firms 
can have more fresh capital injection in the future.  However, this could seriously harm 
creditors’ interest in turbulent periods when firms do not have sound capital. As 
acknowledged in the third statement, the wealth transfer from bondholders to 
stockholders in the form of dividends is perceived unfavorably during times of financial 
crisis, especially when the firm is highly levered. There has been limited evidence on 
the issue of whether issuing dividends will harm bondholders’ interest or to what extent 
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dividend policy will hurt creditors. My study fills this gap and adds to the current 
literature on the wealth effect of corporate events on both bondholders and 
stockholders. 
Dividend policy can lead to conflicts of interest between shareholders and 
bondholders. Increases in dividends indicate lower cash to service debt and cuts in 
dividends suggest that management is conserving cash, indicating potential wealth 
transfer between bondholders and stockholders. An investigation of the effect of 
dividend announcements on bondholders and shareholders can yield a more complete 
picture of the wealth effect of dividend announcements. Many prior studies show that 
unexpected dividend increases lead to wealth transfer from bondholders to stockholders 
if the incremental part is financed issuing new debt or sacrificing promising investment 
opportunities.
57
 Therefore, unexpected dividend increases would increase the default 
risk on bonds and a loss to bondholders should occur. So an announcement of increased 
dividends will be associated with negative bond returns. On the other hand, 
stockholders will benefit from the increased dividend payments. Evidence in prior 
studies suggests that an announcement of increased dividends is associated with 
significant abnormal positive stock returns.  
Dividends can serve as a signal for firms’ future cash flow. Miller and 
Modigliani (1961) were the first to suggest that dividends contain information about the 
firm’s cash flow in the future. Accordingly, researchers developed the hypothesis of 
signaling - that dividend increases signal that management is confident that future 
earnings will be strong enough to continue paying the higher dividends in the future 
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Kalay (1979, 1983), Myers (1977), and Smith and Warner (1979).  
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while dividend cuts signal that management expects lower earnings in the future. 
Therefore, an announcement of increased (decreased) dividends serves as a positive 
(negative) signal for a firm’s future earnings which should have a positive (negative) 
effect on both bondholders and stockholders. Thus the signaling hypothesis predicts a 
positive (negative) bond price response to the announcement of a dividend increase 
(decrease) while the wealth transfer hypothesis implies a negative (positive) response.  
There has been a large body of literature examining the effect of dividend 
announcements on stocks. Evidence suggests that dividend increases (decreases) are 
associated with significant positive (negative) stock price responses. However, evidence 
on the impact of dividend change announcements on bondholders is mixed. Three 
papers have tried to examine the wealth transfer versus signaling hypotheses of 
dividend announcements but provide mixed evidence. Woolridge (1983) and 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) provide evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis. 
On the contrary, Dhillon and Johnson (1994) find evidence for the wealth transfer 
hypothesis. The mixed evidence in these papers can be attributed to historical 
deficiencies in the quality and availability of bond price data. Since these researchers 
collected data by hand, their sample sizes tended to be small and include only heavily 
traded bonds. Moreover, these studies employ data on bond trades from the NYSE, 
which is a small, odd-lot market marked by infrequent trading. On the other hand, the 
corporate bond market is institutional in nature by trading over-the-counter (OTC). In 
addition, the aforementioned studies tend to use large event windows in the order of a 
month or a week, which can be attributed to a lack of frequently traded daily bond data. 
Using monthly returns relative to daily returns, particularly in small samples, can lead 
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to the weaker power of tests (Brown and Warner, 1985; Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell 
and Xu, 2009). In this paper, I employ comprehensive data on the over-the-counter 
bond transactions to calculate daily abnormal bond returns surrounding an 
announcement of dividend changes. In a large sample of dividend change 
announcements during July 2002 to December 2010, I find a positive and statistically 
significant bond market response to dividend increases and a negative and statistically 
significant bond market response to dividend omissions over a three-day event window. 
These findings support the signaling hypothesis that has been used to explain stock 
price responses to dividend changes. Additionally, I find insignificant bond market and 
significantly negative (positive) stock market reactions to announcements of dividend 
decreases (initiations) over the three-day event window. This is inconsistent with the 
signaling hypothesis alone but consistent with a combination of signaling and wealth 
transfer hypotheses. As hypothesized above, while the signaling and wealth transfer 
effects on bond prices tend to cancel out, they tend to reinforce each other on stock 
price reactions surrounding dividend decreases and initiations announcements.  
I also provide evidence on the determinants of the effect of signaling on bond 
returns surrounding a dividend increases announcement. A larger percentage dividend 
increase signals a more prosperous future for bondholders, thus bondholder gains are 
positively correlated with the magnitude of dividend increases. The signaling 
hypothesis predicts that riskier bonds should benefit more from events that decrease a 
firm’s default risk. Consistent with this prediction, I find that speculative rated 
bondholders experience more positive returns surrounding the dividend increases 
announcement than investment rated bondholders. Consistent with the view that 
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dividend signaling can be more convincing in turbulent periods, like the 2008 financial 
crisis, bonds experience greater positive returns after 2008. Furthermore, I find more 
positive returns for financially non-distressed firm bondholders on the announcement of 
a dividend increase, which is consistent with the prediction that positive signaling 
should be more apparent for financially good firms. 
Lastly, my study contributes to the literature on bond price reactions to dividend 
announcements employing the over-the-counter bond transaction data from the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). By the end of January 2005, the 
transaction data in TRACE, which accounts for 99 percent of trades equaling 95 percent 
of market value, were published in 15 minutes.
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 According to Bessembinder, Kahle, 
Maxwell and Xu (2009), prior studies using monthly data from the Lehman Brothers 
Bond Database (LBBD) or collecting daily bond data from The Wall Street Journal 
could offer an opposite inference due to misspecification and the lower power of test 
statistics that have been used in bond event studies. I find that, for both dividend 
increases and decreases announcements, abnormal returns within a period of (+2, +30) 
are negative and statically significant. The response to decreases is about two times 
larger in magnitude than that to increases. This is opposite to the findings in the three-
day even window surrounding the dividend change announcement. These results 
support Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu (2009)’s finding that monthly bond 
event studies can lead to an opposite implication. Researchers should be wary when 
using monthly bond returns in event studies, especially when concurrent corporate 
events can cause a bias in abnormal returns. 
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The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 provides a brief 
review of the related literature and develops my hypotheses. Section 2 describes the 
data and method. Sections 3 and 4 report univariate and multiple analysis of the bond 
price responses to dividend change announcements. Section 5 presents robustness 
checks of my findings. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
 1. Literature and Hypotheses Development 
Using non-TRACE data, researchers have investigated various corporate 
announcements, such as stock offerings (Eberhart and Siddique, 2002; Elliott, Prevost, 
and Rao, 2009), spin-offs (Maxwell and Rao, 2003), share repurchases (Maxwell and 
Stephens, 2003), and mergers and acquisitions announcements (Billet, King, and 
Mauer, 2004), where the implications are different for equity and bonds. Among bond 
datasets that have been used in these studies, Lehman Brothers Bond Database (LBBD) 
is the most widely used. It provides a complete set of month-end bond data. However, 
there are two problems about the dataset. First, the price is the monthly bid price which 
is not the true transaction price. Second, the interval of the data is monthly. Dividend 
increases (decreases) tend to be announced when the firm is operating well (poorly). 
Compared to daily returns, monthly returns could be a result of confounding firm-
specific news other than dividend announcements. Given the impracticality of deleting 
dividend announcements that are contaminated with non-dividend news during a month 
long window, calculations of monthly returns can be overstated. Additionally, the 
standard deviation of bond returns becomes inaccurate due to the noise added by 
confounding events. Therefore, the inferences from analyses of monthly returns around 
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dividend changes are unclear in terms of the magnitude and statistical interpretation of 
bond market responses. To have a clear inference, it is better to conduct daily event 
studies using bond transaction data from TRACE. 
Recent evidence finds that some corporate events lead to significant wealth 
transfers between bondholders and stockholders, i.e. Maxwell and Rao (2003) for spin-
offs; Adams and Mansi (2009) for CEO turnover; but systematic evidence on dividend 
announcements has not been provided. The signaling hypothesis argues that increases 
(cuts) in dividends will lead to an increase (decrease) in bond prices because paying 
dividends can signal firms’ future profitability.59 On the other hand, the wealth transfer 
hypothesis predicts that increases (cuts) in dividends will lead to a decrease (increase) 
in bond prices. In this paper, I examine these two hypotheses by detecting bond price 
reactions to dividend announcements.  
According to the signaling hypothesis, an unexpected increase in dividend 
payments signals a more prosperous future, leading to an increase in bond and stock 
prices. Therefore, dividend announcements should pose a similar effect on bondholders 
and shareholders.  Positive (Negative) abnormal bond returns should be observed 
surrounding the announcements of increased (decreased) dividends. It leads to the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  An announcement of an increase (decrease) in dividends will lead to an 
increase (decrease) in bond prices. 
In contrast to the signaling hypothesis, the wealth transfer hypothesis argues that 
an increase in stock dividend payments reduces the cash flow available to meet bond 
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principal and interest payments. If the reduction is significant, it could increase the 
probability of default on bonds. Therefore, dividend payments cause conflicts of interest 
between bondholders and stockholders. This hypothesis predicts a negative relation 
between bondholders’ and shareholders’ reaction to dividend announcements. 
Specifically, an announcement of increased (decreased) dividends should be followed 
by a positive (negative) response in stock markets but a negative (positive) response in 
bond markets. It leads to the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: An announcement of an increase (decrease) in dividends will lead to a 
decrease (increase) in bond prices. 
My study also contributes to understanding the determinants of bond market 
response to dividend announcements. Previous studies have found that the bond market 
response to corporate events could vary with the level of leverage, rating of bonds, and 
maturities of bonds. Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) find that bondholders’ losses are 
positively correlated with a firm’s financial leverage. Maxwell and Rao (2003) study 
the bondholders’ wealth effects surrounding spin-offs and find that a bondholder’s loss 
is correlated with the size of the spin-offs and risk of the parent firm (investment grade 
versus noninvestment-grade rating). Maxwell and Stephens (2003) find that the loss of 
bondholders surrounding stock repurchases is a function of the size of the repurchase 
and the rating of the firm’s debt. Billett, King and Mauer (2004) show that in mergers 
and acquisitions, target bonds experience higher positive returns when the target bonds 
have a shorter maturity than the acquirer bonds. The relation between bond prices 
changes and ratings of bonds can depend on whether dividends increase or decrease. 
For instance, when the signaling hypothesis holds and dividends increase (decrease), it 
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predicts a prosperous (pessimistic) future of a firm. Accordingly, riskier bonds (junior 
bonds or speculative bonds or longer maturity bonds or firms with higher financial 
leverage ratio) should benefit (suffer) more than other bonds (senior bonds or 
investment bonds or shorter maturity bonds or firms with lower financial leverage 
ratio). The reason is that decreases (increases) in the default risks of riskier bonds are 
much larger than for other bonds. Therefore, riskier bonds will react positively 
(negatively) and larger (smaller) than other bonds surrounding an announcement of 
dividend increases (decreases). On the other hand, the sign of bond market reaction will 
change when the wealth transfer hypothesis holds and dividends increase (decrease). 
Riskier bonds will suffer (benefit) more than other bonds. Increases (decreases) in the 
default risks of riskier bonds are much larger than other bonds. Therefore, riskier bonds 
will react negatively (positively) and smaller (larger) than other bonds. Consequently, I 
develop the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 3: When the signaling hypothesis (hypothesis 1) holds and dividends 
increase (decrease), bond market returns surrounding dividend announcements will be 
negatively (positively) correlated with bond seniority, negatively (positively) correlated 
with bond ratings, positively (negatively) correlated with bonds maturities, and 
positively (negatively) correlated with firms’ financial leverage. 
Hypothesis 4: When the wealth transfer hypothesis (hypothesis 2) holds and dividends 
increase (decrease), bond market returns surrounding dividend announcements will be 
positively (negatively) correlated with bond seniority, positively (negatively) correlated 
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with bond ratings, negatively (positively) correlated with bonds maturities, and 
negatively (positively) correlated with firms’ financial leverage. 
 
 2. Data and Methodology 
 2.1. Data 
Following studies on dividend announcements, dividend announcements data 
are collected from the CRSP monthly event file. The event date of a dividend 
announcement is the declaration date recorded in CRSP. Dividend changes are 
calculated as the percentage difference in dividend payments between the current and 
previous periods. To be included in the sample, a dividend announcement must satisfy 
the following criteria:
60
 
 a)  The firm’s bond data are available on the TRACE during the event windows. 
 b)  The firm pays a taxable cash dividend in U.S dollars in the current and 
previous periods. 
 c)  The shares on which the distributions are paid are ordinary common shares 
and are not shares of closed-end funds or REIT’S (Real Estate Investment Trusts). 
 d)  Announcements with a declaration date within four days before the ending 
of the earnings record month are excluded. 
The period of dividend announcements data in my sample ranges from July 
2002 to December 2010. The Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) 
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provides specific information about bond characteristics like seniority, rating, accrued 
interest, and maturities. Stock returns and firms’ accounting information are drawn from 
CRSP and Compustat, respectively. The above sample selection criteria results in a 
sample of 1,508 observations: 272 dividend decreases and 1,236 dividend increases.  
Tables 10 and 11 provide descriptive statistics on the firm-level and bond-level 
characteristics of the sample. TRACE only provides comprehensive coverage of bond 
markets beginning in 2005. Therefore, I observe that there are fewer dividend 
announcements in earlier years. A large number of dividend decreases occurred in 2008 
and 2009. Regarding the dividend per share, dividend increase firms pay a higher 
dividend than dividend decrease firms. For 2007, I see a decline in the magnitude of 
dividend per share and this trend continues until 2010. These two findings reflect the 
recent economic recession and financial crisis. On the other hand, the largest number of 
dividend increases happened in 2010, which indicates an economic recovery during that 
year. In Panel A of Table 10, I find more announcements of dividend increases than 
dividend decreases. The ∆DIV column reports the percentage change in dividend per 
share compared to the previous period. In total, the dividend change has a mean of 32 
percent for dividend increases and -47 percent for dividend decreases. I do not find a 
significant difference in the leverage ratio between dividend decrease and dividend 
increase firms. In my sample, there are fewer financially non-distressed firms in the 
dividend decreases group than that in the dividend increases group. Panel A reflects that 
the mean financially non-distressed dummy is 21 percent for dividend decreases and 30 
percent for dividend increases, which reflects that firms suffering financial distress are 
more likely to cut back on their dividend payments. In the dividend decreases group, I 
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see a much smaller number of financially non-distressed or unconstrained firms from 
2007 to 2008. Meanwhile, I observe the opposite direction in the dividend increases 
group, where there is a higher percentage of financially non-distressed and 
unconstrained firms in the sample.  
In addition to the firm-level statistics, I also report the bond-level summary 
characteristics in Table 11. Similar to Table 10, there are fewer bonds included in 
earlier years of my sample period. Firms that cut dividend payments pay a slightly 
higher coupon rate than firms that raise dividend payments, which reflects the 
difference in bond ratings between these two groups. Dividend decrease firms have a 
lower bond rating than dividend increase firms. Panel A indicates that the mean bond 
rating is A3 (A or A2) for bonds impacted by dividend decreases (increases) 
announcements. Bonds in the dividend decreases group have shorter remaining 
maturities than that in the dividend increases group. The mean maturities are 7.00 and 
7.59 years, respectively. Most bonds in the sample are investment grade bonds or senior 
bonds. However, dividend increase bonds are more likely to receive an investment 
grade rating or be senior to dividend decrease bonds. Specifically, the percentage of 
investment grade (secured or senior) bonds is 92 (95) percent for dividend increases and 
85 (87) percent for dividend decreases. The above findings lead me to conclude that 
dividend increase bonds are better than dividend decrease bonds, because they have 
better bond ratings, lower interest rates, and are more likely to be investment grade or 
senior bonds. I find a significant decline in bond ratings for the dividend decreases 
group from 2008 to 2010. However, I do not find a significant change in the bond 
ratings of the dividend increases group during the same period. This asymmetric pattern 
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reflects the fact that bonds are more likely to be downgraded when negative events (e.g. 
dividend decreases) occur to a firm in turbulent periods (e.g. a financial crisis). 
 
2.2. Abnormal Bond Return Measures 
Following Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu (2009), I restrict my sample 
to non-convertible, non-putable, and non-zero coupon bonds. In addition, I require that 
bonds: 1) be denominated in US dollars; 2) have a par value of $1,000, 3) make semi-
annual coupon payments, 4) mature in 50 years or less and greater than one year, 5) be 
rated by Moody’s and/or S&P, and 6) neither be in default nor have a tender offer 
outstanding.  Compared to the stock market, the bond market is less liquid, which 
makes estimating daily abnormal bond returns more challenging than stock returns. To 
deal with the illiquidity, I require a bond to trade on at least 10 days during Day -1 to -
20, which is the same as the one employed by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu 
(2009). As suggested by Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu (2009), I use a 
matching portfolio approach to compute abnormal bond returns by subtracting the 
return of a value-weighted index of matched corporate bonds. Using the bond 
transaction data from TRACE, daily bond prices are calculated with the “trade-weighted 
price, all trades” method. Daily raw returns on individual bond issues (RRt) are equal to 
the change in price plus accrued interest over the previous day’s price divided by the 
previous day’s price: 
(1)                                                                
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Where AIt is accrued interest on Day t and P indicates the daily price of the bond.
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Normally, default risk (proxied by bond rating) and time to maturities are two of the 
most salient risk factors considered in estimating bond returns. Thus portfolios matched 
by bond rating and time to maturities are used to proxy for expected return for the bond. 
I use the entire TRACE (excluding bonds that issued dividends in the period Day t-30 to 
Day t+30) universe to construct the matched corporate bond indices. I partition bonds 
by seven letter classifications based on Moody’s ratings. If bonds are unrated by 
Moody, I use S&P’s ratings of the bonds. The seven letter classifications are: Aaa, Aa, 
A, Baa, Ba, B and C. To control for the risk associated with maturity, I group the Aaa, 
Aa, A, B, and Ba classes into long and short maturity categories. Following May 
(2010), I choose the following cutoffs to guarantee that there is approximately the same 
amount of bonds within each category. For the Aaa, Baa, and Ba classes, the two 
categories are maturities less than seven years and seven years and above. For the A and 
B classes, the two categories are less than six years and six years and above. For the Aa 
class, the two categories are less than five years and five years and above. Given the 
much smaller number of traded bonds in the C class, this class is not further partitioned. 
Therefore, bond returns on a value-weighted index of matched portfolios, which are 
constructed using the ratings and maturities, are denoted as MRt. To be included in a 
given index on Day t, a bond should be traded on Day t and Day t-1. The abnormal 
bond return on Day t (ABRt) is computed as the bond raw return (RRt), less the 
contemporaneous return of matched portfolios (MRt):  
)2(                                                                  ttt MRRRABR   
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 AI is calculated as annual coupon payment multiplied by n, the number of calendar days during the 
event window, and divided by 365. 
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For multiple bond issues by the same firm, I calculate abnormal returns 
weighting the principal value of each bond. Therefore, the abnormal bond performance 
for firm i on Day t is calculated as: 
(3)                                                                
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Where k is the number of bonds issued by the same firm and ω is the ratio of 
bond n’s par value of debt initially issued to the total par value of firm i’s bonds in the 
sample. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for bonds are calculated as the sum of the 
firm’s daily abnormal returns over different window periods. Expanded event windows 
are also used in the paper. To detect the stock price response, cumulative abnormal 
returns during the same event window stretching from day -1 to +1, CAR (-1, +1), are 
computed as cumulative Fama-French model adjusted returns. Event windows of stock 
price responses are also expanded to match corresponding bond return event windows. 
 
3. Univariate Analysis of the Bond and Stock Price Responses to Dividend 
Announcements 
To discriminate between the two hypotheses outlined above, I conduct event 
studies to investigate bond and stock price responses around the announcements of 
increased and decreased dividends. Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), defined as 
the sum of daily abnormal returns across the three-day event window from Day -1 to 
Day +1, are then calculated and employed as a measure of the bond market reaction to 
dividend announcements. 
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If the signaling hypothesis holds, dividend announcements should have the same 
effect on stockholders and bondholders. For instance, an announcement of increased 
dividends signals an optimal cash flow in the future which can also guarantee the timely 
payment of principal and interest for bonds. Thus, both bond and stock markets will 
react positively (negatively) to dividend increases (decreases) and this will support the 
signaling hypothesis (hypothesis 1). Accordingly, event window CARs of bond and 
stock prices should be positive (negative) surrounding the announcement of dividend 
increases (decreases). 
If the wealth transfer hypothesis holds, dividend announcements should impact 
stockholders and bondholders differently. An announcement of increased (decreased) 
dividends predicts more (less) dividend payments in the future. This announcement 
causes a positive (negative) reaction in the stock market. On the other hand, it indicates 
that fewer (more) financial resources are available for future principal and interest 
payments, which will increase (decrease) the default risk on bonds. An increased 
(decreased) default risk will harm (benefit) the interest of firms’ bondholders and lead 
to a negative (positive) reaction in the bond market. Therefore, event window CARs in 
bond markets should be negative (positive) surrounding the announcement of dividend 
increases (decreases). In contrast, CARs over the window in stock markets should be 
positive (negative) surrounding the announcement of dividend increases (decreases).  
Panel A of Table 12 reports average CARs for the full sample of announced 
dividend increases and decreases. For each time window, a t-statistic calculated using 
the cross-sectional standard error of CARs for whether the mean CARs is different from 
zero is reported. Consistent with the signaling hypothesis (hypothesis 1), we can see 
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that dividend increases have a positive and significant effect on bond prices in Panel A. 
For the 1,236 dividend increases announcements, the average CARs over Day -1 and 
Day +1 of 0.06 percent is significant according to the t-test. However, dividend 
decreases have no effect on bond prices during the same event window, which is not 
consistent with the prediction of negative bond market reactions to dividend decreases 
announcements by signaling hypothesis. Panel A of Table 12 demonstrates that a firm’s 
dividend decreases announcement is associated with a mean return of zero. The 
insignificant bond market return is inconsistent with the signaling hypothesis, but is 
what would be expected if both signaling and wealth transfer hypotheses hold. The 
wealth transfer hypothesis predicts a positive effect and the signaling hypothesis 
predicts a negative effect of dividend decreases announcements on bond prices. 
Consequently, the signaling and wealth transfer effects on bond prices tend to cancel 
out each other. 
In addition to significant bond market reactions on announcement windows, in 
Table 12, I also find evidence of negative CARs before and after dividend 
announcements, especially for dividend decreases announcements. These findings 
complement the findings of Aharony and Swary (1980), who report significant 
abnormal stock returns before and after dividend change announcements. In Panel A, 
the mean (-30, -5) and (+2, +30) CARs among dividend decreases are -0.87 and -0.80 
percent, respectively and both are statistically significant at the five percent level. 
Furthermore, senior bonds (Panel B), speculative grade bonds (Panel C), and financially 
constrained bonds (Panel E) earn significantly negative abnormal returns prior to 
dividend decreases. Dividend announcements after the 2008 financial crisis elicit larger 
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impacts on bond markets than those before the 2008 financial crisis. I find the same 
pattern for dividend increases announcements.  
To investigate the cross-sectional variation of the bond market response to 
dividend changes, I partition the bonds sample into different groupings based on the 
variables that have been studied before. In Panel B, I split the bonds into senior and 
junior bonds, respectively.
62
 A bond is considered as a senior bond if a bond is secured, 
senior issue of the issuer, and a junior bond otherwise. For dividend decreases, the mean 
(-1, +1) CARs are -0.01 and -0.10 percent, respectively. The negative reaction to 
dividend cuts seems to be more evident in junior bonds, which is consistent with the 
signaling hypothesis prediction that lower level bonds are more exposed to potential 
credit default events. However, the positive reaction to dividend increases seems to be 
driven by senior bonds with a reaction of 0.06 percent and statistically significant at the 
ten percent level. This is not surprising since more than 95% of the bonds in Table 10 
are senior bonds. The signaling hypothesis predicts that that lower rated bonds benefit 
more from events that decrease firms’ default risk. When I divide the sample of 
dividend increases announcements into investment grade and speculative grade bonds in 
Panel C, the average (-1, +1) CARs are 0.02 and 0.22 percent, respectively but only the 
speculative grade bonds group is significant at the 10% level. The significantly positive 
                                                 
62
 If a firm has both senior and junior bonds, the firm’s bonds are separated into two groups of bonds: 
senior and junior bonds. Bond returns for each group are presented in Table 12. This results in an increase 
in the total number of observations in Panel B compared to Panel A. This is also the case when a firm has 
bonds with both investment and speculative credit ratings. As a robustness check, for each firm, I 
calculate an average rating and seniority level as the weighted average of each individual bond rating and 
seniority level in these cases, where the component weights are the proceeds of each bond outstanding 
relative to a firm’s total value of bond outstanding. The result is qualitatively similar to the results 
reported in Panels A and B of Table 12. 
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speculative grade bond returns are consistent with the implication of signaling 
hypothesis in hypothesis 3.  
Signaling can become more convincing in turbulent periods like the 2008 
financial crisis. Bondholders will benefit more if firms increase dividend payments, 
while they will hurt more if firms cut dividend payments. Panel D presents the results 
by dividing the total sample of dividend announcements into two periods: before-crisis 
(before 2008) and after-crisis (after 2008). When the sample of dividend increases 
announcements is divided into before and after-crisis period, the mean (-1, +1) CARs 
are 0 and 0.13 percent, respectively. The former CAR is insignificant while the later 
CAR is significant based on the t-statistics test.  As to dividend decreases 
announcements, I find that the post-announcement mean (+2, +30) CARs also differ 
across the two periods with -0.12 percent versus -1.21 percent, and the later CAR is 
statistically significant. The above evidence is consistent with the implication of the 
signaling hypothesis.   
Akhigbe, Easterwood and Pettit (1997) find negative bond market reactions in 
the week following the announcements of new debt offerings when issuers are faced 
with an unexpected decrease in cash flow. To see how firms’ financial conditions 
impact bondholders’ wealth losses or gains surrounding dividend announcements, I split 
the sample firms into financially unconstrained (non-distressed) firms and financially 
constrained (distressed) firms under each type of dividend announcement in Panel E 
(F). Following van Binsbergen, Graham and Yang (2010), I measure financial distress 
employing a modified version of Altman’s (1968) Z-score. Firms are considered 
nondistressed when their Z-scores are in the top tercile. Financially constrained firms 
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are defined as firms having restricted long-term leverage. A more detailed description 
of the measurement can be seen in the Appendix C. According to the signaling 
hypothesis, signaling effects should be more apparent for financially good firms when 
they increase dividend payments. Consistent with this prediction, financially non-
distressed firm bondholders earn a three-day return of 0.08 percent, while financially 
distressed firm bondholders earn a three-day return of 0.03 percent. However, I find 
financially constrained firm bondholders earn more positive returns than financially 
unconstrained firm bondholders. The mean (-1, +1) CARs surrounding dividend 
increases announcements in Panel E (Financially constrained vs. unconstrained firms) 
are 0.15 and 0.02 percent, respectively.   
On the other hand, bondholders will suffer more from financially bad firms 
when firms cut dividend payments. The three-day event window announcement bond 
returns surrounding dividend decreases announcements fail to support this prediction, 
but post-announcement period bond returns lend support to this prediction. In Panel E, 
the mean (+2, +30) CARs for financially constrained firm bondholders is smaller than 
unconstrained firm bondholders (-2.05 vs. -0.49 percent). Moreover, the former one is 
statistically significant according to the t-statistics test. 
According to the signaling hypothesis, an announcement of initiating (omitting) 
dividend payment serves as a positive (negative) signal for a firm’s future earnings 
which should have a positive (negative) effect on bondholders. In contrast, the wealth 
transfer hypothesis implies a negative (positive) effect of dividend initiations 
(omissions) on bondholders since dividend initiations (omissions) can indicate lower 
(more) cash to service debt. Table 13 presents mean bond CARs for the sample of 
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dividend initiations and omissions. I define a dividend initiation if a firm initiates its 
first dividend or resumes dividends after a period of at least five years from July 2002 to 
December 2010 and a dividend omission if a firm omits its dividend after a period of at 
least three years from July 2002 to December 2010. In Table 13, I find that bond 
markets do not react to dividend initiations over the announcement window (-1, 1). This 
is inconsistent with either hypothesis individually, but is consistent with a wealth-
transfer-signaling combination. As summarized above, the signaling and wealth transfer 
effects of dividend initiations announcements on bond prices tend to cancel out each 
other. 
Bond markets react negatively to dividend omissions over the announcement 
window (-1, +1) with a mean return of -0.38 percent, which is consistent with the 
signaling hypothesis. The negative return is statistically significant based on t-statistics 
test. In addition, there is a large negative reaction prior to a dividend omissions 
announcement with a mean CAR of -2.53 percent over the window (-30, -5). This 
finding suggests that dividend omissions are partially anticipated by the corporate bond 
market, and they complement the findings of Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995), 
who finds significantly negative abnormal stock returns prior to dividend omissions 
announcements. 
To directly compare the reactions across bonds and stocks of the same firms, I 
report the stock market reaction to dividend increases and decreases in Table 14. I 
calculate daily abnormal stock returns using the Fama-French three factors model. 
Consistent with prior studies (e.g. Aharony and Swary, 1980), I find that the stock 
market reacts positively to dividend increases but negatively to dividend decreases on 
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Day -1 to +1. The evidence of positive bond and stock announcement period returns 
surrounding the announcement of increased dividend supports the signaling hypothesis, 
which implies that dividend increases announcements should result in a positive change 
in both bond and stock prices. The significantly negative stock announcement period 
returns surrounding dividend decreases announcements are also consistent with a 
wealth-transfer-signaling combination because both signaling and wealth transfer 
hypotheses predict negative stock market reactions to the announcements. 
As would be expected, signaling is more apparent after the financial crisis 
period with mean announcement day return of 0.22 percent and 0.34 percent 
surrounding dividend increases announcements when the sample is split into before and 
after crisis periods in Panel B and C of Table 14, respectively.  Lastly, the stock market 
reactions to dividend changes are greater in magnitude than bond market reactions in 
the three-day event window. Perhaps the fact that stocks trade much more frequently 
leads to more spontaneous and greater reactions in stock markets than bond markets. 
Table 15 reports stock market returns surrounding dividend initiations and 
omissions announcements. Consistent with Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Healy and 
Palepu (1988), stock markets react positively to the announcement of a dividend 
initiation across different event windows. A firm’s stock price experience a mean 
positive return of 2.21 percent on the dividend initiations announcement day. Since both 
signaling and wealth transfer hypotheses predict a positive effect of dividend initiations 
announcements on stock prices, the significantly positive stock return is consistent with 
a combination of signaling and wealth transfer hypotheses. In the pre- and post-
announcement periods, a firm’s stockholders still earn positive returns.  
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In contrast, stock prices do not experience significance changes surrounding 
dividend omissions announcements across different event windows in Table 15. On the 
announcement day, the stock return is 0.06% and not significantly different from zero. 
The insignificant stock market reactions could be due to a combined effect of negative 
and positive signaling. Dividend omissions signal that management expects lower 
earnings in the future and thus should result in a negative stock price response. 
Additionally, dividend omissions during the turbulent periods, e.g. the 2008 and 2009 
financial crisis, are viewed possibly by stockholders as a wise strategy to conserve cash.  
 
4. Multiple Analysis of the Determinants of Bond Price Responses to Dividend 
Announcements 
Other factors besides dividend changes could influence bond price responses. 
Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) find that bondholders’ losses surrounding dividend 
announcements are positively correlated with a firm’s financial leverage. Maxwell and 
Rao (2003) study bondholders’ wealth effects surrounding spin-offs and find that a 
bondholder’s loss is positively correlated with the risk of the parent firm (investment 
grade versus noninvestment-grade rating). Maxwell and Stephens (2003) show that the 
loss of bondholders surrounding stock repurchases is a function of the firm’s debt 
rating. When a firm faces more default risks, the price of bonds with a longer maturity 
could drop more than shorter maturity bonds. Therefore, the bond market reaction to 
dividend announcements can vary with bond seniority, bond rating, bond maturity, and 
the firm’s financial leverage ratio. To control for these factors, I include them in the 
regression analysis.  Junior_bond, is an indicator variable with a value of 1 if a bond’s 
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seniority belongs to the category of junior; otherwise, 0. The bond rating, denoted as 
Investment_grade, equals 1 if the rating belongs to the category of investment-grade 
rating; otherwise, 0. Maturity denotes the natural logarithm of years remaining for 
bonds. Financial leverage, FL, is defined as the ratio of book value of long-term debt 
over the book value of the total assets of the firm. The financially unconstrained (non-
distressed) firm, denoted as FUC (FND), equals 1 if the firm belongs to the financially 
unconstrained (non-distressed) group; otherwise, 0. The definitions of financially 
unconstrained and non-distressed firms are described in the Appendix C, and are 
consistent with the work of van Binsbergen, Graham and Yang (2010). 
The Signaling hypothesis (hypothesis 1) implies that bond markets will react 
positively (negatively) to the announcement of dividend increases (decreases), which 
should induce positive correlation between bond market responses, which are measured 
by the three-day event window CAR, and the size of dividend changes, ΔDIV. In 
contrast, the wealth transfer hypothesis (hypothesis 2) predicts that the event window 
CAR should be negatively correlated with ΔDIV. I am also interested in investigating 
how bond market reactions differ due to seniority, rating, maturity and financial 
leverage, conditional on the dividend changes. To test the hypotheses outlined in section 
2, the following regression is estimated via Ordinary Least Squares for dividend 
increases and decreases, respectively: 
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Where for firm i, CAR is the cumulative abnormal bond return over the defined 
event window (-1, 1), all independent variables are defined as above, and ε is the 
random error term.  If β1<0 and is statistically significant, indicating a negative relation 
between dividend changes and bond market responses, this will lend support to the 
wealth transfer hypothesis (hypothesis 2). If β1>0 and is statistically significant, 
indicating a positive relation between dividend changes and bond market responses, this 
will lend support to the signaling hypothesis (hypothesis 1). If β1 is insignificant from 0, 
none of the hypotheses holds. 
The relation between Junior_bond (Investment_grade, Maturity, FL, FUC and 
FND) and CAR depends on whether dividends increase or decrease. Therefore, I include 
interaction variables- ΔDIVi*Junior_bondi (ΔDIVi *Investment_gradei, ΔDIVi 
*Maturityi, ΔDIVi*FLi,ΔDIVi *FUCi and ΔDIVi*FNDi) in the regression. For example, 
consider dividend increases (ΔDIV>0). When a firm increases dividend payments and 
wealth transfer occurs, speculative (or subordinated) bonds will suffer more than 
investment grade (senior) bonds, given that they face more default risk. This implies 
that the dummy variable for investment grade bonds, Investment_grade, should be 
positively related to event window CAR (β5>0). When a firm decreases dividend 
payments and wealth transfer occurs, speculative bonds will benefit more than 
investment bonds given that they face less default risk than before. This implies a 
negative relation (β5<0). On the other hand, if a firm increases dividend payments and 
the signaling hypothesis holds, speculative grade bonds will benefit more than 
investment grade bonds and thus a negative relation can be expected (β5<0).  
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When a firm increases dividend payments and wealth transfer occurs, the prices 
of bonds with a longer maturity will drop more than shorter maturity bonds, which 
indicates a negative relation between event window CAR and ΔDIVi *Maturityi (β7<0). 
If wealth transfer occurs, bondholders will face more default risk to an announcement of 
increased dividends when a firm has a higher financial leverage ratio, FL. I thus predict 
that there is a negative relation between event window CAR and ΔDIVi *FLi (β9<0). I 
summarize the expected signs for β3, β5, β7, β9, β11 and β13 in Appendix D. 
Table 16 reports regression results of dividend decreases and dividend increases 
separately. From model 1 to model 3, it can be seen that, neither signaling hypothesis 
nor wealth transfer hypothesis holds in the group of dividend decreases announcements 
given the insignificant coefficients for ΔDIV, β1. However, I find strong evidence 
supporting the signaling hypothesis when firms increase dividend payments, given the 
positive and statistically significant coefficients for ΔDIV, β1, across from model 4 to 
model 6. This finding is consistent with my earlier finding of significant positive bond 
market reactions to dividend increases announcements during a three-day event window 
in Panel A of Table 12. 
Evidence for dividend decreases announcements is not significant since 
estimated coefficients for interaction variables in models 1 through 3 are not statistically 
significant. The signs of coefficients for interaction variables of investment rating and 
announcement year after 2008 are consistent with the implications of signaling 
hypothesis as summarized in Appendix D, but coefficients are not significantly different 
from zero. 
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Models 4, 5, and 6 also report multiple analysis results of the determinants of 
bond market returns surrounding dividend increases announcements. Bond market 
returns surrounding the announcements do not differ due to the difference of seniority, 
as evidenced by the insignificant coefficients of the interaction variable for junior bond, 
β3. This could be due to the small number of bonds belonging to junior bond category. 
The bond reaction to dividend increases announcements is weaker when the firm’s bond 
rating belongs to investment grade, indicating that speculative grade bonds react more 
positively to an increased dividend announcement than investment grade bonds. This 
finding is consistent with the evidence in the previous univariate analysis that a mean (-
1, +1) CAR for speculative grade bonds is much larger than that for investment grade 
bonds. Both these two findings are consistent with the prediction of the signaling 
hypothesis that, riskier bonds should benefit more from events that decrease a firm’s 
default risk. 
In contrast to the expectations of the signaling hypothesis, the bond market 
reaction to the announcement of a dividend increase is significantly negative for bonds 
with longer maturities. The estimated coefficients, β7, are negative and statistically 
significant at the one percent level. The negative sign of the coefficient for the financial 
leverage interaction variable contradicts the prediction of the signaling hypothesis. 
Consistent with the view that dividend signaling could be more evident during turbulent 
periods like the 2008 financial crisis, the coefficient for the indicator variable of 
dividend announcement year after 2008 is positive. There is weak evidence that 
financially unconstrained and non-distressed firm bondholders react more positively to 
increased dividend announcements given the insignificant positive estimated 
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coefficients (β11 and β13 in Models 5 and 6 of Table 16). The weak evidence could be 
due to the control of the size of increased dividends. 
In Table 17, I report Pearson and Spearman rank correlation coefficients 
between bond and stock returns in Panels A and B, respectively. If signaling hypothesis 
holds, then I expect to observe a positive relation between bond and stock returns. For 
the mean (-1, +1) CAR of increased dividend announcements, the Spearman rank 
correlation coefficient between bond and stock abnormal returns is significantly positive 
at the ten percent level. Particularly, the correlation in speculative rating bonds (I-S 
column in Panel B of Table 17) is 0.14 which is greater than investment rating group of 
bonds. However, there is no significant correlation between bond and stock abnormal 
returns surrounding the decreased dividend announcements within the same event 
window. In sum, the correlation coefficient results provide evidence of signaling for 
firms’ bondholders and stockholders surrounding the increased dividend 
announcements. 
 
 5. Robustness Checks 
As robustness checks for the measure of daily bond market reactions to 
decreased or increased dividend announcements, I use abnormal standardized bond 
returns as suggested by Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). Ederington, Guan and 
Yang (2012) find dramatic improvement in the power of tests when bond return 
heteroskedasticity is corrected by standardizing bond returns by time-series standard 
deviations, based on returns 25 days before and after the event. The advantage of the 
Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012) method over Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and 
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Xu (2007) method of measuring daily bond returns is that they consider the need to 
correct for heteroskedasticity by standardizing bond returns. Prices on long-term and 
low rated bonds are much more variable than prices on short-term and high rated bonds 
so there is considerable heteroskedasticity.  The heteroskedasticity in bond returns is 
likely much more severe than for stocks since individual bonds’ characteristics, such as 
term-to-maturity, credit ratings and liquidity, vary  and prices are much more volatile on 
lower rated, long maturity, and illiquid bonds than on high rated, short maturity, and 
liquid bonds. 
From Panels A and B of Table 18, abnormal standardized bond returns 
surrounding decreased on increased dividend announcements, on average, are not 
significantly different from zero. I further split firms’ bonds into speculative and 
investment rating bonds. Panel A shows that abnormal bond standardized returns of 
speculative rating bonds around dividend decreases announcements are negative, but 
investment rating bond returns are positive. Both bond returns are not significantly 
different from zero. In the event window (-1, +1), the difference of bond returns (Spec-
Investment) between speculative and investment rating bonds is negative. This supports 
the signaling hypothesis, which asserts that speculative bondholders suffer more losses 
than investment bondholders surrounding dividend decreases announcements. However, 
the evidence for signaling hypothesis is weak, given that the difference of bond returns 
is not significantly different from zero. 
In Panel B, over a three-day event window surrounding an announcement of 
increased dividend, I find an abnormal bond standardized return of 20.63 (median of 
16.54) percent for speculative rating bonds where the t-statistics and Wilcoxon sign-
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rank tests are statistically significant at the five percent level. In contrast, the return 
from investment rating bonds is negative and insignificant. The difference of the three-
day abnormal bond standardized return between speculative and investment rating 
bonds is positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. The positive and 
significant difference remains across other event windows. The evidence is consistent 
with the signaling hypothesis, which predicts that speculative rating bonds should 
experience greater positive returns than investment rating bonds surrounding an 
increased dividend announcement. Consistent with my previous finding, signaling 
hypothesis holds for increased dividend announcements, but does not hold for decreased 
dividend announcements. Panel C stratifies the increased dividend sample by whether a 
dividend announcement is occurred before 2008 or after 2008. Consistent with my early 
finding of the difference of bond returns before and after 2008, bondholders earn larger 
positive returns surrounding the announcement of increased dividend after the 2008 
financial crisis. In unreported regression results, the relationship between bond returns 
surrounding the announcement of increased dividend and the magnitude of increased 
dividend remains significantly positive, which is consistent with the finding in Table 17 
when using Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu  (2007) method to estimated 
abnormal bond returns.  
 
6. Conclusions 
Due to the poor quality and availability of bond price data, existing evidence on 
the effect of dividend announcements on bondholders is limited and mixed. I use the 
OTC bond transaction data from TRACE to explore the wealth effects of dividend 
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change announcements on bondholders across a period from July 2002 to December 
2010. In a large sample of dividend increases announcements, I find that the corporate 
bond market reacts positively to dividend increases announcements. The mean three-
day abnormal bond return for dividend increases is 0.06 percent and statistically 
significant. Furthermore, dividend omissions can lead to an average three-day abnormal 
bond return of -0.38 percent that is statistically significant, which is consistent with the 
prediction of the signaling hypothesis that omitted dividends signal a pessimistic future 
of a firm. 
Inconsistent with the implication of the signaling hypothesis that decreased 
(initiated) dividends signal a pessimistic (optimistic) future of a firm, bond market 
reactions to dividend decreases (initiations) announcements are not significantly 
different from zero. However, this is consistent with a wealth-transfer-signaling 
combination since the signaling and wealth transfer effects on bond prices tend to offset 
each other. 
Consistent with previous studies, I find that stock markets react positively 
(negatively) and significantly to dividend increases (decreases) announcements. The 
dividend increases results suggest that the same inference on the influence of dividend 
increases announcements in the bond and stock markets can be explained by the 
signaling hypothesis rather than the wealth transfer hypothesis. Since the signaling and 
wealth transfer effects on stock prices tend to reinforce each other, the significantly 
negative stock market reactions to dividend decreases announcements are also 
consistent with a combination of signaling and wealth transfer hypotheses. 
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Lastly, consistent with the implications of the signaling hypothesis, the 
abnormal bond return is more positive for larger percentage dividend increases and 
among speculative grade bonds, which exhibits a significant three-day abnormal return 
of 0.22 percent. Consistent with the predictions of signaling hypothesis that positive 
signaling should be more apparent in turbulent periods and for financially good firms, I 
find that the bond market reaction to the announcement of an increased dividend is 
stronger for the period after 2008, and financially non-distressed firms. According to the 
signaling hypothesis, longer maturity bonds should experience greater positive returns 
than shorter maturity bonds surrounding dividend increases announcements. In contrast 
to the prediction, long-maturity bonds experience less positive returns surrounding the 
announcement of increased dividend. 
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Chapter 4: Pre-trade Transparency in Over-the-Counter Markets
63
 
 
Over-the-counter (hereafter OTC) dealer markets are responsible for the 
operation of more than $1,000 trillion in financial assets, accounting for more than 90% 
of all value across financial asset classes.
64
  This market is economically important, as 
less than $75 trillion worth of assets are traded annually across all stock markets and the 
annual GDP of the wealthiest nation (the United States) is less than $16 trillion. Given 
the significance of OTC markets, it is not surprising that extensive empirical literature 
exists on the transaction costs in these markets.
65
 In OTC markets, it is important to 
obtain the best trade quote after searching for and negotiating with potentially 
fragmented liquidity providers.  On the other hand, the availability of these quote 
information, which is defined as pre-trade transparency, is very limited to investors in 
OTC markets. Consequently, the search process can be potentially costly to investors in 
OTC markets because of the sequential search and bilateral bargaining that 
characterizes consummation of trades (Duffie, 2010; 2012). However, little evidence 
exists as to whether, and, if so, how, pre-trade transparency/opacity influences 
information search costs, and thus the transaction costs in OTC markets. This research 
helps fill this void in the literature. 
Transparency is always an important element pertaining to market operations. 
While many have explored the importance and the consequences of bringing post-trade 
transparency to OTC markets, little research has been conducted to understand the 
                                                 
63
 This chapter is based on collaborative work with Zhuo Zhong. 
64
 OTC markets consist of, for example, foreign exchange markets, markets for interest rate swaps, 
markets for credit default swaps, corporate and municipal bond markets. 
65
 Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman (2006), Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri (2007), and 
Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) for the U.S. corporate bond market; and Harris and Piwowar (2006) 
for the U.S. municipal bond market. 
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implications of pre-trade transparency in OTC trading. Post-trade transparency is often 
defined as the availability of trade information following a transaction, such as prices 
and volumes, whereas, pre-trade transparency is defined as the availability of 
information prior to a transaction, such as trade interest and quotations. OTC markets 
have come under intense scrutiny due to the lack of transparency during the 2008 
financial crisis. In the crisis, the opacity of OTC markets made price discovery and 
liquidity very challenging. If more pre-trade transparency had been enforced, the 
situation might have been different. Furthermore, both regulators and practitioners view 
pre-trade transparency as equally important to post-trade transparency in OTC trading. 
In her keynote address in October 2010 at the National Association of Bond Lawyers 
35th Bond Attorneys’ Workshop, Elisse Walter, Chairperson of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, said, “Again, that is why I believe that improved pre-trade 
transparency is an important goal. Investors need better information and better access 
both to tap and provide liquidity in the market.” 
Despite unanimous agreement on the importance of pre-trade transparency, 
practitioners differ on the perceived impact on the market.  In March 2010, a survey 
report from the Association for Financial Markets in Europe showed that a third of 
traders believed greater pre-trade transparency would negatively impact liquidity.
66
 
However, in June 2010, a survey from the International Capital Market Association 
found that the majority of corporate bond market participants believed that pre-trade 
                                                 
66
The survey was conducted on buy-side traders (not dealers). Source: Financial News. 
http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2011-08-08/bond-trading-electronic-revolution 
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transparency was the most important measure to improve market liquidity.
67
 These 
conflicting views about the perceived implications of pre-trade transparency help 
provide evidence that the effects are not mutually agreeable. This stark contrast in 
perception provides the basis for our question of whether, and, if so, how, an increase in 
pre-trade transparency will affect trading in OTC markets. 
To guide our empirical research and explain the pre-trade transparency 
mechanism influencing OTC trading, we construct a search model, which is a 
specialized example of Zhong (2012). In the model, we consider traders’ lack of pre-
trade information as Knightian uncertainty. Unlike risk, where the odds of future states 
are known, Knightian uncertainty refers to the situation in which the odds of future 
states are unknown. Citing the lack of pre-trade information and the awareness of this 
deficiency in OTC markets indicates the vagueness of information possessed by traders, 
which gives credence to Knightian uncertainty in this search process. Our model shows 
that pre-trade information enhances a traders’ willingness to search, which implicitly 
improves their bargaining capabilities. As a result, dealers have to lower their ask prices 
and increase their bid prices in order to secure trades. In other words, dealers have to 
compete for traders more aggressively. This results in not only smaller bid-ask spreads, 
but also less dispersion among bid-ask spreads.  
                                                 
67
 In the International Capital Market Association’s report, 83% of survey respondents ranked pre-trade 
transparency as the most important measure for improving liquidity, compared with 57% who believed 
improvements in liquidity are best accomplished through post-trade transparency. ICMA said 41% of 
respondents to its survey were investors; 36% were sell-side firms, such as banks; 13% were companies 
involved in securities repurchase or lending; and the remaining 10% were companies such as exchanges, 
issuers, and underwriters. Source: http://www.icmagroup.org/assets/documents/Maket-
Practice/Regulatory-Policy/MiFID-
BMT/ICMA%20corporate%20bonds%20response%20to%20CESR%20FINAL%204June2010.pdf 
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We test our model implications through an empirical study on U.S. corporate 
bonds using the over-the-counter bond transaction data from TRACE. In the U.S., the 
majority of corporate bonds are traded in OTC markets, but some are traded on both 
OTC and NYSE markets. The NYSE’s Bonds (previously known as the Automated 
Bond System) operates the largest centralized corporate bond market in the U.S. and is 
organized as an electronic limit order book system providing comprehensive pre-trade 
transparency. Thus, bonds traded on both OTC and NYSE markets are more pre-trade 
transparent relative to bonds that are only traded in OTC markets.  Since we focus only 
on bond transactions occurred on the OTC market, the availability of the pre-trade 
quote, which is provided by the limit order book, is the only one relevant difference 
between these two groups of bonds in regards of trading environments. Bond traders 
benefit from the pre-trade quote information in NYSE Bonds since their bargaining 
power increases when they trade with dealers. Accordingly, the increases in bargaining 
power benefits bond traders on the OTC market by reducing their transaction costs.
68
  
Based on this feature we conduct an observational study. First, we construct a 
group of bonds traded on both OTC and NYSE, identified as the OTC-NYSE group, 
and then we employ propensity score matching to identify a matched group of bonds 
that trade only in OTC, namely OTC-only group. Finally, we analyze the transaction 
costs, variances of transaction costs, and yields between these two groups. Consistent 
                                                 
68
  This is one possible explanation for lower transaction cost if we compare transaction costs in NYSE 
Bonds and OTC market directly. The lower transaction cost in NYSE Bonds could be the compensation 
that traders get for liquidity provision by posting limit orders on NYSE Bonds. In contrast, OTC 
transactions are more similar to a market order. The other alternative explanation of lower transaction 
cost on NYSE Bonds is the demand-based selection of trades. Hendershott and Madhavan (2014) find 
that electronic auctions are preferred for easier trades and in more liquid bonds. However, these two 
possible explanations do not apply to our finding since we only compare trading cost incurred on the 
OTC market, rather than the trading cost between the NYSE and OTC markets. 
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with our search model implications, we find smaller bond bid-ask spreads and smaller 
standard deviation of bid-ask spreads in the OTC-NYSE group compared to OTC-only 
group. Our findings are robust to a multitude of tests. In the univariate analysis, where 
bonds are matched by issuers, the OTC-NYSE group has on average 24 basis points 
smaller effective bid-ask spreads than the OTC-only group. The standard deviation of 
bid-ask spreads are also significantly smaller for the OTC-NYSE group of bonds. These 
findings are consistent across different rating categories. After acquiring a sample of 
OTC-only bonds with firm and bond characteristics similar to OTC-NYSE bonds via 
propensity score matching, the mean and standard deviation of bid-ask spreads of the 
OTC-NYSE group remain statistically and economically lower than the matched OTC-
only group.  The average effective bid-ask spread is 10 basis points lower on OTC-
NYSE group of bonds. In our sample period from 2008 to 2011, OTC-only bond 
transactions between dealers and traders are roughly $1,058 billion per year. Therefore, 
if NYSE pre-trade transparency had been offered as part of OTC trading, traders would 
have saved approximately $1,058 million per year on transaction costs. A potential 
endogeneity issue for our empirical design of matching groups is that firms may choose 
to list bonds with smaller transaction costs on both OTC and NYSE markets. We 
address this concern with two-stage least square regressions utilizing a bond’s listing 
probability as the instrumental variable, as suggested by Wooldridge (2002). Our 
regression results provide evidence that bonds’ transaction costs, as measured by bid-
ask spreads, are negatively correlated with the presence of NYSE pre-trade transparency 
with a p-value less than 0.01. 
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The reduction in bond transaction costs is also significant for sophisticated 
institutional traders. In a truncated sample, we focus specifically on institutional sized 
trades (trade size>$100,000) and find that bonds’ bid-ask spreads are negatively related 
to whether a bond is listed on both OTC and NYSE. As institutional traders are likely to 
be informed traders (Anand, Chakravarty, and Martell, 2005), this suggests that 
improving pre-trade information favors traders over dealers. Pre-trade information is 
more likely to help traders enhance their bargaining capabilities than to help dealers to 
discern informed trading. If it were the latter that dominated, then we should observe a 
positive relation between bonds’ bid-ask spreads and whether a bond is listed on both 
OTC and NYSE, which we did not. 
Furthermore, NYSE pre-trade transparent bonds tend to have lower yields, 
suggesting that an improvement in pre-trade transparency causes a significant reduction 
in bond yields and thus adds value to bonds. Pre-trade transparency reduces bonds’ 
transaction costs, thereby increasing bonds’ liquidity. The increase of bond value 
associated with improving pre-trade transparency is the premium of improved liquidity.  
We are aware of other three recent papers that has examined the impact of trade 
transparency on transaction costs in the U.S. corporate bond markets (Bessembinder, 
Maxwell and Venkataraman, 2006; Edwards, Harris and Piwowar, 2007; and Goldstein, 
Hotchkiss and Sirri, 2007). Employing a sample of institutional trades in corporate 
bonds, Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) find a reduction of trade 
execution costs for both TRACE eligible and non-eligible bonds after the introduction 
of the TRACE reporting system on July 1, 2002. The reduction for TRACE eligible 
bonds is more than twice as big as the TRACE non-eligible bonds. Using a 
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comprehensive record of OTC corporate bond transactions, Edwards, Harris and 
Piwowar (2007) document a significant decrease of bond transaction costs after the 
TRACE reporting system was initiated. Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2007) find that, 
depending on the trade size, the impact of last-sale trade (belonged to the TRACE 
reporting system), has either a neutral or a positive effect on BBB corporate bonds’ 
liquidity, as measured by estimated bid-ask spreads. 
Our paper differs from these recent papers in the following aspects. First, these 
studies use the introduction of TRACE reporting system to test the relation between 
corporate bonds trading and market transparency. More specifically, they focus on the 
influence of improving post-trade transparency, which is the release of transaction 
information following a trade. However, the focus of both our theoretical model and 
empirical study is on the influence of improving pre-trade transparency, which is the 
release of quote information. Given the bilateral trading nature in over-the-counter 
market, it is more critical to examine whether and if so, how the pre-trade transparency 
impacts transaction costs in OTC market. Second, Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar 
(2007) show a regression result that listing on the NYSE can reduce bonds’ transaction 
costs, but they do not discuss it in details nor adjust for the endogeneity problem as it is 
not the focus of their paper. Given the importance of pre-trade transparency their result 
should be further explored. We extend their paper by resolving the endogeneity issue 
with the propensity score matching method and an instrumental regression. Lastly, we 
show that the improved pre-trade transparency in corporate bond markets favors traders 
over dealers as both volatility of bid-ask spreads and institutional sized trades’ bid-ask 
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spreads decrease, indicating more competition among dealers and that potential 
informed traders face smaller bid-ask spreads. 
The next section provides a review of related literature. Section 2 presents the 
model of the search equilibrium in an OTC market. In Section 3, we conduct an 
empirical study on the corporate bond market to test the implications of our model. 
Sections 4 and 5 provide further discussions of our paper’s implications. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the paper.  
 
 1. Related Literature 
Our paper adds to the literature on the relationship between pre-trade 
transparency and market quality. This relationship is important to the design of markets 
since it provides implications on market liquidity, informational efficiency, intermarket 
competition, and ultimately the welfare of market participants. However, academia has 
yet to reach a consensus on major issues in these areas. Baruch (2005) develops a model 
in which liquidity demanders and suppliers have differing degrees of access to the limit 
order book. The model predicts that liquidity demanders benefit from access to the book 
while liquidity suppliers benefit when the book is closed. Boehmer, Saar, and Yu (2005) 
find that the introduction of the NYSE’s OpenBook service, which provides limit order 
book information, decreases the price impact of orders and improves the informational 
efficiency of prices. Eom, Ok, and Park (2007) find that market stability and 
informational efficiency of the price are improved when the Korea Exchange increases 
the number of publicly disclosed quotes. On the other hand, Madhavan, Porter, and 
Weaver (2005) find that increased pre-trade transparency leads to higher trading costs 
 91 
 
 
 
and volatility after the Toronto Stock Exchange disseminated real-time information on 
its limit order book to the public.  
In addition to empirical and theoretical studies, the influence of pre-trade 
transparency has been investigated via experimental studies. Bloomfield and O’Hara 
(1999) show that pre-trade transparency has no impact on informational efficiency, bid-
ask spreads, and trader welfare. Whereas Flood, Huisman, Koedijk, and Mahieu (1999) 
conclude that pre-trade opacity leads to more dispersed opening spreads and lower 
trading volume due to higher search costs. However, higher search costs result in much 
faster price discovery due to induced aggressive pricing strategies. In an experimental 
multiple-dealer market, Flood, Koedijk, van Dijk, and van Leeuwen (2002) show that 
pre-trade transparency reduces price efficiency and improves market liquidity, 
measured by dealers’ bid-ask spreads. Despite fruitful yet divergent views in previous 
studies, there is no actual empirical evidence regarding the impact of pre-trade opacity 
in OTC financial markets on liquidity. Our paper fills this gap by comparing the mean 
and standard deviation of bid-ask spread of bonds traded in OTC-only markets with the 
bid-ask spread of bonds traded in both OTC and NYSE markets. 
In contrast to past studies on post-trade transparency in the corporate bonds 
market, our paper focuses on the pre-trade transparency. Previous research focuses on 
the release of the TRACE data as a natural experiment and finds that transparency 
improves the OTC market’s liquidity (see Bessembinder, Maxwell, and Venkataraman, 
2006; Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007; and Goldstein, Hotchkiss, and Sirri, 2007). 
TRACE contains only information related to traded prices but doesn’t contain 
information regarding quotes (pre-trade information), therefore, studies using TRACE 
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focus specifically on post-trade transparency. Our paper adds new evidence on the 
impact from improving pre-trade transparency on the corporate bonds market. Carrion 
(2009) shows that bond trading costs on NYSE are lower than OTC markets, which is a 
market with greater pre-trade transparency. However, the lower bond trading costs on 
NYSE could also be attributed to the improvement of post-trade transparency on NYSE 
markets. The difference in bond trading costs between NYSE bonds and OTC bonds 
may also depend on unobserved bond or firm characteristics related to whether or not 
firms choose or are chosen to list bonds on the NYSE. Using TRACE bond transaction 
data, we compare the difference of OTC transaction costs between bonds traded on both 
the OTC and NYSE markets, and only on the OTC markets. We address any 
endogeneity concerns by employing propensity score matching methodologies and two-
stage least square regressions. 
Theoretical models on OTC market microstructure are based on the search 
modeling. Seminal work includes Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005, 2007), which 
shows that the search cost determines the bid-ask spread in an OTC market. Further 
work includes Weill (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008), Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), 
Rocheteau and Weill (2011), Afonso (2011), and Lagos, Rocheteau, and Weill (2011). 
Zhu (2011) constructs a search model where traders face contact-order uncertainty to 
examine how transparency affects OTC trading. Consistent with the model implication, 
we find pre-trade transparency results in lower US corporate bond transaction costs, 
which is one measure of bond market liquidity. 
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 2. The Search Equilibrium in the OTC Market 
To illustrate how pre-trade transparency affects OTC market’s liquidity, we 
provide a close form example of the general model in Zhong (2012). Zhong (2012) 
models opacity as Knightian uncertainty faced by traders to study the relation between 
transparency and OTC market’s liquidity. Our model is a special example with 
investors and dealers having different discount rates for future.  
In a simple exchange economy where the dealer is the only intermediary, there 
are three types of agents: buying traders, selling traders, and dealers. Traders are 
heterogeneous in their internal valuations  : more specifically,    for the buyer and    
for the seller, both of which follow the uniform distribution over      . Dealers are 
heterogeneous in transaction costs  , which follow the uniform distribution over      . 
We do not model the heterogeneity among traders explicitly. This assumption is a 
reduced description of various reasons that prompt traders to trade. Transaction costs 
are expenses incurred by dealers in maintaining preferred inventory levels, as noted in 
the inventory literature.
69
 These costs are different from transaction costs faced by 
traders. Traders’ transaction costs are mark-ups which are dealers’ profit margin in 
OTC trading. Due to different risk capacities, dealers’ preferred inventory positions also 
differ, which implies heterogeneity in transaction costs among dealers. In addition, 
transaction costs also include operational fees or the expense of innovating financial 
products.
70
 Thus, the heterogeneity in dealers’ transaction costs can be interpreted as the 
                                                 
69
 See Amihud and Mendelson (1980) for specifics concerning preferred inventory levels. 
70
 Unlike equity trading, in which traded assets are standardized, most OTC markets are for trades of 
customized products. Making a market for those tailored products requires professional knowledge and 
special training, both of which could incur a substantial cost. In addition, dealers sometimes create an 
OTC market by inventing a new financial product. The considerable expenses associated with innovation 
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variation among dealers in professional knowledge and special training in facilitating 
trades. Assuming the dealer is the only intermediary captures the essence of the OTC 
market: there is no central exchange where assets are traded publicly. In the OTC 
market, the only way for traders to obtain quotes is to contact individual dealers—
specifically, one randomly picked dealer for every round of contact. Thus, transactions 
in the OTC market are carried out over a range of individually negotiated prices 
resulting from a costly sequential search process. 
The dealer is infinitely lived and sets bid and ask prices to maximize expected 
profit. Traders, who have max-min preferences, engage in the sequential search process 
with Knightian uncertainty. Knightian uncertainty arises from lack of transparency in 
the OTC market. Opacity of the OTC market makes traders search without knowing the 
distribution of dealers’ quotes. This process resembles the Ellsberg (1961)’s 
experiment, in which decision makers make decisions without knowing the distribution 
of balls in the urn. We use the  -contamination to model Knightian uncertainty. 
Specifically, the set of priors available to traders is an  -contamination of the historical 
distributions over bid and ask prices.
71
 In particular, for any given  , the buyer is 
endowed with the following set of priors, 
   ( )  {(   )         }                                                    (1)
where    is the historical distribution of ask prices and  is the set of all probability 
measures on the Borel set of real numbers. Sellers are endowed with the following set 
                                                                                                                                               
are partially covered by bid-ask spreads that dealers charge when intermediating trades over the new 
product. 
71
 The  -contamination refers to the procedure of introducing a set of priors by contaminating a single 
hypothetical prior with an   probability ball around it. To be more specific,  
  ( )  {(   )         }                                                    
where    is the hypothetical prior and   is any probability distribution in the relevant space. 
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of priors, 
   ( )  {(   )         }                                                    (2)  
where    is the historical distribution of bid prices and  is the set of all probability 
measures on the Borel set of real numbers. In either   ( ) or   ( ), when   is zero, the 
set consists of a unique prior, which means no Knightian uncertainty; as   becomes 
larger, the level of Knightian uncertainty increases. As Knightian uncertainty represents 
the lack of transparency,    measures the degree of transparency in OTC trading. 
Specifically, when the OTC market is fully transparent, traders face no Knightian 
uncertainty in their searches, i.e.,   is zero; when the OTC market becomes less 
transparent, traders face larger Knightian uncertainty, i.e.,   increases; and when the 
OTC market becomes completely opaque, traders face enormous Knightian uncertainty, 
i.e.,   equals one. This  -contamination specification not only measures the OTC 
market transparency with its radius  , but also incorporates historical ask and bid price 
information with its core    and    elements, respectively. In other words, traders 
construct their priors by contaminating the distributions of historical prices and how 
severely they contaminate the distributions depends on the transparency of the OTC 
market. We restrict both buyers and sellers to face the same level of Knightian 
uncertainty because we use Knightian uncertainty as the description of the trading 
environment rather than the source of heterogeneity among OTC traders. Traders 
discount future payoffs with  , and dealers discount future payoffs with   . 
 To obtain the close form solution of the model, we let   
   
    
. This 
assumption does not alter model implications under the general setting (see Zhong 
(2012) for the general model). 
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 2.1. The Trader’s Decision 
For any given  , a buyer is trying to maximize his or her minimal expected 
future payoff, 
    {∫  ( )       ( )}, (3)  
where  ( ) is the discounted future payoff. More specifically,  ( )     (    ) if he 
or she trades at time  , or zero otherwise. That is, 
 
 ( )  {
  (    ) if he        trades at time    
    otherwise 
                                                   
(4)  
 According to Zhong (2012), traders’ optimal trading strategies have the optimal 
stopping rule property. Specifically, a buyer, who values the asset at   , buys when the 
ask price is below his reservation buying price   (  ). Otherwise, the buyer keeps 
searching. The reservation buying price is 
 
     (  )  
 (   )
   
∫       ̂   ̂
  (  )
 
  
(5)  
 
Similarly, a seller, who values the asset at   , sells when the bid price is above his 
reservation selling price   (  ). And the seller continues to search in other cases. The 
reservation selling price is 
 
     (  )  
 (   )
   
∫   [   ̂]  ̂
 
  (  )
  
(6)  
 
In the above,   is the minimal ask and   is the maximal bid. 
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2.2. The Dealer’s Decision 
A dealer posts a pair of stationary bid and ask prices to maximize his expected 
discounted profits. The dealer is constrained by keeping expected supply equal to 
expected demand because the dealer wants to maintain his preferred inventory level. 
This assumption that dealers carry no inventory across successive periods is extensively 
used in past studies on OTC trading.
72
  
As   is the total mass of dealers operating in the market, 
    
 
  (  ) represents 
the density of buyers for every dealer. The number of buyers visiting the dealer who 
have reservation price     is as follows: 1 at date 0,       
   at date 1,   
        at 
date 2, ...,   
        at date  . If the dealer sets the ask to  , then the market demand 
at time   is 
   ( )  
    
 
∫   
         (  )   
  ( )
 
 
 
 
∫
(    ( 
 ))
 
(      ( 
 )(   ) )
   
   
  ( )
 
, 
(7)  
where    (  ) is the density of reservation buying prices 
   (  )  
      ( 
 )(   ) 
(   )(    )
. 
(8)  
In the above,     is the cumulative density function of ask prices. 
  By an analogous derivation, the date   supply associated with the bid price   is 
   ( )
 
 
 
∫
  
 (  )(    (    ( 
 ))(   ) )
   
   
 
  ( )
  
(9)  
                                                 
72
 The same assumption is made in Spulber (1996), Rust and Hall (2003), Duffie, Garleanu, and Pedersen 
(2005; 2007), and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009). 
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And    is the cumulative density function of bid prices. 
 Given demand   ( ) and supply    ( ), the dealer's objective is 
 
   
   
∑(  ) (   ( )  (   )  ( ))
 
   
  
(10)  
subject to  
   ( )    ( )  (11)  
 
2.3. The Stationary Search Equilibrium 
Propostion 1 characterizes the stationary search equilibrium in the OTC market. 
Proposition 1  
When   
   
    
, for any given  , there exists a continuously differentiable symmetric 
equilibrium pricing policy,  ( )  ( )  with  ( ) increasing and  ( ) decreasing in   
for all       , where    denotes the marginal dealer whose profit is zero. Pricing 
policy functions are 
 
 ( )  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
(12)  
  ( )     ( )  (13)  
 
   
    
       
 
(14)  
The spread,  ( )  ( ), increases with    
In the equilibrium, traders adopt an optimal search strategy (equations (9) and 
(10)) based on dealers’ pricing strategies, and dealers maximize their profits based on 
traders’ search strategies. In the equilibrium, traders’ predictions of prices—that is, 
traders’ sets of priors—systematically deviate from equilibrium prices, and the 
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deviation is characterized by the  -contamination of the equilibrium price. The 
systematic deviation depends on the transparency of the OTC market. When the OTC 
market is fully transparent, our equilibrium becomes the equilibrium obtained in 
Spulber (1996) as traders’ sets of priors implode to singletons, which are equilibrium 
prices. 
In Proposition 1, the spread is wider for the dealer with higher transaction costs. 
This coincides with the empirical findings in Li and Schürhoff (2012) and Hollifield, 
Neklyudov, and Spatt (2012), in which they show that inefficient OTC dealers charge 
wider spreads. 
 
2.4. Comparative Statics 
In this section, we perform comparative statics with respect to the change of 
transparency level,  , on the equilibrium.. 
Proposition 2  
For any            , if        then for any   [  
    
        
) ,  ( )     ( )    
and  ( )     ( )   . Let   
  and   
   be the cumulative distribution function of the 
ask when      and     , respectively, and let   
  and   
   be the cumulative 
distribution function of the bid when      and     , respectively. If      , then 
  
   first order stochastically dominates   
  ,   
   first order stochastically dominates 
  
  . 
Proposition 3   
The average spread increases in  . 
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Proposition 4   
The variance of the spread increases in  . 
Proposition 2 indicates that dealers in a more transparent market (smaller  ) 
charge lower ask prices and higher bid prices. As a result, the average spread in the 
OTC market decreases as the market becomes less opaque (see Proposition 3). In 
addition, the variance of the spread in the OTC market also decreases with more 
transparency (smaller  , see Proposition 4). The shrinking bid-ask spread and variance 
of the spread are due to the change in traders’ perceptions of their outside options. 
When the OTC market becomes more transparent, traders are more certain about their 
search processes, which enhances their confidence in finding better offers from dealers. 
Thus, traders are more willing to search. In other words, traders have increased their 
bargaining power as they now have better access to bid and ask quotes. As a result, 
dealers in the more transparent market have to compete more aggressively to secure 
trades, which leads to smaller and less disperse spreads. Proposition 5 reflects traders’ 
willingness to search as traders reservation buying prices decrease and reservation 
selling price increase. Proposition 6 shows that competition among dealers escalates as 
fewer dealers are acting in the equilibrium. 
Proposition 5  
For any            , if        then for any  
  (
   
        
 
 
 
  ] ,   (  )    
  (  )   , and for any    [  
 
 
 
   
        
),   (  )      (  )   . 
Proposition 6      
   , which measures the equilibrium population of dealers, is strictly increases in    
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Though the implication on transaction costs is the same, there is advantage on 
modeling opacity with Knightian uncertainty rather than directly assuming traders 
experience higher search cost in a less transparent market. Our approach, which is more 
complicated, is able to explain the channel of how opacity in a market factors into 
traders increasing search cost. Opacity increases traders’ model uncertainty in search. 
Then, the larger model uncertainty implicitly factors into traders’ search cost, which 
reduces traders’ patience in search, thereby increasing transaction costs in equilibrium. 
 
3. An Empirical Study on the Corporate Bond Market 
In section 1, our search model illustrates that pre-trade transparency affects OTC 
trading through enhancing traders bargaining capability. We test the empirical 
implications resulting from the model. More specifically, we conduct an empirical 
analysis on the corporate bond market to test if the average and standard deviation of 
bid-ask spread decrease as pre-trade transparency increases (see Propositions 3 and 4).  
 
 3.1. Data and Sample 
Our initial sample ranges from November 1, 2008, to March 31, 2011, and 
includes 40,977 bonds with 26,658,403 trades and $7.6 trillion of volume. Firm 
characteristics data is obtained from COMPUSTAT, bond transactions data from the 
Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE), and bond characteristics data from 
the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). An important file for the 
analysis is the “ISSUE EXCHANGE” master file that is retrieved from FISD. This file 
documents the exchange(s) (if any) where the bonds are listed. For a debt security to be 
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listed on the NYSE, the debt issue must have a minimum market value or principal 
amount of $5,000,000. Additionally, the debt security must have an investment grade 
rating to a senior issue or a rating that is no lower than an S&P rating of “B”. The credit 
rating is not required if the issuer of the debt security has equity securities listed on the 
NYSE. Through June 30, 2011, all bonds listed on NYSE Bonds are subject to an initial 
listing fee of $15,000. Effective July 1, 2011, all bonds listed on NYSE Bonds are 
subject to an initial listing fee of $5,000 and an annual listing fee of $5,000. According 
to NYSE Bonds trading guideline, any debt securities listed on the NYSE are eligible to 
trade on NYSE Bonds trading platform.
73
 Hence, we are able to identify OTC traded 
bonds also traded on the NYSE. Since TRACE reports trades with very few bond 
characteristics, Mergent’s FISD database is employed to secure comprehensive bond 
attributes, such as coupon, maturity, and ratings. FISD reports an exhaustive list of 
35,779 bond characteristics that are available. Table 19 describes the sample selection 
procedure. 
We filter the data by eliminating 739 put-able bonds, 869 bonds with abnormal 
prices (prices greater than $200 or less than $10), bond trading with subsequent 
corrections, bonds’ trading side are not indicated, and bond trading affected by price 
reversions.
74
 To exclude rarely traded bonds, we require the bond trade at least 9 times 
during the sample period, which eliminates 8,287 bonds from our sample. These 
filtering conditions leave a sample of 25,884 bonds and 24,958,872 trades. To compute 
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 http://www.nyse.com/bonds/nysebonds/1095449059236.html 
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 Note the bond return from time   to time     as   
   ; a price reversal happens if    
        and 
  
          
  or if    
      and   
          
 . We adjust our filter rule from Bessembinder, 
Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009). Bessembinder et al. (2009) define large return reversals as 20% or more 
price change which is reversed over 20% in the next observation. Our results are qualitatively the same 
when applying their rules to our sample. 
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same-bond-same-day effective bid-ask spreads, we further require bonds to have at least 
one buy and one sell transaction within a day as in Hong and Warga (2000), 
Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003) and Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2005). Bonds that 
cannot be identified in the “ISSUE EXCHANGE” master file are also excluded from 
the sample. Lastly, we drop all interdealer transactions and bonds listed on an exchange 
other than the NYSE.
75
 The final sample used for the empirical analysis contains 20,857 
bonds responsible for 13,475,170 trades and roughly $4.4 trillion of volume. Table 20 
provides descriptive statistics for the 20,857 bonds in the sample.  
The average (median) bid-ask spread is 97 (100) basis points. 66% (6%) of bond 
issuers are classified as finance (utilities), though bond issuers are from a wide array of 
industries. Thus, we partition the bonds into three industry categories: Finance, Utilities, 
and Other for the multiple regression analysis. Private companies are able to issue 
publicly traded debt if they satisfy disclosure requirements similar to public companies. 
We identify public companies by matching the issuer’s CUSIP in TRACE to equity’s 
first 6-digit NCUSIP in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) data set.76 In 
aggregate, we classify only 14.3% of sample bonds are issued by private firms. The 
mean (median) maturity of the sample bonds is 11.8 (10.0) years.  
 
                                                 
75
 The empirical results are not affected at all even if we include those bonds listed on exchanges other 
than the NYSE, e.g., the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and the Luxembourg Stock Exchange. 
76
 Unlike CUSIPs for stocks, CUSIPs for bond is somehow permanent. Cusip for issuer could be changed 
through the time, for many reasons, such as a slight change in company name. However, when issuers 
changed their name, the cusips for their bonds will not change (cusips for their stocks will change though.) 
In Mergent, issuer_cusip reflects the historical value. In CRSP, NCUSIP is a security’s historical cusip. 
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3.2. The Estimation of Effective Bid-ask Spreads 
The relation between transparency and liquidity is a pertinent issue in bond 
markets. In this paper, we investigate whether greater transparency in the corporate 
bond market with respect to pre-trade quote information leads to better liquidity as 
measured by lower bid-ask spreads. Since the quotation data for corporate bond trading 
is generally unobtainable, we are forced to estimate effective bid-ask spreads using 
transaction records. Hong and Warga (2000), Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003), and 
Goldstein, Hotchkiss and Sirri (2005) all calculate the “traded bid-ask spreads” over a 
one-day window in the corporate bond market. Specifically, this approach takes the 
average of the differences between selling prices and buying prices on the same day as 
the effective bid-ask spread. We estimate the effective bid-ask spread for a particular 
bond as the time series average of its traded bid-ask spreads in a one-day window. The 
traded bid-ask spread is the difference between the average daily selling price and 
average daily buying price divided by their sum: 
1. Denoting   to each individual bond and   to time periods, we have  
 
         
            
            
  
(15)  
where                  are the average daily selling price and buying price, 
respectively.  
2. Taking the time series average of         , we have 
 
        ∑
        
  
  
   
  
(16)  
where    is the time length of the bonds in our sample. 
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3.3. The Empirical Design to Test Pre-trade Transparency in Corporate Bond 
Markets 
Though the OTC market of corporate bonds has achieved greater post-trade 
transparency since the unveiling of the TRACE reporting system on July 01, 2002, the 
market still lacks of pre-trade transparency. There is no centralized and extensive report 
of pre-trade information such as real-time quote data in this market before NYSE Bonds 
is introduced. There are some potential data sources providing quote data, like 
proprietary market information vendors (e.g., Bloomberg Trade Order Management 
Solutions (TOMS)) or private electronic trading networks (e.g., Tradeweb, 
MarketAxess, Goldman Sachs GSessions, and BlackRock Aladdin Trading Network). 
These data sources are fragmented and have other limitations.  For example, GSessions 
only operates each Tuesday and Thursday, in two five-minute sessions each day. The 
quotes provided in these systems are representative rather than firm. The depth at each 
quote is not informative to investors and investors are not identical since it is costly to 
purchase access to these trading systems.  
In contrast to the OTC market’s bilateral trading feature, NYSE Bonds is the 
largest centralized corporate bond market in the U.S. functioning through an electronic 
limit order book system.
77
 The NYSE Bonds trading platform, where corporate bonds 
are traded, provides real-time full market-by-order depth, best limit quotes, and trades 
to all its participants. Pre-trade pricing data on individual corporate bonds is updated 
every 10 seconds. Firm and executable bids and offers entered by members or 
                                                 
77
 The NYSE conducts two daily bond auctions – an Opening Bond Auction at 4:00 a.m. ET and a Core 
Bond Auction at 9:30 a.m. ET. Orders not executed in either auction become eligible for continuous 
trading immediately after the auction. 
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sponsored participants are displayed on a full order book (NYSE BondBook) with full 
depth of market. On NYSE BondBook, there are no subject quotes and all quotes are 
firm. Orders are matched on a strict price-time priority basis. NYSE Bonds also adopts 
a Bonds Liquidity Providers (BLPs) program to maintain liquidity. Liquidity providers 
are obligated to maintain: 1) a bid at least 70% of the trading day in each of its assigned 
BLP bonds; 2) an offer at least 70% of the trading day in each of its assigned BLP 
bonds; 3) a bid or offer at the Exchange’s Best Bid or Exchange's Best Offer at least 5% 
of the trading day in each of its assigned BLP bonds in the aggregate. The program 
currently covers over 2,800 debt securities issued by approximately 560 corporate 
issuers. Furthermore, to increase investor participation, the trading platform provides a 
variety of order types, cost-effective order executions, and equal access for bond 
investors to trading information. Undisplayed reserve interest will always yield to 
displayed orders at a particular price.  All orders will only be matched with orders 
resident in the order book. Bonds are traded in decimal increments to two decimal 
digits. 
The NYSE Bonds system provides the opportunity to test if pre-trade 
transparency has any effect on OTC trading. We design an observational study by 
constructing two groups of bonds. The first group, which is the treatment group 
identified as the OTC-NYSE group, consists of bonds traded on both OTC and NYSE 
markets. The second group, which is the control group classified as the OTC-only 
group, consists of bonds traded only in the OTC market.  The objective is to compare 
effective bid-ask spreads and variance of the effective bid-ask spread between these two 
groups. As with all observational studies, our main challenge in drawing conclusions 
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from this comparison is the endogeneity problem, as the assignment of bonds into the 
treatment and the control groups is not random. That is, the difference in bid-ask 
spreads between the OTC-NYSE and OTC-only group may depend on unobserved bond 
or firm characteristics related to whether or not firms choose or are chosen to list bonds 
on the NYSE.  Sample selection bias could lead to biased estimates of the pre-trade 
transparency effect, which can provide favorable conclusions. Therefore, we need to 
control for the endogeneity that bonds with smaller spreads are chosen by their issuers 
to trade on both OTC and NYSE markets. We address this concern in the next section. 
Based on our model implications in propositions 3 and 4, below is our null hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1 The average and standard deviation of effective bid-ask spreads in 
the OTC-NYSE group are smaller than the average and standard deviation of effective 
bid-ask spreads in the OTC-only group. 
 
3.4. Empirical Results on the Difference in Bid-ask Spreads between Bonds with 
and without NYSE Pre-trade Information 
In this section, we report univariate and regression results of comparing the 
mean and standard deviation of bid-ask spreads of the OTC-NYSE and the OTC-only 
group. We address sample selection bias in several different ways. First, we focus on 
bonds issued by the same firm to control for firm characteristics. Second, propensity 
score matching is used to reduce selection bias by equating the OTC-NYSE and OTC-
only group of bonds based on individual firm and bond characteristics.  The advantage 
of this method is the ability to compare the difference in the mean and standard 
deviation of bonds’ bid-ask spreads between OTC-NYSE and OTC-only bonds when 
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controlling for firm and bond characteristics. Finally, we conduct multiple regression 
analysis to examine the statistical significance of the relationship between the NYSE 
pre-trade transparency and the size of bond bid-ask spreads. Estimates are provided for 
two-stage least squares estimation with the probability of listing bonds on the NYSE as 
the instrumental variable. We find consistent results for all the procedures above. Our 
results suggest that pre-trade transparency reduces the mean and standard deviation of 
effective bid-ask spreads in corporate bond trading. This result is consistent with 
hypothesis 1 and theoretical model implications discussed in the previous section. 
In Table 21, we compare the average effective bid-ask spreads of bonds issued 
by the same firm. The number of bonds varies due to the availability of variables. The 
number of non-investment-grade bonds is significantly smaller than the number of 
investment-grade bonds in both groups. This is consistent with the notion that rating 
agencies are more willing to assign investment ratings to corporate bonds.  
Results provided in Table 21 support our theoretical prediction that the pre-trade 
transparency helps reducing the mean and standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. For the 
total sample in Table 21, the average bid-ask spread for OTC-NYSE group bonds is 24 
basis points lower than those of OTC-only group bonds, and the difference is 
statistically significant (p-value=0.00). In addition, we obtain consistent results across 
different credit rating categories. We find that the difference in the bid-ask spreads of 
non-investment-grade bonds is 51 basis points, which is much greater than the 
difference in superior bonds (difference of 22 basis points) and other investment-grade 
bonds (difference of 20 basis points). Both differences are significant with p-values less 
than 0.01. This suggests that the reduction of bid-ask spreads is more evident for low-
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credit-rating bonds relative to high-credit-rating bonds. In addition, we also find the 
same pattern for the standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. On average, the standard 
deviation is significantly smaller for OTC-NYSE bonds than OTC-only bonds across 
different rating categories in Table 21.  
The number of bonds within the OTC-only bonds in Table 21 is far greater than 
that of OTC-NYSE bonds, suggesting that fewer bonds are traded on the NYSE than in 
OTC markets. Also, the coupon rate between the OTC-only group and OTC-NYSE 
group differs dramatically. It could be that firms choose bonds that are more liquid to 
trade on the NYSE. These findings suggest that the lower level and standard deviation 
of bid-ask spreads for OTC-NYSE group of bonds may be due to the significant 
difference of bond characteristics between the two groups. To compare the difference of 
bid-ask spreads between these two groups of bonds when controlling for both bond and 
firm features, we use propensity-score matching. 
We utilize propensity-score matching to acquire a sample of bonds with 
characteristics similar to the bonds traded both in OTC markets and on the NYSE for 
the sample. First, we run logistic regressions to determine which factors influence 
firms’ listing decisions. Using the estimated coefficients, we can obtain the predicted 
probability (propensity score) for each bond. Then we match each OTC-NYSE bond to 
an OTC-only bond based on the closest propensity score. Table 22 presents results of 
the logistic regressions and propensity-score matching.  
 We attempt to model firms’ bond listing decisions from two avenues: firm 
characteristics and bond features. There has been no research on how firms decide to list 
bonds on the NYSE versus in OTC markets. Thus, we construct our model based on 
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basic intuition and on studies of foreign firms’ preferences on the U.S. bond market. We 
control for the following firm characteristics: size, leverage ratio, equity listing status, 
and accounting standard. The equity listing status of a firm affects bond listing choice 
since private firms are less likely to list bonds on the NYSE as they fail to meet the 
strict disclosure requirements imposed by the exchange. In addition, cross listing studies 
show that foreign firms listing equities on U.S. stock exchanges are more likely to 
choose the U.S. bond market (see Miller and Puthenpurackal (2002)). For the 
accounting standard, Gao (2011) shows that firms adopting International Financial 
Reporting Standards prefer the U.S. public bond market. Bond features, which 
complicate the valuation of bonds, may also affect a firm’s listing decisions. For 
example, retail investors, who dominate the NYSE, may prefer a fixed rate bond to a 
variable one. This clientele effect can impact firms’ decisions as to whether or not to list 
their bonds on the NYSE. In Appendix F, we present our variables of choice and their 
definitions. 
 Panel A in Table 22 provides our logistic regression results of firms’ decisions to 
list bonds on the NYSE. The dependent variable is binary in nature with a value of 1 if a 
bond is listed on the NYSE and 0 otherwise. We find that firms who choose to list bonds 
on the NYSE are small firms or highly leveraged firms. Small or highly leveraged firms 
should experience more difficulty selling bonds in the debt market than large or low 
leverage firms. For instance, small firms have poorer information disclosure and less 
coverage than large companies (see Lang and Lundholm (1993, 1996)). This could 
increase the costs for small firms raising funds solely from OTC markets. Higher 
leverage firms pose greater risks to bond investors than low leverage firms. Therefore, 
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these firms may attempt to promote the sale of their bonds by listing bonds both on the 
NYSE and in OTC markets to reach a greater number of investors. Gao (2011) finds 
that firms adopting International Financial Reporting Standards prefer to list bonds on 
the U.S. public bond market but she does not specify whether it is in OTC markets or on 
the NYSE. To investigate whether firms’ accounting standards impact firms’ listing 
choice in bond markets, we assign a dummy variable to firms adopting International 
Financial Reporting Standards in the logistic regressions. In Panel A of Table 22, we 
find that accounting standards have a positive effect on the choice to list debt on the 
NYSE given that both two coefficients are positive and highly significant. This result 
signifies that firms adopting International Financial Reporting Standards are more likely 
to list their bonds on the exchange. Bond issuers’ industry category may affect bond-
listing choice. Bond issuers in the utilities industry tend to issue bonds in the exchange, 
while issuers in the finance industry tend to issue bonds in the OTC markets. 
 The effect of a firm’s equity listing status on debt listing choice is mixed. Signs of 
the coefficients for the dummy variable of when a firm is a private firm are contrasting 
in the logistic regressions. We are also interested in whether listing equities on the 
NYSE encourages firms to list their bonds on the NYSE since having equities on the 
NYSE may reduce the information disclosure cost of listing bonds on the NYSE. In 
unreported results, we find positively significant coefficients for indicator variables of 
whether a firm’s stock is listed on the NYSE. This evidence is consistent with the 
notions that (1) the NYSE does not place any additional disclosure requirements on 
firms who already trade equities on the exchange as they already satisfy NYSE 
disclosure requirements for listing stock, and (2) the additional reporting costs 
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associated with stringent disclosure requirements on bonds imposed by the NYSE are 
marginal for firms with equities listed on the NYSE.  
 We use the abovementioned variables to control for a firm’s characteristics in its 
bond-listing choice. We also control for a variety of a bond’s characteristics in modeling 
the listing choice of a bond. We find bonds with larger issuance sizes, longer maturity, 
higher credit ratings, or without variable rates are more likely to be listed on the NYSE. 
Besides that, global bonds and Yankee bonds are also more likely to be listed on the 
NYSE. Senior bonds and Rule 144a bonds are less likely to be listed on the NYSE. 
 Large or long-maturity debt offerings can be more costly and difficult to issue as 
issuers try to efficiently raise capital by selling debt. Apparently, listing bonds in both 
markets can help issuers raise funds more efficiently given the increase in investor base 
issuers can reach.  
 We find that the probability of listing bonds on the NYSE is negatively correlated 
with Moody’s bond rating. This correlation indicates that the probability increases as 
credit quality increases. This relation continues to hold when we use an indicator 
variable for investment-grade bonds as a proxy for bonds’ credit quality. This reflects 
the clientele effect, as higher rated bonds are usually associated with lower risks, so 
they are more preferred by retail investors, who prefer to trade on the exchange.  
 Variable interest payment bonds, with coupon payments adjusting to a schedule or a 
reference index (for example, LIBOR or Treasury bond interest rates), are less likely to 
be listed on the NYSE. This finding indicates that typically bonds with complicated 
instruments that are more complex for retail investors to value are not traded on the 
NYSE. Since the majority of traders on the NYSE are retail investors, complex bonds 
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might not be favored on the NYSE and hence will tend to suffer from a liquidity 
shortage. 
 A separating equilibrium can help to signal the quality of foreign firms who choose 
to access the U.S. capital markets (see Karolyi (2006)). We find evidence that global 
bonds are more likely to be listed on the NYSE than domestic bonds. Furthermore, we 
find Yankee bonds, U.S. dollar-denominated bonds issued by foreign firms in the U.S. 
market, are more likely to be listed on the NYSE. However, not all types of bonds from 
foreign issuers are likely to be listed on the NYSE. Rule 144a bonds issued by foreign 
firms, which are traded only by large institutions (Qualified Institutional Buyers 
(QIBS)), are less likely to be listed on the exchange. This finding is consistent with the 
clientele effect as most institutional investors trade in OTC markets. 
 Panel B of Table 22 reports the comparison results after matching bonds by their 
propensity scores. We find that the average effective bid-ask spread for bonds traded 
both on the OTC and NYSE markets is still (about 7 and 10 basis points in two different 
regressions, respectively) lower than bonds traded only in OTC markets. The difference 
is statistically significant. Our data shows that in the sample period, approximately 
$1,058 billion per year is traded on bonds for which pre-trade quote information is not 
available.
78
 These results indicate that traders could save a minimum of $1,058 million 
per year on transaction costs if pre-trade transparency were to be enforced. In Panel B, 
we also find that the standard deviations of bid-ask spreads for bonds having NYSE pre-
trade transparency are smaller than bonds without the pre-trade transparency. Both 
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 In the sample period from November 1, 2008 to March 31, 2011, the sum of buy- and sell-sized trading 
volume in the OTC markets is $2,558 billion. Thus, the annual trading volume is approximately $1,058 
billion. 
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parametric and non-parametric tests indicate this difference is statistically significant at 
the 0.01 level. 
In the previous analysis, we examine the economic significance of the bid-ask 
spread difference between bonds with and without NYSE pre-trade transparency. We 
run multiple regressions to examine the statistical significance of the relation between 
the NYSE pre-trade transparency and bonds’ bid-ask spreads when controlling other 
factors that may influence bid-ask spreads. We start this analysis with a OLS regression 
in Table 23. In addition to the OLS specification, we provide regression results using 
two-stage least square estimation (2SLS-Logistic I and II). The dependent variables, 
except as noted, in the regressions are effective bid-ask spreads which is the time-series 
average of the difference between the average daily selling price and average daily 
buying price divided by their sum. P-values of estimated coefficients are reported in 
parentheses. Consistent with our theoretical model predictions, we find that in each of 
the models presented in Table 23, NYSE pre-trade transparency is negatively correlated 
with bonds’ bid-ask spreads, all else being equal.79  
The first two regressors in Table 23 characterize the level of NYSE pre-trade 
transparency in corporate bond markets, respectively. From the OLS model, the effect 
of a bond being listed on the NYSE on the bid-ask spread is significantly negative. In 
addition, bond issuances by private firms have higher transaction costs than debt issued 
by publicly traded companies, as measured by the greater bid-ask spread. A private firm 
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 To control the effect of trade size on bond spreads, we consider the impact of retail-sized investors’ 
trading on bid-ask spreads in unreported results and find qualitatively similar results. We include the 
percentage of retail-sized trades and trading volume in our regressions, respectively. We find a positive 
relationship between bid-ask spreads and the proportion of retail-sized trades and trading volume, 
indicating that small trades occur at higher transaction costs than do trades of institutional investors. 
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does not have to agree to disclosure requirements and thus has greater information 
opacity than a publicly listed firm. This opacity interferes with investors’ ability to 
evaluate the bond and causes them to incur larger transaction costs. The coefficient for 
the issuance size is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that 
large issues are cheaper to trade than small issues, consistent with Edwards, Harris, and 
Piwowar (2007). Bonds with a greater maturity are considered to possess greater risk 
compared to short term bonds, thus it should cost more to trade longer term bonds. We 
find consistent evidence with this notion, as long term bonds have larger bid-ask 
spreads than short term bonds. Different types of bonds issued by the firm may also 
impact bond trading costs. The estimated coefficients for global bonds are significantly 
negative. The lower transaction costs for global bonds could be due to the competition 
of bond transactions across different countries. Senior bonds have a priority claim in 
firms’ residual assets when the firm faces bankruptcy and is more desired by investors. 
Therefore, a senior bond tends to have a lower transaction cost. Foreign bonds and 
Yankee bonds, issued by foreign firms, are more favored by investors in the market, 
which brings more liquidity to the bonds. This, in turn, makes foreign bonds and 
Yankee bonds cheaper to trade. 
As discussed in section 3.4, our findings of the difference of bid-ask spreads 
between the OTC-only and the OTC-NYSE group bonds could be due to the sample 
selection bias. This means that omitted factors could simultaneously determine both 
bid-ask spread and firms’ listing choice. Thus, we employ two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) estimation to enable causal inference. As recommended by Wooldridge (2002), 
estimated probability from logistic regressions is a better instrument than using bond or 
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firm characteristics when the endogenous variable is a binary variable. The advantage 
of this method is that the misspecification of logistic model in the first stage regression 
is irrelevant in the IV regressions provided that the dummy variable for NYSE listing is 
partially correlated with the fitted probabilities. Using bond or firm characteristics 
instead of the fitted probabilities as instrumental variables could result in seriously 
inconsistent estimates if the logistic model for the binary endogenous variable is not 
correct (Wooldridge, 2002).  
2SLS-Logistic I and II models of Table 23 examine the relation between bonds’ 
bid-ask spreads and the NYSE pre-trade transparency using 2SLS specifications. In the 
first column of each model, we report results for the first stage regressions predicting 
the fitted value of being listed on the NYSE using probability of bonds being listed on 
the NYSE from Logistic I and II as the instrument variable, respectively. Instruments in 
both two models are positively significant, indicating relevance. The joint F-tests of 
significance are 187 and 259 respectively with p-values less than 0.01, indicating weak 
instruments are not a concern. Hausman tests indicate that 2SLS regressions provide 
more consistent estimated coefficients than OLS regressions.  
Table 23, Columns 5 and 6 report results from the second stage regression using 
probability estimated from Logistic I model as the instrument variable. In this 
specification, the coefficient on bonds listed on the NYSE is negative with a p-value 
less than 0.01, which confirms the causal interpretation of NYSE pre-trade transparency 
on a bond’s bid-ask spread. The last two columns of Table 23 presents results for a 
specification using probability estimated from Logistic II model as instrument variable. 
In this specification, the coefficient on the indicator variable for bonds being listed on 
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the NYSE remains negative and highly significant. In addition, we find that the 
magnitude of the coefficient estimates in 2SLS regressions (-0.72*10
-2
 and -0.83*10
-2
) 
increase compared to estimated coefficients in OLS model (-0.10*10
-2
). All other 
control variables have the same signs as the OLS specification. Transaction costs are 
greater for low-rated bonds relative to high-rated bonds, as evidenced by the positive 
and highly significant coefficients of Moody’s bond ratings. It is common knowledge 
that high-rated bonds tend to be favored more by investors than low-rated bonds. 
Therefore, high-rated bonds cost less to trade than low-rated bonds as there is an 
increase in investor base. This relation continues to hold when we use an indicator 
variable for investment-grade bonds as a proxy for bonds’ credit quality in unreported 
regressions results. 
Overall, each of the regressions presented in Table 23 indicate that the NYSE 
pre-trade transparent bonds have lower transaction costs (smaller bid-ask spreads) 
compared to more opaque bonds even after controlling for other factors that impact 
bond transaction costs. 
 
4. The Empirical Implications for Informed Traders 
In the market microstructure literature, a sophisticated trader who has more 
information faces larger bid-ask spreads since dealers protect themselves against 
information asymmetry (see Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). 
Following this intuition, Pagano and Roell (1996) show that pre-trade transparency 
decreases bid-ask spreads as information asymmetry is eased, though not necessarily for 
all trade sizes. While they emphasize that pre-trade transparency enhances dealers’ 
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ability to discern informed trading, we emphasize that pre-trade transparency refines 
traders’ information sets, leading to more bargaining power. This difference leads to 
different empirical predictions. Given that institutional traders have superior 
information in trading, Pagano and Roell (1996) predict that institutional-sized trades of 
pre-trade transparent bonds should have larger bid-ask spreads because institutional 
traders’ information rents are reduced when more pre-trade information is provided. In 
contrast, our model predicts the opposite as pre-trade information increases institutional 
traders’ bargaining ability, which implies smaller bid-ask spreads for them.  
To test this prediction, we restrict the sample of bond transactions to 
institutional-sized trades (trade size>$100,000) in Tables 24 and 25.
80
 On average, the 
institutional-sized trades have smaller bid-ask spread than total sample trades reported 
in Panel B of Table 22. This finding may suggest that institutional traders negotiate 
better prices than do retail traders. In Table 24, we find that the average effective bid-
ask spreads are smaller on OTC-NYSE bonds (NYSE pre-trade transparent bonds) than 
OTC-only bonds for institutional-sized trades. Though the difference is not significant 
for investment grade bonds, we do find that it is statistically significant for non-
investment-grade bonds. Consistent with our model prediction of smaller bid-ask 
spreads for institutional traders provided with more pre-trade information, we find 
smaller spreads in institutional sized trades. OTC-NYSE bonds in Logistic I model are 
three (two for Logistic II) basis points smaller than OTC-Only bonds in Panel A of 
Table 25. For informed traders (institutional traders), the standard deviation of bid-ask 
spreads of OTC-NYSE bonds is also smaller than OTC-Only bonds. Depending on the 
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 We follow Edwards, Harris and Piwowar (2007) to define institutional-sized trades as trades with a size 
greater than $100,000. 
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logistic model specifications, the standard deviation of bid-ask spreads is as much as 
0.0007 smaller for OTC-NYSE bonds. All of these differences are statistically 
significant. Panel B of Table 25 continues to provide support the finding that OTC-
NYSE bonds are more liquid after controlling for the sample selection bias with the 
2SLS regressions. This finding is evidenced by the negatively significant coefficient for 
the indicator variable of bonds being listed on the NYSE in the second stage 
regressions. Collectively, these results provide supporting evidence for our search 
model, while not finding any supporting evidence of the information asymmetry model. 
Thus, the primary mechanism of pre-trade transparency affecting bonds’ liquidity is 
through increasing traders’ bargaining ability rather than increasing dealers’ ability to 
discern informed orders. This implies that improving pre-trade transparency favors 
traders over dealers.   
The lower bid-ask spread for institutional-sized trades on OTC-NYSE bonds 
documented in our paper provides evidence that the pre-trade transparency is important 
for institutional traders. If opaqueness is primarily a problem for naive individual 
investors then we should observe little or no effect of NYSE reporting when the sample 
is limited to institutional trades (trade size>$100,000) in Table 25. In contrast, the 
statistically significant effects documented in our paper support the conclusion that pre-
trade transparency is important to not only naïve individual traders, but also 
sophisticated institutional investors as well.
81
 
 
                                                 
81
 Bessembinder, Maxwell and Venkataraman (2006) find that trade execution costs of institutional trades 
reduce after the introduction of TRACE on July 1, 2002. 
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 5. Transparency and Valuation in the Corporate Bond Market 
In section 2, we find that corporate bonds with NYSE pre-trade transparency 
have higher liquidity than those without NYSE pre-trade transparency. The increase in 
liquidity should add value to NYSE pre-trade transparent bonds, since investors value 
liquidity.
82
 In Panel A of Table 26, we find that OTC-NYSE bonds on average have 
lower yields (higher prices) than OTC-Only bonds in the propensity-score matching 
specifications. For instance, OTC-NYSE bonds have an average yield of 6.27%, which 
is significantly smaller than OTC-only bonds’ mean yield of 7.89% in the Logistic II 
model. After controlling for the sample selection bias by using the probability of being 
listed on the NYSE as the instrumental variable in Panel B of Table 26, our findings 
remain intact as OTC-NYSE bonds have significantly smaller yield than OTC-Only 
bonds. This is evidenced by the negatively significant coefficient for the indicator 
variable of bonds being listed on the NYSE. These results indicate that OTC-NYSE 
bonds have higher valuations, which verifies the conjecture that pre-trade transparency 
increases bonds’ values. This finding is economically important since it also suggests 
that issuers listed on the NYSE Bonds platform have significantly lower cost of debt 
capital than otherwise identical firms. 
In our model, we explain the mechanism that pre-trade transparency affects 
liquidity through the reduction of traders’ perceived Knightian uncertainty. Hence, the 
above result implies that reducing Knightian uncertainty can increase the value of a 
bond. This provides an empirical support of Easley and O’Hara (2010b), in which they 
                                                 
82
 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) find that illiquid securities should compensate security investors with a 
liquidity premium. Lo, Mamaysky, and Wang (2004) argue that illiquidity leads to lower security prices 
and larger yield spreads given the same future cash flows since investors demand an ex ante risk premium. 
Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) find that illiquid bondholders are compensated with higher yield spreads 
and bonds’ yield spreads decrease when liquidity improves.  
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show that an asset’s value increases when its associated Knightian uncertainty 
decreases. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Given the significant importance of OTC market in financial markets and the 
bilateral trading nature in OTC market, a motivating question arises, “Whether, and if 
so, how, pre-trade transparency affects OTC trading?” Our theoretical and empirical 
evidence shows that pre-trade transparency in the OTC market decreases the mean and 
standard deviation of bid-ask spreads for traders who trade in the market.  
We construct a search model by incorporating Knightian uncertainty into 
traders’ search processes. Our empirical findings are robust to endogeneity of firms’ 
bond listing decisions on NYSE. After controlling for endogeneity with propensity-
score matching, the average effective bid-ask spread of OTC-NYSE bonds is 10 basis 
points smaller than the average effective bid-ask spread of OTC-only bonds. The 10-
basis-point difference suggests that approximately $1,058 million could be saved on 
transaction costs if pre-trade information were revealed in the corporate bond market. 
Using the probability of being listed on the NYSE as an instrumental variable, we still 
find bonds’ bid-ask spreads are negatively correlated with the presence of NYSE pre-
trade transparency.  
In contrast to the prediction of Pagano and Roell (1996), our theoretical and 
empirical evidence shows that improved pre-trade transparency increases traders’ 
bargaining ability rather than dealers’ ability to discern informed orders. Bond bid-ask 
spreads for institutional-sized trades on OTC-NYSE bonds are significantly smaller 
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than OTC-only bonds after controlling bond and firm characteristics. This finding is 
robust across various univariate and multivariate tests.  
Consistent with the notion that improved liquidity should add value to securities, 
we find that OTC-NYSE bonds have significantly lower bond yields than OTC-only 
bonds. For instance, OTC-NYSE bonds have a mean yield of 6.27%, while OTC-only 
bonds have an average yield of 7.89% after controlling for endogeneity with propensity-
score matching. Upon, controlling for the endogeneity of firms’ bond listing decisions 
on NYSE, we document a negative relationship between bond yields and NYSE pre-
trade transparency. Therefore, the improved pre-trade transparency adds value to OTC-
NYSE bonds. 
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Appendix A: Chapter 2 
 From Black and Scholes (1973) model, we obtain the following formulas: 
2/'2
 
1
2
0
2
2
0
1
102
)(
2
)(
10
2
2
2
1
)(;
2
1
)(
))(2/()/ln(
))(2/()/ln(
)()(
)()(
x
x
z
tTr
tTr
exNdzexN
tTd
tT
tTrDA
d
tT
tTrDA
d
dNAdNDePut
dNDedNACall















 





 
It is assumed that t=0 when a firm issues a new debt in the following proofs. max (0, AT-D) and max (0, 
D-AT) indicate the payoff of the call and put at time T, respectively. Call0 and Put0 indicate the price of 
the call and put at time 0, respectively.  
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Proof of equation (20): 
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Appendix B: Variable Descriptions, Chapter 2 
Variable Description 
Issuance size/ Assets Offering size scaled by total assets in the fiscal year prior to the bond 
issue 
Issuance size/ Long-term debt Offering size scaled by long-term debt in the fiscal year prior to the 
bond issue 
New bond maturity (years) Natural logarithm of the number of years before the bond is expired; 
For multiple debt offerings issued by the same firm on the same day, 
I calculate an average maturity, rating and seniority level as the 
weighted average of each component offering’s maturity, rating and 
seniority level in these cases, where the component weights are the 
proceeds of each bond issuance relative to total offering proceeds. 
New bond rating A value of 1 (2,3,…) is assigned to Moody’s rating of Aaa (Aa1, 
Aa2,…); for multiple debt offerings, the calculation of a firm's new 
bond rating is the same as new bond maturity. 
New bond seniority A security level scale integer assigned to a new bond seniority 
(Senior Secured=1, Senior=2, Senior Subordinate=3, Junior=4, 
Junior Subordinate=5, Subordinate=6, None=7); for multiple debt 
offerings, the calculation of a firm's new bond seniority is the same 
as new bond maturity. 
Existing bond maturity (years 
remaining) 
Natural logarithm of the number of years remaining before the bond 
is expired; In multiple regressions of Table 9, for multiple 
outstanding bonds by the same firm, I compute an aggregrated 
maturity as the weighted average of each outstanding bond's 
maturity, where the weight is defined as the proceeds of each debt 
issuance relative to total offering proceeds 
Existing bond rating A value of 1 (2,3,…) is assigned to Moody’s rating of Aaa (Aa1, 
Aa2,…) 
Existing bond seniority A security level scale integer assigned to an existing bond seniority 
(Senior Secured=1, Senior=2, Senior Subordinate=3, Junior=4, 
Junior Subordinate=5, Subordinate=6, None=7)  
Intended uses: stock 
repurchases 
Indicator variable equal to 1 when the intended use of newly raised 
funds is a stock repurchase. 
Intended uses: expansions 
Indicator variable equal to 1 when the intended use of newly raised 
funds is an expansion. Expansions uses include all financings of new 
risky projects such as mergers, future acquisitions, and capital 
expenditures. 
Intended uses: refinancings Indicator variable equal to 1 when the intended use of newly raised 
funds is a refinancing. 
Firms' size (millions) Natural logarithm of total assets in the fiscal year prior to the bond 
issue 
Firms' leverage ratio Long-term debt divided by total assets in the fiscal year prior to the 
bond issue  
 137 
 
Asset risk Standard deviation of unlevered stock returns (std. dev.), which is 
estimated using daily stock returns over the window -240 to -40 prior 
to the event date. Unlevered returns are computed by multiplying 
stock returns by (1 − Leverage), where Leverage is the ratio of the 
book value of total debt to the sum of the book value of total debt 
and the market value of equity at the end of the corresponding fiscal 
year.  
Tangibility Book value of net property, plant, and equipment scaled by total 
assets in the fiscal year prior to the bond issue  
Tax rate Sum of income taxes divided by the pretax income less 
appropriations to untaxed reserves 
Firms' growth opportunities Market value of equity (common shares outstanding multiplied by 
common stock prices) scaled by the book value of equity (total value 
of common/ordinary equity) 
Firms' profit Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) over total assets 
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Appendix C: Definitions of Z-score and Financially Unconstrained, 
Chapter 3 
 
According to van Binsbergen, Graham and Yang (2010), I calculate a modified version 
of Z-score and define financially non-distressed and unconstrained firms as follows: 
                                                                                                                                               
 
Assets(6) Book Total
9)Capital(17 Working*1.236) Earnings(Retained*1.4Sales(12)Net *1.0)Income(170tax -ePr*3.3 
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Appendix D: Predicted Signs of Variables of Dividend Payment 
Announcements by the Signaling and Wealth Transfer Hypotheses 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction variables:
ΔDIV*Junior_ 
bond (β3)
ΔDIV*Investment
_grade (β5)
ΔDIV*Maturity 
(β7)
ΔDIV*FL
(β9)
ΔDIV*FUC
(β11)
ΔDIV*FND(
β13)
A. Signaling holds
Dividend increases + - + + + +
Dividend decreases - + - - - -
B. Wealth Transfer holds
Dividend increases - + - - - -
Dividend decreases + - + + + +
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Appendix E: Chapter 4 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Proof: 
 We will prove Proposition 11, then show that Proposition 1 is a special case of 
it. 
 Let's denote  ( )  ∑ (  )   ( )  and  ( )  ∑ (  )
   ( ) . Given that 
  ( )  is continuous and decreasing function on      , it is easy to see that  ( ) is 
continuous and decreasing on      . We note that, from the value function of the buyers  
  ( )     {        ∫  ( ̂)   }                                               (  ) 
                                 
     and     ( ). Similarly, we have  ( ) continuous and increasing on [   ], in 
which     ( )  and    
 
. As   ( )    ( ) , we have  ( )   ( ) . Then, we 
define the inverse functions  ( ) and  ( ) mapping from   to prices.  
 From the inverse function theorem, we have 
  ( )  (
  
  
)
  
 ( 
      ( )(   ) 
 (   )(    (    ( )))
)
  
                               (A2) 
  ( )  (
  
  
)
  
 (
    (    ( ))(   ) 
 (   )(      ( ))
)
  
                               (A3) 
 As  ( ) increases in   and  ( ) decreases in  , we have 
  ( )      ̂       [ ̂   ]  
 
  
                               (A4) 
    ( )    [ ̂   ]    [ ̂   ]  
 
  
                              (A5) 
where    is the marginal dealer whose profit margin and trading volume are zeros. 
Thus, the total mass of dealer   equals to   .  
 Plugging   ( ) and   ( ) into  
 ( ) and   ( ) respectively, we obtain  
  ( )      ( )  ( 
    
 
  
(   ) 
 (   )(  
  (    )
  
)
)
  
                            (A6) 
 For the dealer with transaction cost  , he chooses   to maximize the expected 
profit ( ( )   ( )   ) . The optimality condition implies, 
 ( )   ( )    (  ( )    ( ))                            (A7) 
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Thus, we obtain 
 ( ( ))   ( ( ))    
   (   ) (  
 (    )
  )  
( )
    
 
  
(   ) 
                     (  ) 
                          
Substituting  ( )   ( ( )) into equation (A8), we get 
 ( )   ( )   
 
 (  
 (    )
  )
    
 
  
(   ) 
∫
      ( 
 )(   ) 
    (    (  ))
   
  ( )
 ( ) 
           (  ) 
                
Since, for any  ,  ( ( ))   ( ( ))  it implies that 
  
  
 
  
  
  And since   ( )  
   ( )  we have 
  
  
  
  
  
  Thus, 
 ( )   ( )                                               (A10) 
in which   represents a constant.  
 From the buyer’s reservation value, we have 
    ( )  
 (   )
   
∫       ̂   ̂   
 ( )  
 (   )
   
  ( )
 
∫
 
  
  ( )  
  
 
  
     (A11) 
where the second equality is obtained by performing a change of variables. 
Likewise, we have 
    ( )  
 (   )
   
∫   [   ̂]  ̂
 
  ( )
   ( )
 
 (   )
   
∫
 
  
  ( )  
  
 
                                                                      (   ) 
 
 From the above, it is obvious that     ( )    ( )  Since  (  )    
  ( ) and  (  )      ( )  we have  (  )   (  )     This implies    , and 
hence, 
 141 
 
 
 
 ( )     ( )                                                         (A13) 
                                           
 Plugging the equation (A13) into the optimality condition (equation (A8)) and 
differentiating with respect to  , we arrive at the following differential equation 
  ( )  
 ( )(  ( ))
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
  ( )
  
                                               (   ) 
                                
where 
 ( )  
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The solution for the above differential equation is 
 ( )   ∫   ( )  
  
 (
     
  
 ∫ ( 
 
 
 
   
 
 ( ))  ∫  ( )  
  
   
  
 
)                (   ) 
             
where 
 ( )  
  ( )
   
                                                                  (   ) 
                                                        
Thus, equation (A16) determines the equilibrium asks. And the equilibrium bids equal 
to      
To determine the equilibrium   , we apply     (  )   (  )  to the buyer’s 
reservation value   ( ) and get  
  
    
 
 
 (   )
   
(
    
 
 
 
  
∫  ( )  
  
 
)                                             (   ) 
          
 To prove Proposition 1, we let   
   
    
. As a result, we have  ( )   , and 
hence ,   ( )  
 
 
. From eq (A18), we can show that    
    
       
. Since  (  )  
 (  )    , we have  
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 ( )  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
  Q.E.D.  
Proof of Proposition 2 
Proof: 
 Proposition 1 implies that if        then  
 (  )   
 (  ) (We will prove this 
in details in Proposition 6). Based on Proposition 1, for any  [    (  ))   (    )  
 (    ). For any   [ 
 (  )  
 (  ))  we have  (    )     (    ). 
 Since   follows a uniform distribution in      , the pricing function of   
indicates that   follows a uniform distribution in [
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
]. Thus,    
    
  
  . 
Since    increases in  ,    decreases in  , i.e.,   
  ( )    
  ( ). 
 
Q.E.D. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Proof: 
 The spread,  ( )   ( ), which equals   ( )   . Since  ( ) is linear in  , 
and since   is uniformly distributed on      . Thus, we have  ( ) uniformly distributed 
on [ ( )  (  )) . The mean of  ( )  is 
 
 
 
   
 
, which increases in   . As from 
Proposition 3, we have the mean of  ( ) increases in    and hence, the spread increases 
in  . 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4 
Proof: 
 As mentioned in the proof of Proposition 3, the spread equals   ( )   , it is 
obvious that the variance of the spread equals the variance of  ( ). Since  ( ) is 
uniformly distributed on [ ( )  (  )) , the variance of  ( )  is 
 
  
(
  
 
)
 
. Since    
 143 
 
 
 
increases in  , we know that the variance of  ( ) increases in  , and so does the 
variance of the spread. 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 5 
Proof: 
 Since the equilibrium is symmetric, i.e., the seller’s reservation value is 
symmetric of the buyer’s reservation value, it is suffice to prove the claim with the 
buyer’s reservation value,   (  ). From the buyer’s optimal search strategy, we have 
 
     (  )  
 (   )
   
∫   ( ̂)  ̂
 
 
 
   (  )  
 (   )  
 (   )
  
(A19) 
 Therefore 
    
  
 
 (   ) 
(       ) 
    
(A20) 
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6 
Proof: 
    
  
 
 (    )
(       ) 
   
(A21) 
          Q.E.D. 
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Appendix F: Variable Definitions, Chapter 4 
Firm characteristics information is collected from Compustat. Bond variables are from Mergent 
FISD.  
Variable Description 
Firm size (log millions) 
Natural logarithm of total assets in the fiscal year prior to the 
bond issue  
Leverage 
Ratio of long-term debt over total asset in the fiscal year prior to 
the bond issue 
Firms' accounting standard-IFRS 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the accounting standard that a 
company uses in presenting its financial statements is 
International Financial Reporting Standards 
Firms' accounting standard-
Domestic 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the accounting standard that a 
company uses in presenting its financial statements is Domestic 
Issuer is in finance industry 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the issuer belongs to the finance 
industry 
Issuer is a utility 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the issuer belongs to the utility 
industry 
Issuers' equity is private Binary variable equal to 1 when the issuer is a private firm 
Issue size (sq. root of millions) Square root of the par value of debt initially issued. 
Moody's bond rating 
A value of 1 (2,3,…) is assigned to Moody’s rating of Aaa (Aa1, 
Aa2,…) 
Years to maturity The number of years before the bond is expired 
Global Bond Binary variable equal to 1 when the issue is offered globally 
Variable rate bond 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the coupon type for the issue is 
variable 
Foreign bond 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the issue is denominated in a 
foreign currency. 
Senior bond 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the security is a senior issue of 
the issuer. 
Rule144a bond 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the issue is a private placement 
exempt from registration under SEC Rule 144a. 
Yankee Bond 
Binary variable equal to 1 when the bond is issued by a foreign 
issuer, but is registered with the SEC and is payable in dollars. 
Listed on the NYSE Binary variable equal to 1 when the bond is listed on the NYSE 
  
 
1
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Table 1. Predicted Signs of Variables for New Debt Offerings by the Wealth Transfer and Signaling Hypotheses, Chapter 2 
Panel A presents signs of expected returns by different hypotheses. Panels B and C provide signs of the determinants of bond and stock price responses to debt 
offering announcements, respectively. I use “+/-” to represent an uncertain relationship and “?” if no implication.   
 
      Panel A: Predicted returns of bonds and stocks, and the correlation of returns surrounding new debt offering announcements 
Hypotheses 
Predicted Abnormal Bond 
Returns 
Predicted Abnormal 
Stock Returns 
Correlation between 
Abnormal Bond Returns and 
Stock returns 
Wealth Transfer - + - 
Negative Signaling - - + 
Positive Signaling + + + 
 
      Panel B: Predicted signs of the relationship between bond market returns and relevant variables surrounding new debt offering announcements. 
Hypotheses 
Seniority: 
New<Existing 
Maturity: 
New<Existing 
Existing Bond's Rating: 
Investment 
Existing Bond's Maturity 
Wealth Transfer + - + - 
Negative Signaling +/- +/- + - 
Positive Signaling +/- +/- - + 
 
     Panel C: Predicted signs of the relationship between stock market returns surrounding the new debt issue and firms’ intended use of newly 
raised funds. 
Hypotheses Security Markets Stock repurchases Expansions Refinancing Repurchases-Expansions 
Wealth Transfer 
Bond markets - - 0 - 
Stock markets + + 0 + 
Signaling 
Bond markets + - - + 
Stock markets + - - + 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A presents the number of straight debt offerings per sample year at the debt (issue) - and firm-level 
from 2005 to 2011. The ‘‘uncontaminated” sample consists of debt offering announcements not 
accompanied by contaminating news during day -1 to +1. Panel B provides descriptive statistics about the 
characteristics of debt offering, bonds and companies included in the sample. Bond offering 
characteristics including new bond’s issuance size, maturity and new bond ratings are collected from 
SDC. Other bond-specific information is obtained from the Mergent Fixed Income Security Database 
(FISD). All accounting variables are measured in the fiscal year immediately preceding the debt offering 
announcement year and obtained from the COMPUSTAT. Definitions of variables can be seen in 
Appendix B.  
 
Panel A. Distribution of straight debt offerings per sample year 
  Debt level Firm level 
Year 
Total 
sample 
 Uncontaminated 
sample 
Total 
sample 
 Uncontaminated 
sample 
2005 92 75 70 58 
2006 110 98 73 63 
2007 181 131 107 80 
2008 166 124 100 76 
2009 299 223 210 161 
2010 259 201 169 130 
2011 249 192 130 98 
Total 1,356 1,044 859 666 
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Panel B. Descriptive statistics of bond and firm variables 
Variables Sample Size Mean Median Std. Dev. 25th percentile 75th percentile 
Issuance size (millions) 859 1,112 731 1,175 400 1,500 
Issuance size/ Assets 859 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.08 
Issuance size/ Long-term debt 859 0.28 0.17 0.49 0.10 0.31 
New bond maturity (years) 859 11.71 10.02 8.60 7.07 14.02 
Existing bond maturity (years 
remaining) 
859 8.73 7.54 4.8 5.34 11.19 
New bond rating 859 8.97 9.00 3.41 6.00 11.00 
Existing bond rating 859 9.07 9.00 3.58 6.00 11.00 
Intended uses: stock repurchases 859 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 
Intended uses: expansions 859 0.14 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 
Intended uses: refinancing 859 0.31 0.00 0.46 0.00 1.00 
Intended uses: unclear 859 0.47 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Firms' size (millions) 859 35,995 17,604 54,495 7,735 36,677 
Asset risk (std. dev. of unlevered 
stock returns) 
859 0.017 0.014 0.011 0.010 0.020 
Tangibility 857 0.38 0.32 0.27 0.14 0.58 
Tax rate 859 0.28 0.32 0.92 0.24 0.37 
Firms' growth opportunities 857 5.72 2.52 43.51 1.65 4.20 
Firms' profit 859 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.07 0.15 
Proportion of new bonds' 
maturity shorter than existing 
bonds % 
3,738 32.08 
    
Proportion of new bonds 
subordinated to existing bonds % 
3,738 0.83 
    
Proportion of new bonds senior 
than existing bonds % 
3,738 2.84         
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Table 3. Bond and Stock Market Reactions surrounding Debt Offering 
Announcement Dates 
The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2011. The unit of observation is a debt offering at the firm level. 
The ‘‘uncontaminated” sample consists of debt offering announcements not accompanied by 
contaminating news during day -1 to +1. ABSR represents abnormal standardized bond returns. Dates in 
braces i.e. {-3.3}, denote a composite return from day -3 to +3 including all possible ABSRs as defined in 
Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). When a firm has multiple bonds, bond returns are calculated as an 
equal average of bond returns. CAR is computed as the raw stock return minus value-weighted market 
returns. SCAR represents standardized cumulative abnormal returns, which are defined as cumulative 
abnormal market adjusted returns divided by the time series standard deviation of abnormal returns over 
the window (-300, -46) relative to the announcement date. The significance level of the mean and median 
is based on t-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test, respectively. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Bonds Total Sample   Uncontaminated Sample 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median 
ABSR(-1,+1) 695 -0.16*** -0.20***   531 -0.16*** -0.21*** 
ABSR{-3,+3} 839 -0.15*** -0.14*** 
 
651 -0.13*** -0.13*** 
ABSR{-5,+5} 859 -0.13*** -0.12***   666 -0.12*** -0.10*** 
Panel B: Stocks Total Sample   Uncontaminated Sample 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median 
CAR (-1,+1)  859 0.0007 -0.0002   666 0.0011 0.0001 
CAR (-3,+3)  859 0.0045*** 0.0033*** 666 0.0039** 0.0023** 
CAR (-5,+5)  859 0.0061*** 0.0044*** 666 0.0059** 0.0035** 
SCAR (-1,+1)  859 0.0077 -0.0049 
 
666 0.0253 0.0023 
SCAR (-3,+3)  859 0.1027*** 0.0837*** 666 0.0890*** 0.0707*** 
SCAR (-5,+5)  859 0.1096*** 0.0896*** 666 0.0951*** 0.0695*** 
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Table 4. Existing Bond Market Response to New Debt Offerings by the Difference of Seniority (Maturity) between New and 
Existing Bonds 
This table presents existing bond returns surrounding new debt offering announcements segmented by the difference of seniority (maturity) between new and 
existing bonds. The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2011. Each existing bond is treated as a separate bond when comparing the difference of seniority and 
maturity. More details can be seen in the footnote 42. The ‘‘uncontaminated” sample consists of debt offering announcements not accompanied by contaminating 
news during day -1 to +1. ABSR represents abnormal standardized bond returns. Dates in braces i.e. {-3, +3}, denote a composite return from day -3 to +3 
including all possible ABSRs as defined in Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). When a firm has multiple bonds, bond returns are calculated as an equal average 
of bond returns.  In Panels A and B, the column “Difference” indicates the difference in abnormal standardized bond returns (ABSR) between a new bond 
subordinated to an existing bond: Seniority: New<Existing and a new bond senior to an existing bond: Seniority: New>Existing. In Panels C and D: the column 
“Difference” indicates the difference of abnormal standardized bond returns (ABSR) between groups of a new bond’s maturity shorter than an existing bond: 
Maturity: New< Existing and a new bond’s maturity longer than an existing bond: Maturity: New>existing. The difference in means test uses the unequal 
variance t-test. The significance level of the difference in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum two sample test. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Seniority: New<Existing   Seniority: New>Existing   Difference   
 Panel A: Total   N Mean Median 
 
N Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 ABSR(-1,+1) 17 0.46* 0.21* 
 
40 -0.16 0.13 
 
0.62* 0.08* 
 ABSR{-3,+3} 21 0.19 0.29 
 
54 -0.07 -0.10 
 
0.26 0.39 
 ABSR{-5,+5} 22 0.09 -0.02   57 -0.05 0.00 
 
0.14 -0.02 
 Panel B: Uncontaminated 
          ABSR(-1,+1) 14 0.30 0.17 
 
31 -0.12 0.21 
 
0.42 -0.04 
 ABSR{-3,+3} 18 0.17 0.21 
 
41 0.00 0.01 
 
0.17 0.20 
 ABSR{-5,+5} 18 0.02 -0.02   44 -0.04 0.04   0.06 -0.06   
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Table 4. Existing Bond Market Response to New Debt Offerings by the Difference of Seniority (Maturity) between New and 
Existing Bonds, Continued 
   Maturity: New<Existing      Maturity: New>Existing   Difference   
 Panel C: Total  N Mean Median 
  
N Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
 ABSR(-1,+1) 362 -0.37*** -0.33*** 
  
604 -0.13*** -0.16*** 
 
-0.24*** -0.17*** 
 ABSR{-3,+3} 457 -0.29*** -0.23*** 
 
761 -0.14*** -0.13*** 
 
-0.15*** -0.10*** 
 ABSR{-5,+5} 479 -0.25*** -0.18*** 
  
779 -0.11*** -0.08*** 
 
-0.14*** -0.10*** 
 Panel D: Uncontaminated 
          ABSR(-1,+1) 273 -0.36*** -0.32*** 
  
458 -0.13*** -0.16*** 
 
-0.23*** -0.16*** 
 ABSR{-3,+3} 349 -0.26*** -0.23*** 
 
589 -0.11*** -0.10*** 
 
-0.15*** -0.13*** 
 ABSR{-5,+5} 367 -0.23*** -0.16***   603 -0.09*** -0.07*** 
 
-0.14*** -0.09***   
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Table 5. Existing Bond Market Response to New Debt Offerings by Bonds’ Credit 
Rating 
The sample period is from 2005 to 2011. The ‘‘uncontaminated” sample consists of debt offering 
announcements not accompanied by contaminating news during day -1 to +1. ABSR represents abnormal 
standardized bond returns. Dates in braces i.e. {-3, +3}, denote a composite return from day -3 to +3 
including all possible ABSRs as defined in Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). A bond is considered an 
investment-grade rated bond if the bond’s rating belongs to the category of investment-grade rating 
(rating above Ba1 or BB+). In contrast, a bond is considered to be a speculative rated bond if its rating 
belongs to the category of speculative-grade rating (rating below Ba1 or BB+). When a firm has multiple 
bonds, bond returns are calculated as an equal average of bond returns. The column “Difference” 
indicates the difference of abnormal standardized bond returns (ABSR) between investment and 
speculative rated bonds. The difference in means test uses the unequal variance t-test. The significance 
level of the difference in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum two sample test. The symbols ***, ** 
and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 Existing bonds’ rating: Investments   Speculative   Difference 
  N Mean Median   N Mean Median   Mean Median 
Panel A: Total 
          ABSR(-1,+1) 528 -0.20*** -0.21*** 
 
168 -0.06 -0.13 
 
-0.14 -0.08* 
ABSR{-3,+3} 622 -0.17*** -0.16*** 
 
220 -0.12** -0.08* 
 
-0.05 -0.08 
ABSR{-5,+5} 636 -0.14*** -0.14*** 
 
226 -0.09* -0.03 
 
-0.05 -0.11* 
Panel B: Uncontaminated                   
ABSR(-1,+1) 396 -0.18*** -0.21*** 
 
135 -0.11 -0.18* 
 
-0.07 -0.03 
ABSR{-3,+3} 475 -0.13*** -0.14**** 177 -0.12* -0.08* 
 
-0.01 -0.06 
ABSR{-5,+5} 486 -0.11*** -0.11***   181 -0.12** -0.08*   0.01 -0.03 
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Table 6. Existing Bond and Stock Market Response to New Debt Offerings by Firms’ Intended Uses of Newly Raised Funds 
from Debt Financing 
The sample period is from 2005 to 2011. The ‘‘uncontaminated” sample consists of debt offering announcements not accompanied by contaminating news 
during day -1 to +1. ABSR represents abnormal standardized bond returns. Dates in braces i.e. {-3, +3}, denote a composite return from day -3 to +3 including 
all possible ABSRs as defined in Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). When a firm has multiple bonds, bond returns are calculated as an equal average of bond 
returns. Using hand-collected data from Factiva, I identify a firm’s intended use of newly raised funds from new debt offerings. An intended use is defined as 
stock repurchase (refinancing) when the intended use of newly raised funds is a stock repurchase (refinancing). Expansions uses include all financings of new 
risky projects such as mergers, future acquisitions, and capital expenditures. I define an intended use as unclear if the intended use is unclear or has many 
possibilities listed in the debt offering announcement news. The column named (1) - (2) represents the difference in bond/stock returns between stock repurchase 
uses and expansions uses. Likewise, (1) - (3) indicates the bond/stock return difference between stock repurchase use and refinancing use, and (2) – (3) indicates 
the bond/stock return difference between expansions uses and refinancing uses. The difference in means test uses the unequal variance t-test. The significance 
level of the difference in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum two sample test. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 
levels, respectively. 
 
Intended use:
Panel A: Total N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
ABSR(-1,+1) 51 -0.22** -0.15*** 98 -0.32*** -0.44*** 212 -0.09 -0.18 334 -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.10 0.29** -0.13 0.03 -0.23** -0.26***
ABSR{-3,+3} 65 -0.15** -0.13** 117 -0.26*** -0.26*** 259 -0.15*** -0.10*** 398 -0.13*** -0.13*** 0.11 0.13 0.00 -0.03 -0.11* -0.16*
ABSR{-5,+5} 66 -0.14** -0.10** 122 -0.20*** -0.19*** 268 -0.12*** -0.10*** 403 -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.06 0.09 -0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.09*
Panel B: Uncontamianated
ABSR(-1,+1) 42 -0.15 -0.14* 79 -0.38*** -0.48*** 159 -0.09 -0.14 251 -0.15*** -0.16*** 0.23* 0.34*** -0.06 0.00 -0.29*** -0.34***
ABSR{-3,+3} 52 -0.08 -0.12 95 -0.26*** -0.28*** 198 -0.12** -0.08** 306 -0.10*** -0.11*** 0.18 0.16** 0.04 -0.04 -0.14 -0.20**
ABSR{-5,+5} 53 -0.09 -0.09 98 -0.19*** -0.19*** 205 -0.11** -0.09* 310 -0.10*** -0.10*** 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.00 -0.08 -0.10*
 
Intended use:
Panel C: Total N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
SCAR (-1,+1) 66 0.20* 0.18** 122 -0.04 0.00 268 0.07 0.01 403 -0.05 -0.06 0.25 0.18* 0.14 0.17* -0.11 -0.01
SCAR (-3,+3) 66 0.31*** 0.28*** 122 0.03 -0.03 268 0.18*** 0.12*** 403 0.04 0.08 0.28** 0.31** 0.13 0.16 -0.15 -0.15
SCAR (-5,+5) 66 0.44*** 0.34*** 122 -0.06 -0.11 268 0.20*** 0.13*** 403 0.05 0.08 0.51*** 0.44*** 0.25** 0.21** -0.26** -0.23**
Panel D: Uncontamianated
SCAR (-1,+1) 53 0.23* 0.18* 98 0.00 0.01 205 0.02 -0.06 310 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.17* 0.21 0.24* -0.01 0.07
SCAR (-3,+3) 53 0.25** 0.24* 98 0.06 -0.03 205 0.12** 0.08** 310 0.05 0.07 0.19 0.27 0.12 0.16 -0.06 -0.11
SCAR (-5,+5) 53 0.41*** 0.31*** 98 -0.03 -0.07 205 0.14** 0.10** 310 0.05 0.07 0.44*** 0.38*** 0.27* 0.20* -0.17 -0.17
(2) - (3)(4) Unclear
(4) Unclear
Bonds
Stocks
(1) Stock Repurchases (2) Expansions (3) Refinancings (1) - (2) (1) - (3)
(1) Stock Repurchases (2) Expansions (3) Refinancings
(2) - (3)
(1) - (2) (1) - (3)
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Table 7. Bond-level Regressions Explaining Existing Bondholders’ Losses 
surrounding New Debt Offering Announcements 
This table displays the bond-level regression results where the dependent variables are ABSR {-3, +3}. 
Dates in braces i.e. {-3, +3}, denote a composite return from day -3 to +3 including all possible ABSRs 
as defined in Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2011. The 
‘‘uncontaminated” sample consists of debt offering announcements not accompanied by contaminating 
news during day -1 to +1. New bonds’ seniority: New<Existing (New>Existing) is a dummy variable 
with a value of 1 if the new bonds are subordinated to (senior than) existing bonds and 0 otherwise. New 
bonds’ maturity: New<Existing is an indicator variable which equals 1 when new bonds’ maturity is 
shorter than existing bonds and 0 otherwise. P-values of F-test for the difference of coefficients between 
New bonds’ seniority: New<Existing and New>Existing are reported in the last row of the table. Existing 
bonds’ rating: “investment” assumes a value of 1 if an existing bond’s rating belongs to an investment 
grade rated category and is 0 otherwise. The indicator variable for a large offering equals 1 if the debt 
issuance size is greater than or equal to 4.46% of total assets and 0 otherwise. 4.46% is the median 
percentage of debt issuance size over the firm’s total asset across the total sample. All other control 
variables are defined as in Appendix B. To avoid underestimating the standard deviation associated with 
the potential correlation in bond returns within the same firm, I estimate the regressions using firm 
clustered residuals. P-values for the significance of the coefficients are shown in parentheses. The 
symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.53** 0.57** 0.55** 0.75*** 0.35 0.42* 0.39* 0.62***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.14) (0.08) (0.09) (0.01)
Bonds' seniority: New<Existing 0.39** 0.35* 0.33* 0.39** 0.35** 0.34**
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Bonds' seniority: New>Existing 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.20 0.19 0.17
(0.52) (0.61) (0.62) (0.23) (0.26) (0.30)
Bonds' maturity: New<Existing -0.10*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Existing bonds' rating: investment -0.02 -0.06 -0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.05 -0.01
(0.82) (0.37) (0.59) (0.98) (0.74) (0.29) (0.57) (0.88)
Existing bonds' maturity (bond-level) -0.14*** -0.16***
(0.00) (0.00)
Firms' leverage>Target leverage 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02
(0.82) (0.94) (0.92) (0.86) (0.59) (0.71) (0.68) (0.64)
Indicator variable for a large offering (>=4.46%) -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.15***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Asset risk 3.77 3.86 3.90 3.67 4.91 5.05 4.89 4.71
(0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13)
High volume issues -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(0.72) (0.69) (0.65) (0.73) (0.90) (0.79) (0.78) (0.89)
Tangibility -0.21** -0.19** -0.20** -0.18** -0.20** -0.19** -0.20** -0.18**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Tax rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(0.79) (0.76) (0.79) (0.81) (0.32) (0.29) (0.32) (0.35)
Firms' growth opportunities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.33) (0.35) (0.28) (0.26) (0.50)
Firms' profit -0.26 -0.24 -0.24 -0.36 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.11
(0.52) (0.55) (0.55) (0.36) (0.57) (0.58) (0.56) (0.77)
Firms' size -0.06*** -0.05** -0.05** -0.05*** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04** -0.04**
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
R-square in % 1.78 1.97 2.13 3.87 1.96 2.21 2.49 4.47
# of observations 3,505 3,480 3,480 3,505 2,611 2,593 2,593 2,611
Difference of coefficients for seniority (P-value) 0.08 NA 0.10 0.11 0.30 NA 0.38 0.35
Total Sample Uncontaminated Sample
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Table 8. Firm-level Regressions Explaining Bond and Stock Returns surrounding 
New Debt Offering Announcements 
This table displays the firm-level regression results. The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2011. The 
‘‘uncontaminated” sample consists of debt offering announcements not accompanied by contaminating 
news during day -1 to +1. The dependent variable in bond regressions is ABSR {-3, +3}. Dates in braces 
i.e. {-3, +3}, denote a composite return from day -3 to +3 including all possible ABSRs as defined in 
Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). In stock regressions, the dependent variable is SCAR (-1, +1). 
Intended uses are indicator variables for whether the firm intends to use the proceeds for stock 
repurchases, expansions, or debt refinancing. The indicator variable for a large offering equals 1 if the 
debt issuance size is greater than or equal to 4.46% of total assets and 0 otherwise. 4.46% is the median 
percentage of debt issuance size over the firm’s total asset across the total sample. Seniority: New-
Existing indicates the difference of the seniority level between new bonds and firms’ existing bonds at the 
firm level. Maturity: New-Existing is the maturity difference between new bonds and firms’ existing 
bonds at the firm level. A bond’s maturity is defined as the natural logarithm of the number of years 
remaining before the bond is expired. Definitions of all other variables can be seen in Appendix B. P-
values of F-test for the difference of coefficients between different intended uses of newly raised funds 
are reported in the bottom rows. The p-values for the significance of the coefficients are shown in 
parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Intercept 0.38 0.59** -0.15 -0.40 0.19 0.47 -0.17 -0.34
(0.15) (0.03) (0.68) (0.29) (0.53) (0.12) (0.67) (0.38)
Intended uses: Stock repurchases -0.02 -0.02 0.27** 0.26* 0.00 0.01 0.24* 0.24*
(0.82) (0.84) (0.05) (0.06) (0.98) (0.92) (0.09) (0.09)
Intended uses: Expansions -0.13* -0.12* 0.00 -0.01 -0.15* -0.13 0.00 -0.01
(0.09) (0.10) (0.98) (0.89) (0.09) (0.13) (0.99) (0.91)
Intended uses: Refinancing -0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
(0.41) (0.41) (0.33) (0.35) (0.65) (0.66) (0.86) (0.85)
Seniority: New-Existing -0.18* -0.18* -0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.13 -0.19 -0.17
(0.09) (0.07) (0.43) (0.51) (0.31) (0.23) (0.19) (0.22)
Maturity: New-Existing 0.04 -0.09* 0.07* -0.05
(0.29) (0.07) (0.10) (0.35)
Firms' existing bond maturities -0.17*** 0.16** -0.21*** 0.13*
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.08)
Existing bonds' rating: investment -0.03 0.00 -0.09 -0.12 -0.02 0.02 -0.23** -0.25**
(0.72) (0.96) (0.42) (0.27) (0.83) (0.83) (0.04) (0.02)
Firms' leverage>Target leverage 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
(0.15) (0.13) (0.32) (0.30) (0.17) (0.17) (0.37) (0.36)
Indicator variable for a large offering (>=4.46%) -0.09 -0.10* 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02
(0.13) (0.10) (0.80) (0.82) (0.28) (0.22) (0.78) (0.80)
Asset risk 6.11*** 5.69** 0.42 0.75 5.65** 5.29** 0.91 1.07
(0.01) (0.02) (0.90) (0.83) (0.04) (0.05) (0.80) (0.76)
High volume issues -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.05 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.06
(0.85) (0.84) (0.45) (0.52) (0.56) (0.61) (0.42) (0.46)
Tangibility -0.24*** -0.17* 0.19 0.12 -0.23** -0.16 0.13 0.08
(0.01) (0.08) (0.17) (0.37) (0.04) (0.16) (0.37) (0.57)
Tax rate -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04
(0.82) (0.82) (0.53) (0.51) (0.43) (0.44) (0.31) (0.31)
Firms' growth opportunities 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.94) (0.90) (0.44) (0.42) (0.99) (0.97) (0.34) (0.35)
Firms' profit 0.02 -0.04 -0.43 -0.38 0.47 0.39 0.02 0.07
(0.96) (0.92) (0.42) (0.48) (0.25) (0.34) (0.97) (0.90)
Firms' size -0.05** -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.05) (0.13) (0.76) (0.90) (0.25) (0.45) (0.48) (0.60)
R-square in % 3.10 4.47 1.76 2.02 3.12 4.72 2.09 2.41
# of observations 836 836 855 855 650 650 664 664
F-test for repurchases = expansions (P-value) 0.33 0.36 0.09 0.08 0.25 0.26 0.10 0.10
F-test for repurchases = refinancings (P-value) 0.79 0.77 0.10 0.21 0.80 0.72 0.08 0.09
F-test for refinancings = expansions (P-value) 0.31 0.38 0.42 0.42 0.20 0.27 0.91 0.97
Total Sample Uncontaminated Sample
Bonds Stocks Bonds Stocks
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Table 9. Bond and Firm-level Regressions Explaining Bond and Stock Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns surrounding New Debt Offering Announcements 
Panel A displays the bond-level regression results where the dependent variables are each bond’s CAR (-
1, +1). Panel B reports the firm-level regression results using a firm’s bond and stock CAR (-1, +1) as 
dependent variables, respectively. CAR represents cumulative abnormal returns. Bond abnormal returns 
is estimated using the “trade-weighted price, all trades” method of Bessembinder et al. (2009) and stock 
cumulative abnormal returns is computed as the raw stock return minus value-weighted market returns. 
The sample period ranges from 2005 to 2011. The ‘‘uncontaminated” sample consists of debt offering 
announcements not accompanied by contaminating news during day -1 to +1. In Panel A, New bonds’ 
seniority: New<Existing (New>Existing) is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the new bonds are 
subordinated to (senior than) existing bonds and 0 otherwise. New bonds’ maturity: New<Existing is an 
indicator variable which equals 1 when new bonds’ maturity is shorter than existing bonds and 0 
otherwise. P-values of F-test for the difference of coefficients between New bonds’ seniority: 
New<Existing and New>Existing are reported in the last row of the table. To avoid underestimating the 
standard deviation associated with the potential correlation in bond returns within the same firm, I 
estimate the regressions using firm clustered residuals. In Panel B, Intended uses are indicator variables 
for whether the firm intends to use the proceeds for stock repurchases, expansions, or debt refinancing. P-
values of F-test for the difference of coefficients between different intended uses of newly raised funds 
are reported in the bottom rows. All other control variables are defined as in Appendix B. P-values for the 
significance of the coefficients are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance 
at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.003 0.005 0.004 0.007*
(0.49) (0.32) (0.40) (0.10)
Bonds' seniority: New<Existing 0.006** 0.006* 0.006**
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
Bonds' seniority: New>Existing 0.006 0.006 0.005
(0.14) (0.15) (0.17)
Bonds' maturity: New<Existing -0.002** -0.002**
(0.03) (0.03)
Existing bonds' rating: investment 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.52) (0.89) (0.58) (0.41)
Existing bonds' maturity (bond-level) -0.003***
(0.00)
Firms' leverage>Target leverage 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.80) (0.73) (0.77) (0.72)
Indicator variable for a large offering (>=4.46%) -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Asset risk 0.052 0.064 0.056 0.050
(0.46) (0.38) (0.42) (0.47)
High volume issues 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.88) (0.98) (0.96) (0.89)
Tangibility -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.15) (0.19) (0.15) (0.19)
Tax rate -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.36) (0.31) (0.36) (0.40)
Firms' growth opportunities 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.47) (0.67) (0.72) (0.61)
Firms' profit 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.95) (0.90) (0.95) (0.85)
Firms' size -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.17) (0.22) (0.20) (0.19)
R-square in % 1.06 1.01 1.37 2.65
# of observations 2,771 2,751 2,751 2,771
Difference of coefficients for seniority (P-value) 0.90 NA 0.98 0.96
Uncontaminated Sample
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Panel B: Uncontaminated Sample 
  Bonds Stocks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.005 0.008 -0.007 -0.014 
  (0.33) (0.13) (0.65) (0.40) 
Intended uses: Stock repurchases -0.001 -0.001 0.007 0.006 
  (0.68) (0.72) (0.24) (0.27) 
Intended uses: Expansions -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.16) (0.20) (0.70) (0.64) 
Intended uses: Refinancing -0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.16) (0.17) (0.59) (0.62) 
Seniority: New-Existing -0.003 -0.003 -0.014** -0.014** 
  (0.21) (0.17) (0.02) (0.02) 
Maturity: New-Existing 0.001   -0.003   
  (0.28)   (0.24)   
Firms' existing bond maturities   -0.002**   0.004 
    (0.04)   (0.11) 
Existing bonds' rating: investment 0.001 0.001 -0.009** -0.010** 
  (0.57) (0.41) (0.05) (0.04) 
Firms' leverage>Target leverage 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.24) (0.24) (0.50) (0.48) 
Indicator variable for a large offering 
(>=4.46%) -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.57) (0.54) (0.73) (0.75) 
Asset risk 0.091* 0.088* 0.427*** 0.431*** 
  (0.07) (0.08) (0.00) (0.00) 
High volume issues 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 
  (0.90) (0.97) (0.47) (0.53) 
Tangibility -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.005 
  (0.06) (0.13) (0.58) (0.44) 
Tax rate 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.48) (0.49) (0.12) (0.11) 
Firms' growth opportunities 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.75) (0.76) (0.37) (0.36) 
Firms' profit -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 
  (0.29) (0.24) (0.73) (0.78) 
Firms' size -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.15) (0.23) (0.60) (0.66) 
R-square in % 2.47 2.96 3.87 3.92 
# of observations 664 664 664 664 
F-test for repurchases = expansions (P-value) 0.55 0.57 0.20 0.20 
F-test for repurchases = refinancings (P-value) 0.66 0.63 0.44 0.47 
F-test for refinancings = expansions (P-value) 0.79 0.87 0.44 0.41 
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Table 10. Firm Level Characteristics, Chapter 3 
This table presents the sample distribution and firm characteristics from July 2002 to December 2010. Panel A presents firm level characteristics for dividend 
decreases and increases announcements. Panel B reports firm level characteristics for dividend omissions and initiations announcements. Dividend indicates the 
dividend payment as of the dividend announcement day. ∆DIV indicates the size of dividend changes, which is calculated as the percentage difference in 
dividend payments between current and previous period. All the remaining variables are measured in the last fiscal year ending before the dividend 
announcement year. Assets are extracted from Compustat annual file. Financial leverage is defined as the ratio of book value of long-term debt over the book 
value of the total assets of the firm. Financial Non-distressed (Unconstrained) Dummy is an indicator variable equals 1 if a firm is financially non-distressed 
(unconstrained), and 0 if a firm is financially distressed (constrained). Following van Binsbergen, Graham and Yang (2010), I measure financial distress 
employing a modified version of Altman’s (1968) Z-score. Firms are considered nondistressed when their Z-scores are in the top tercile. Financially constrained 
firms are defined as firms having restricted long-term leverage. A more detailed description of these two measurements can be seen in the Appendix C.  
 
 
 
 
Panel A
Year N Dividend ($/Share) ∆DIV
Assets($
Mill)
Financial 
leverage
Financially non-
distressed dummy
Financially 
unconstrained dummy
N Dividend ($/Share) ∆DIV
Assets($
Mill)
Financial 
leverage
Financially non-
distressed dummy
Financially 
unconstrained dummy
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 12 0.29 44% 147.68 0.28 25% 75%
2003 5 0.27 -50% 26.70 0.25 40% 100% 70 0.30 27% 131.56 0.20 31% 68%
2004 9 0.21 -42% 186.26 0.27 33% 56% 118 0.30 32% 104.15 0.21 21% 72%
2005 34 0.18 -40% 40.10 0.27 10% 90% 174 0.32 25% 80.58 0.26 21% 91%
2006 35 0.27 -36% 89.57 0.19 29% 88% 163 0.32 19% 89.03 0.24 28% 91%
2007 20 0.33 -42% 63.40 0.23 20% 90% 191 0.37 54% 88.13 0.23 31% 86%
2008 53 0.24 -49% 203.72 0.19 11% 77% 147 0.40 35% 75.04 0.25 35% 89%
2009 81 0.17 -60% 268.44 0.23 19% 87% 151 0.33 29% 54.16 0.25 38% 87%
2010 35 0.20 -32% 69.66 0.22 39% 82% 210 0.38 31% 60.15 0.26 34% 80%
Total 272 0.22 -47% 152.54 0.22 21% 84% 1,236 0.35 32% 81.47 0.24 30% 84%
Panel B
64 NA NA 44.24 0.32 22% 93% 41 0.19 NA 41.52 0.35 16% 81%
Dividend decreases Dividend increases
Dividend omissions Dividend initiations
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Table 11. Bond Level Characteristics 
This table presents bond characteristics in the full sample across the sample period from July 2002 to December 2010. Panel A presents firm level characteristics 
for dividend decreases and increases announcements. Panel B reports firm level characteristics for dividend omissions and initiations announcements. Bond 
characteristics data are extracted from Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). Coupon rate is the bond’s annual interest rate. Years to Maturity 
denotes the number of remaining years to maturity for bonds. Issued proceeds are the par values of the bond when initially issued. Bond rating issued by Moody 
is denoted as numerical values (Aaa=1…D=25). If bonds are unrated by Moody, I use S&P’s ratings of the bonds. Investment dummy is a binary variable with a 
value of 1 if a bond’s rating belongs to the category of investment-grade rating (rating above Ba1 or BB+) and is 0 otherwise. Senior dummy equals 1 if a bond is 
secured, senior issue of the issuer and 0 otherwise.  
Panel A Dividend decreases Dividend increases 
Year N 
Coupon 
rate 
(%) 
Years to 
maturity 
Issued 
proceeds 
($Mill) 
Bond 
rating 
Investment 
dummy 
Senior 
dummy 
N 
Coupon 
rate 
(%) 
Years to 
maturity 
Issued 
proceeds 
($Mill) 
Bond 
rating 
Investment 
dummy 
Senior 
dummy 
2002 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 41 6.47 7.51 1,456.64 6.32 98% 93% 
2003 8 5.52 5.53 643.75 7.13 100% 100% 496 6.21 7.32 825.50 4.47 99% 90% 
2004 66 5.88 6.53 730.08 4.48 100% 82% 555 5.68 6.96 727.07 5.23 96% 95% 
2005 94 5.98 8.03 453.85 9.93 49% 100% 817 5.70 6.85 678.69 6.15 90% 94% 
2006 153 6.39 8.38 737.69 8.50 61% 94% 748 5.67 6.25 728.48 6.27 90% 94% 
2007 57 6.09 7.65 602.24 8.11 81% 100% 782 5.73 7.15 747.03 6.61 89% 91% 
2008 326 5.80 6.93 977.84 5.80 95% 78% 610 5.88 7.92 829.96 7.08 90% 97% 
2009 602 5.75 6.13 1,104.01 6.40 93% 86% 568 6.18 9.45 773.29 7.63 92% 100% 
2010 120 6.48 9.05 676.78 10.97 73% 99% 993 5.80 8.79 787.81 7.05 93% 100% 
Total 1,426 5.92 7.00 917.11 7.09 85% 87% 5,610 5.83 7.59 763.65 6.40 92% 95% 
Panel B Dividend omissions Dividend initiations 
  211 6.66 8.99 750.37 8.85 72% 100% 116 7.04 8.71 792.33 10.73 71% 100% 
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Table 12. Bond Market Responses to Dividend Change Announcements 
The full sample consists of 272 announcements of decreased dividends and 1,236 announcements of 
increased dividends from July 2002 to December 2010. The sample is limited to bonds that traded on at 
least 10 days during Day -21 to Day -1, where Day 0 is the day of dividend announcements. CAR is the 
sum of the firm’s daily abnormal bond returns over the event window. Daily abnormal bond returns are 
calculated as the bond’s raw return less the contemporaneous return on a value-weighted portfolio of 
bonds matched on rating and maturity. Daily bond prices are calculated with the “trade-weighted price, 
all trades” method of Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell and Xu (2009). When a sample bond is not traded 
on a given day, the most recent observed daily price is used for that day. For firms with multiple bond 
issues, the firm’s daily abnormal return is computed as the value-weighted average of abnormal returns 
on each bond issues. Using the Mergent FISD, I further partition the full sample into different categories 
based on bond characteristics: seniority (Panel B), and investment rating (Panel C). I also partition the 
full sample based on firm characteristics:  financially unconstrained (Panel E) and non-distressed (Panel 
F). To examine the influence of financial crisis on dividend announcement effects, I divide the full 
sample into two periods: before and after 2008 in Panel D. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Event window (days) N Mean CARs T-stat N Mean CARs T-stat 
Panel A: Full sample                     Decreases                                        Increases 
(-30,-5) 272 -0.87%** -2.18 1,236 -0.33%*** -3.13 
(-4,-2) 272 -0.19% -1.47 1,236 -0.06%* -1.76 
(-1,+1) 272 0.00% 0.00 1,236 0.06%* 1.66 
(+2,+30) 272 -0.80%** -2.39 1,236 -0.42%*** -3.45 
Panel B:  
      Decreases Senior bonds Junior bonds 
(-30,-5) 267 -0.85%** -1.96 36 -0.24% -0.16 
(-4,-2) 267 -0.15% -1.15 36 -0.20% -0.42 
(-1,+1) 267 -0.01% -0.10 36 -0.10% -0.34 
(+2,+30) 267 -0.71%** -2.10 36 -1.95%* -1.78 
Increases     
(-30,-5) 1,226 -0.33%*** -3.12 61 -0.38% -1.33 
(-4,-2) 1,226 -0.06%* -1.79 61 0.10% 0.79 
(-1,+1) 1,226 0.06%* 1.71 61 -0.09% -0.87 
(+2,+30) 1,226 -0.42%*** -3.35 61 -0.65%*** -2.82 
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 Table 12. Bond Market Responses to Dividend Change Announcements, 
Continued 
Panel C: Investment grade Speculative grade 
Decreases                                              
  N Mean CARs T-stat N Mean CARs T-stat 
(-30,-5) 212 -0.69%* -1.74 69 -1.54% -1.51 
(-4,-2) 209 -0.17% -1.18 69 -0.27% -0.91 
(-1,+1) 209 -0.02% -0.18 72 0.05% 0.19 
(+2,+30) 209 -0.72%** -2.55 77 -1.00% -1.10 
Increases     
(-30,-5) 1,063 -0.25%*** -3.88 214 -0.85% -1.50 
(-4,-2) 1,063 -0.03% -0.82 210 -0.28%** -1.95 
(-1,+1) 1,062 0.02% 0.65 210 0.22%* 1.74 
(+2,+30) 1,064 -0.36%*** -5.67 214 -0.77% -1.16 
 
Panel D: Decreases Increases 
Event window (days) N Mean CARs T-stat N Mean CARs T-stat 
Before 2008 
      (-30,-5) 103 -0.45% -1.23 733 -0.15%** -2.56 
(-4,-2) 103 0.03% 0.24 733 -0.05% -1.35 
(-1,+1) 103 -0.04% -0.29 733 0.00% 0.15 
(+2,+30) 103 -0.12% -0.52 733 -0.20%*** -2.59 
After 2008 
      
(-30,-5) 169 -1.14%* -1.88 508 -0.59%** -2.42 
(-4,-2) 169 -0.33% -1.63 508 -0.08% -1.19 
(-1,+1) 169 0.02% 0.11 508 0.13%* 1.90 
(+2,+30) 169 -1.21%** -2.35 508 -0.75%*** -2.69 
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Table 12. Bond Market Responses to Dividend Change Announcements, 
Continued 
Event window (days) N Mean CARs T-stat N Mean CARs T-stat 
Panel E: Financially unconstrained Decreases                        
  
Increases 
 (-30,-5) 204 -0.48% -1.13 993 -0.29%*** -3.80 
(-4,-2) 204 -0.20% -1.51 993 -0.10%*** -2.66 
(-1,+1) 204 -0.05% -0.41 993 0.02% 0.70 
(+2,+30) 204 -0.48% -1.24 993 -0.43%*** -4.23 
             Financially constrained 
     
(-30,-5) 38 -1.72%** -2.26 183 -0.44%* -1.66 
(-4,-2) 38 -0.36% -0.96 183 0.12% 1.33 
(-1,+1) 38 0.24% 0.50 183 0.15%* 1.75 
(+2,+30) 38 -2.05%** -2.39 183 -0.49% -1.29 
Panel F: Financially non-distressed 
     (-30,-5) 51 -0.83%* -1.80 354 -0.41%*** -2.69 
(-4,-2) 51 -0.04% -0.25 354 -0.07% -1.27 
(-1,+1) 51 -0.18% -1.22 354 0.08% 1.22 
(+2,+30) 51 0.12% 0.33 354 -0.58%*** -2.81 
              Financially distressed 
     
(-30,-5) 191 -0.64% -1.37 822 -0.27%*** -3.10 
(-4,-2) 191 -0.27%* -1.79 822 -0.06% -1.38 
(-1,+1) 191 0.04% 0.26 822 0.03% 0.78 
(+2,+30) 191 -0.95%** -2.18 822 -0.38%*** -3.17 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
  
162 
 
Table 13. Bond Market Responses to Dividend Initiations and Omissions 
Announcements 
I define a dividend initiation as being when a firm initiates its first dividend or resumes dividends after a 
period of at least five years from July 2002 to December 2010 and a dividend omission if a firm omits its 
dividend after a period of at least three years from July 2002 to December 2010. The symbols ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
  Dividend initiations Dividend omissions 
Event window (days) N Mean CARs T-stat N Mean CARs T-stat 
(-30,-5) 41 -0.89%** -2.13 64 -2.53%*** -4.72 
(-4,-2) 41 -0.23% -1.04 64 -0.29%* -1.76 
(-1,+1) 41 -0.23% -1.45 64 -0.38%* -1.81 
(+2,+30) 41 -1.23%** -2.12 64 -2.94%*** -5.18 
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Table 14. Stock Market Abnormal Returns surrounding Dividend Change 
Announcements Calculated Using Fama-French Model 
The full sample consists of 269 announcements of decreased dividends and 1,236 announcements of 
increased dividends from July 2002 to December 2010. The sample is limited to bonds that traded on at 
least 10 days during Day -21 to Day -1, where Day 0 is the day of dividend announcements. CAR is the 
sum of the firm’s daily abnormal stock returns estimated from Fama-French 3-factor model over the 
event window. To examine the influence of financial crisis on dividend announcement effects, I divide 
the full sample into two periods: before and after 2008 in Panels B and C. The symbols ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
  Decreases   Increases  
Event window (days) N Mean CARs T-stat N Mean CARs T-stat 
Panel A: Full sample 
      (-30,-5) 269 -3.04%** -2.55 1,236 -0.59%** -2.72 
(-4,-2)  269 0.09% 0.25 1,236 0.08% 1.06 
(-1,+1) 269 -0.73% -1.31 1,236 0.53%*** 6.19 
(0,0) 269 -0.33%** -1.97 1,236 0.27%*** 4.87 
(0,+1) 269 -0.61% -1.30 1,236 0.53%*** 6.77 
(+2,+30)  269 0.07% 0.06 1,236 -0.28% -1.19 
Panel B: Before 2008 
      (-30,-5) 103 -0.16% -0.14 732 -0.03% -0.13 
(-4,-2)  103 0.01% 0.03 732 0.10% 1.26 
(-1,+1) 103 0.34% 0.68 732 0.59%*** 5.64 
(0,0) 103 -0.25% -0.80 732 0.22%*** 3.35 
(0,+1) 103 -0.08% -0.18 732 0.51%*** 5.40 
(+2,+30)  103 0.74% 0.66 732 0.13% 0.48 
Panel C: After 2008 
      (-30,-5) 166 -4.82%*** -2.71 504 -1.39%*** -3.53 
(-4,-2)  166 0.14% 0.26 504 0.04% 0.28 
(-1,+1) 166 -1.39%* -1.66 504 0.45%*** 3.09 
(0,0) 166 -0.39% -0.74 504 0.34%*** 3.53 
(0,+1) 166 -0.95% -1.32 504 0.55%*** 4.15 
(+2,+30)  166 -0.35% -0.22 504 -0.88%** -1.98 
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Table 15. Stock Market Abnormal Returns surrounding Dividend Initiations and 
Omissions Announcements Calculated Using Fama-French Model 
I define a dividend initiation as being when a firm initiates its first dividend or resumes dividends after a 
period of at least five years from July 2002 to December 2010 and a dividend omission if a firm omits its 
dividend after a period of at least three years from July 2002 to December 2010. The symbols ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Event window (days) N Mean CARs T-stat 
Panel A: Dividend initiations     
(-30,-5) 33 3.60%** 2.30 
(-4,-2)  33 0.43% 0.71 
(-1,+1) 33 2.50%*** 3.64 
(0,0) 33 2.21%*** 4.72 
(0,+1) 33 2.59%*** 4.38 
(+2,+30)  33 1.45% 0.94 
Panel B: Dividend omissions 
  (-30,-5) 62 -2.78%** -2.29 
(-4,-2) 62 -0.24% -0.55 
(-1,+1) 62 0.44% 0.81 
(0,0) 62 0.06% 0.17 
(0,+1) 62 0.65% 1.24 
(+2,+30) 62 -0.16% -0.14 
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Table 16. Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Bond Price Responses to 
Dividend Change Announcements 
Dependent variables are CAR (-1, 1). CAR is the sum of the firm’s daily abnormal bond returns over the 
event window. Daily abnormal bond returns are calculated as the bond’s raw return less the 
contemporaneous return on a value-weighted portfolio of bonds matched on rating and maturity. Daily 
bond prices are calculated with the “trade-weighted price, all trades” method of Bessembinder, Kahle, 
Maxwell and Xu (2009). All estimated coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. P-values for the significance 
of the coefficients are shown in parentheses. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the one, 
five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
  Dividend decreases   Dividend increases 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
∆DIV (β1) -20.21 -17.21 -15.88 
 
10.50*** 6.85* 7.63*** 
 
(0.27) (0.33) (0.22) 
 
(0.00) (0.09) (0.00) 
Junior_bond 1.71 1.84 1.56 
 
0.13 -0.55 0.00 
 
(0.90) (0.89) (0.91) 
 
(0.96) (0.81) (1.00) 
∆DIV*Junior_bond (β3) 11.04 9.20 10.44 
 
-3.71 -2.90 -3.15 
 
(0.57) (0.63) (0.59) 
 
(0.74) (0.79) (0.77) 
Investment_grade 1.86 2.23 2.02 
 
-0.10 -0.45 -0.73 
 
(0.78) (0.72) (0.75) 
 
(0.92) (0.64) (0.48) 
∆DIV * Investment_grade (β5) 13.31 11.88 11.30 
 
-6.58*** -5.97*** -4.91*** 
 
(0.29) (0.30) (0.32) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Maturity(log years) 1.36 1.68 1.09 
 
0.59* 0.69** 0.69** 
 
(0.54) (0.46) (0.62) 
 
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02) 
∆DIV * Maturity (β7) 6.20 6.75 5.67 
 
-2.98*** -3.38*** -3.33*** 
 
(0.13) (0.11) (0.16) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
FL -1.98 
   
2.33*** 
  
 
(0.13) 
   
(0.00) 
  ∆DIV * FL (β9) 13.26 
   
-6.18 
  
 
(0.75) 
   
(0.27) 
  After 2008 -1.02 -2.04 -1.26 
 
0.72 0.62 0.65 
 
(0.85) (0.72) (0.81) 
 
(0.32) (0.38) (0.36) 
∆DIV * After 2008 -3.97 -5.83 -4.42 
 
0.73 1.46 1.25 
 
(0.72) (0.61) (0.69) 
 
(0.62) (0.25) (0.34) 
FUC 
 
-2.96* 
   
-1.55*** 
 
  
(0.10) 
   
(0.00) 
 ∆DIV * FUC (β11) 
 
1.20 
   
1.84 
 
  
(0.93) 
   
(0.62) 
 FND 
  
0.13 
   
0.25*** 
   
(0.16) 
   
(0.00) 
∆DIV * FND (β13) 
  
5.07 
   
1.18 
   
(0.72) 
   
(0.47) 
Intercept -2.77 -1.24 -2.91 
 
-1.02 1.15 -0.10 
 
(0.76) (0.89) (0.68) 
 
(0.46) (0.43) (0.93) 
R-Square (%) 4.11 4.18 4.03 
 
3.99 4.04 3.94 
# of Observations 242 242 242   1,170 1,170 1,170 
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Table 17. Correlation Coefficients between Stock and Bond Returns surrounding Dividend Change Announcements 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between stock and bond returns segmented by dividend changes and bond credit ratings. D-S (I-I) represents the 
correlation coefficients between a firm’s stock returns and speculative (investment) rating bond returns surrounding dividend decreases (increases) 
announcements. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Pearson correlation coefficients 
  Total Decreases Increases Speculative Investment D-S D-I I-S I-I 
(-30, -5) 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.12*** 0.23*** 0.26*** 0.30** 0.38*** 0.19*** 0.10*** 
(-4, -2) 0.16*** 0.33*** 0.00 0.09 0.18*** 0.25** 0.37*** -0.03 0.01 
(-1,+1) 0.05** 0.07 0.04 0.05 0.05* 0.15 0.05 -0.04 0.06* 
(+2,+30) 0.13*** 0.11* 0.15*** 0.14** 0.15*** 0.06 0.16** 0.19*** 0.13*** 
N 1,505 269 1,236 254 1,251 66 203 188 1,048 
 
Panel B: Spearman correlation coefficients 
  Total Decreases Increases Speculative Investment D-S D-I I-S I-I 
(-30, -5) 0.13*** 0.30*** 0.08*** 0.12**  0.14*** 0.21* 0.34*** 0.07 0.08*** 
(-4, -2) 0.06** 0.16** 0.03 -0.02 0.07*** 0.25** 0.12* -0.12* 0.07** 
(-1,+1) 0.10*** 0.06 0.10*** 0.11* 0.09*** 0.03 0.08 0.14** 0.08*** 
(+2,+30) 0.10*** 0.18*** 0.07*** 0.04 0.11*** 0.15 0.19*** -0.01 0.09*** 
N 1,505 269 1,236 254 1,251 66 203 188 1,048 
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Table 18. Abnormal Standardized Bond Returns surrounding Dividend Change Announcements 
This table presents abnormal standardized bond returns surrounding dividend change announcements. The sample period is from January 2005 to December 2010. 
ABSR represents abnormal standardized bond returns. Dates in braces i.e. {-3.3}, denote a composite return from Day -3 to Day +3 including all possible ABSRs 
as defined in Ederington, Guan and Yang (2012). When a firm has multiple bonds, bond returns are calculated as an equal average of bond returns. Financial and 
utility industries are eliminated from the sample. Dividend announcements contaminated by quarterly earnings, mergers and acquisitions, equity offering and 
stock repurchases announcements from Day -1 to Day +1 are also excluded from the sample. In Panels A and B, Spec-investment indicates the difference of 
abnormal standardized bond returns (ABSR) between groups of speculative rating bonds and investment rating bonds. Panel C stratifies the increased dividend 
sample by whether an announcement of increased dividend is occurred before 2008 or after 2008. The difference in means test uses the unequal variance t-test. 
The significance level of the difference in medians is based on a Wilcoxon rank-sum two sample test. The symbols ***, ** and * indicate significance at the one, 
five, and ten percent levels, respectively. 
Event window (days) N Mean Median   N Mean Median   N Mean Median   Mean Median 
Panel A: Decreases Total sample 
 
Speculative rating 
 
Investment rating 
 
Spec-investment 
ABSR (-1, +1) 85 2.26% 5.70% 
 
27 -0.57% 1.01% 
 
58 3.58% 6.55% 
 
-4.15% -5.54% 
ABSR {-3, +3} 115 5.59% 11.86% 
 
37 -0.08% -4.06% 
 
78 8.28% 13.49% 
 
-8.36% -17.55% 
ABSR {-5, +5} 124 4.42% 11.72% 
 
39 2.15% 19.49% 
 
85 5.46% 11.19% 
 
-3.31% 8.30% 
Panel B: Increases 
              ABSR (-1, +1) 430 -2.80% 0.55% 
 
50 20.63%** 16.54%** 
 
381 -5.99%* -0.76% 
 
26.62%*** 17.30%*** 
ABSR {-3, +3} 538 -0.10% 0.45% 
 
74 16.41%** 15.30%** 
 
466 -2.60% -0.17% 
 
19.01%** 15.47%*** 
ABSR {-5, +5} 556 -0.60% 0.65%   78 11.82%* 3.64%*   481 -2.47% 0.31%   14.29%** 3.33%** 
 
Event window (days) N Mean Median   N Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel C: Increases  After 2008 
 
Before 2008 Difference 
ABSR (-1, +1) 258 -0.11% 2.72% 
 
172 -7.04% -0.27% 6.93% 2.99%* 
ABSR {-3, +3} 314 2.99% 2.29% 
 
224 -6.07% -3.61% 9.06%** 5.90%** 
ABSR {-5, +5} 322 1.24% 0.43%  234 -4.65% 1.00% 5.89% -0.57% 
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Table 19. Sample Composition, Chapter 4 
The sample period is from November 1, 2008 to March 31, 2011. This table describes the composition of the final sample. From TRACE we collect bond trade 
data. Bond characteristics, such as coupon, maturity and ratings, are obtained from Mergent’s FISD database. The filtering conditions applied rule out bonds that 
are: (i) put-able; (ii) with abnormal prices (less than $10 or greater than $200); (iii) subsequently corrected; (iv) affected by price reversions and (v) traded less 
than 9 times over the sample period. To estimate a bond’s daily bid-ask spread, we further require bonds to have at least one buy and one sell within a day. 
Lastly, all but NYSE listed bonds are discarded. 
 
  # of Bonds # of Trades Size($s) Yield (%) Coupon (%) Dollar Volume (Billions) 
Data downloaded from 
TRACE(Starting from Nov 1, 2008 
to March 31, 2011) 
40,977 26,658,403 285,916.96 8.98 N.A. 7,621.94 
After filtering conditions: 25,884 24,958,872 276,633.09 8.04 5.90 6,904.32 
Sell 25,146 9,058,715 279,239.83 6.90 5.90 2,529.54 
Inter-dealer 25,167 10,019,697 206,389.84 8.32 5.92 2,067.92 
Buy  24,263 5,880,460 392,306.06 9.35 5.85 2,306.86 
Sample(only buy and sell plus 
NYSE) 
            
OTC-only 16,670 8,776,241 291,459.79 8.83 5.03 2,557.92 
OTC-NYSE 4,187 4,698,929 396,650.13 5.91 6.10 1,863.83 
Sell 20,857 8,225,185 280,275.13 6.89 5.90 2,305.31 
Buy 20,857 5,249,985 403,132.08 9.23 5.88 2,116.44 
   
  
169 
 
 
Table 20. Sample Summary Statistics 
This table presents the number of observations, mean, median, and standard deviation of all variables in 
the main sample. Definitions of variables can be seen in the Appendix F. 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
Bid-ask Spread 20,857 0.0097 0.01 0.01 
Firm size (log millions) 17,889 11.4508 11.49 2.30 
Leverage 17,886 0.2229 0.17 0.19 
Firms' accounting standard-IFRS 20,857 0.0284 0.00 0.17 
Firms' accounting standard-Domestic 20,857 0.8002 1.00 0.40 
Issuer is in finance industry 20,857 0.6574 1.00 0.47 
Issuer is a utility 20,857 0.0610 0.00 0.24 
Issuers' equity is private 20,857 0.1425 0.00 0.35 
Issue size (sq. root of millions) 20,857 11.0846 5.43 11.22 
Moody's bond rating 20,857 9.8220 7.00 7.56 
Years to maturity (years) 20,857 11.8303 10.00 9.51 
Global bond 20,857 0.1166 0.00 0.32 
Variable rate bond 20,857 0.1334 0.00 0.34 
Foreign bond 20,857 0.0001 0.00 0.01 
Senior bond 20,857 0.0770 0.00 0.27 
Rule144a bond 20,857 0.0021 0.00 0.05 
Yankee bond 20,857 0.0826 0.00 0.28 
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Table 21. Effective Bid-ask Spreads Matched by the Same Issuer 
This table presents the differences of bid-ask spreads between OTC-only bonds with OTC-NYSE bonds, at the issuer level across ratings. Moody’s bond ratings 
are used to measure a bond’s credit rating. If bonds are unrated by Moody’s, S&P ratings are used in their place. OTC-only (OTC-NYSE) bonds indicate bonds 
listed in the over-the-counter markets (both over-the-counter market and the NYSE market). The bid-ask spread is estimated as the time series average of its 
traded bid-ask spreads in a one-day window. For each bond, the effective (traded) bid-ask spread is the difference between the average daily selling price and 
average daily buying price divided by their sum. Superior bonds include bonds that have a moody rating of Aaa, Aa1, Aa and Aa2 during the sample period. 
Other investment grade bonds consist of bonds that have a rating between Baa3 and Aa3. Bonds rated as or below Baa3 belong to non-investment grade bonds 
category. The bid-ask spread is winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. tt-test (Wilcoxon) is used to test the difference of mean (median) bid-ask spreads 
between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal Wallis tests are used to test the difference of standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. The p-value of each test 
is reported. 
# of bonds Mean(Basis Points) t Value Std Dev *10
-2
Coupon(%) Age(Years) # of bonds Mean(Basis Points) t Value Std Dev *10
-2
Coupon(%) Age(Years) tt-test Wilcoxn Anova Kruskal Wallis
Total 9,487 105 139.01 0.74 4.95 4.74 3,061 81 80.27 0.56 5.90 4.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Superior Bonds (Aa2 and up) 635 79 26.04 0.76 3.29 3.17 124 47 12.35 0.42 4.28 3.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other Investment Bonds (Aa3-Baa3) 6,064 100 123.67 0.63 5.03 4.84 2,092 80 69.20 0.53 5.70 4.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-investment Bonds 1,826 131 54.80 1.02 5.37 5.00 533 80 26.03 0.71 7.40 5.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OTC-only OTC-NYSE Difference
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Table 22. Effective Bid-ask Spreads Differences by Propensity Score Matching 
Panel A presents results of logistic regressions for the determinants of a firm’s listing decisions. The 
probability is modeled as 1 when a bond listed in both the OTC market and NYSE. Logistic I and II 
represent logistic models with two different sets of independent variables below. Definitions of 
independent variables can be found in the Appendix F. P-values are reported in parentheses. Using the 
estimated coefficients in Panel A, the predicted probability (propensity score) for each bond is estimated 
and used to acquire a sample of OTC-only bonds with characteristics similar to bonds (based on the 
closest propensity score) traded both in OTC markets and on the NYSE in Panel B. The mean and 
standard deviation of estimated bid-ask spreads are reported in Panel B. The bid-ask spread is winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles. tt-test (Wilcoxon) is used to test the difference of mean (median) bid-ask 
spreads between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal Wallis tests are used to test the difference 
of standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. The p-value of each test is reported. 
Panel A: Dependent Variable: Listed on NYSE YES/NO 
Model: Logistic I Logistic II 
  Coefficient P-value Coefficient P-value 
Intercept -1.46 (0.00) -0.80 (0.00) 
Firm size (log millions) 
 
  -0.13 (0.00) 
Leverage 
 
  0.35 (0.01) 
Firms' accounting standard-IFRS 
 
  0.96 (0.00) 
Firms' accounting standard-Domestic 
 
  0.67 (0.00) 
Issuer is in finance industry -0.59 (0.00) -0.21 (0.00) 
Issuer is a utility 0.28 (0.00) 0.25 (0.00) 
Issuers' equity is private -0.57 (0.00) 0.72 (0.12) 
Issue size (sq. root of millions) 0.06 (0.00) 0.05 (0.00) 
Moody's bond rating -0.05 (0.00) -0.06 (0.01) 
Years to maturity 0.02 (0.00) 0.02 (0.01) 
Global bond 0.35 (0.00) 0.35 (0.01) 
Variable rate bond -2.83 (0.00) -2.81 (0.01) 
Foreign bond 0.66 (0.65) 0.76 (0.61) 
Senior bond -0.59 (0.00) -0.70 (0.00) 
Rule144a bond -2.24 (0.00) -1.87 (0.01) 
Yankee bond 0.24 (0.00) 0.46 (0.00) 
Pseudo R-square 0.19 0.19 
# of Bonds 20,857 17,886 
Panel B: Propensity Scoring Matched Bid-ask Spread Difference  
 
OTC-only OTC-NYSE OTC-only OTC-NYSE 
Spread-Mean (bps) 84 77 87 77 
S.D. *10
-2
 0.64 0.55 0.67 0.54 
tt-test for differences 0.00 0.00 
Wilcoxon-test for differences 0.00 0.00 
ANOVA 0.00 0.00 
Kruskal-Wallis 0.00 0.00 
# of Bonds 4,187 3,843 
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Table 23. Effective Bid-ask Spreads and NYSE Pre-trade Transparency 
This table reports regression results for the relation between a bond’s effective bid-ask spread and whether a bond is listed on the NYSE. The sample period is 
from November 1, 2008 to March 31, 2011. The dependent variable, except as noted, is the estimated effective bid-ask spread, which is the time series average of 
the difference between the average daily selling price and average daily buying price divided by their sum. Prob of Being Listed on the NYSE is the propensity 
score computed from the logistic models in Table 4. All other independent variables are defined as in Appendix F. In the OLS model, we use a dummy variable 
of 1 to represent whether a bond is listed on the NYSE in the OLS regression. In the remaining two models, we present regression estimates using a two-stage 
least squares (2SLS) method with the probability of being listed on the NYSE from Logistic I and II models as instruments (as suggested by Wooldridge, 2002) 
for the dummy variable of bonds listed on the NYSE. All estimated coefficients reported are multiplied by 100. The bid-ask spread is winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentiles. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Model:
Dependent variable
Listed on the NYSE -0.10 (0.00) -0.72 (0.00) -0.83 (0.00)
Prob of Beling Listed on the NYSE   50.99 (0.00) 63.02 (0.00)  
Issuers' equity is private 0.15 (0.00) -2.89 (0.00) 0.11 (0.00) 6.24 (0.42) -0.19 (0.57)
Issue size (log millions) -0.02 (0.00) 0.51 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) 0.40 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00)
Moody's bond rating 0.00 (0.94) -0.17 (0.00) 0.01 (0.01) -0.13 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Years to maturity 0.02 (0.00) 0.23 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00) 0.17 (0.00) 0.02 (0.00)
Global bond -0.09 (0.00) 4.06 (0.00) -0.03 (0.11) 2.70 (0.01) -0.04 (0.60)
Variable rate bond -0.05 (0.00) -9.43 (0.00) -0.17 (0.00) -7.99 (0.00) -0.18 (0.01)
Foreign bond -0.71 (0.06) 1.81 (0.93) -0.69 (0.09) 1.66 (0.94) -0.69 (0.16)
Senior bond -0.27 (0.00) -3.64 (0.00) -0.31 (0.00) -2.90 (0.01) -0.26 (0.00)
Rule144a bond -0.35 (0.00) -11.92 (0.03) -0.50 (0.00) -8.34 (0.29) -0.57 (0.00)
Yankee bond -0.49 (0.00) 2.07 (0.03) -0.47 (0.00) 1.82 (0.09) -0.45 (0.00)
Intercept 1.05 (0.00) 4.53 (0.00) 1.10 (0.00) 3.43 (0.00) 1.12 (0.00)
 Adj. R-square
# of Bonds
Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bid-ask Spread Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bid-ask Spread
17,88620,857
0.17 0.090.17 0.14
2SLS-Logistics I 2SLS-Logistics IIOLS
Bid-ask Spread
0.23
20,857
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Table 24. Institutional Traders’ Effective Bid-ask Spreads 
This table reports effective bid-ask spreads of institutional-sized trades (trade size>$100,000). Total sample includes all bonds and sub sample includes bonds 
matched by the same issuer. The effective bid-ask spread is the difference between the average daily selling price and average daily buying price divided by their 
sum. The sample period is from November 1, 2008 to March 31, 2011. OTC-only (OTC-NYSE) bonds indicate bonds listed in the over-the-counter markets 
(both over-the-counter market and the NYSE market). Investment bonds represent bonds rated by Moody as Baa3 or a higher rating. Non-investment bond 
represent bonds with a Moody’s rating of Ba1 or a lower rating. The bid-ask spread is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. tt-test (Wilcoxon) is used to test 
the difference of mean (median) bid-ask spreads between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal Wallis tests are used to test the difference of standard 
deviation of bid-ask spreads. The p-value of each test is reported. 
# of bonds Mean(Basis Points) t Value Std Dev *10
-2
# of bonds Mean(Basis Points) t Value Std Dev *10
-2
tt-test Wilcoxn Anova Kruskal Wallis
Total 9,653 46 82.95 0.54 3,614 37 58.68 0.38 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02
Investment Bonds 5,681 39 64.19 0.46 2,726 38 51.09 0.39 0.29 0.00 0.32 0.00
Non-investment Bonds 3,972 54 55.04 0.62 888 33 29.25 0.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total 4,342 46 59.78 0.50 2,487 39 47.46 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment Bonds 3,197 41 51.53 0.45 1,981 40 42.29 0.42 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37
Non-investment Bonds 1,145 58 32.23 0.61 506 35 21.85 0.36 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
OTC-only OTC-NYSE
Sub 
Sample
Total 
Sample
Difference
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Table 25. Institutional Traders’ Effective Bid-ask Spreads and NYSE Pre-trade 
Transparency 
This table reports results for the relation between a bond’s bid-ask spread and whether a bond is listed on 
the NYSE for the sample limiting to institutional-sized trades (trade size>$100,000). Panels A and B 
report propensity score matching and regression results, respectively. The estimated effective bid-ask 
spread in Panel A is computed as the time series average of the difference between the average daily 
selling price and average daily buying price divided by their sum. The bond bid-ask spread is winsorized 
at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  tt-test (Wilcoxon) is used to test the difference of mean (median) bid-ask 
spreads between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal Wallis tests are used to test the difference 
of standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. Panel B reports regression estimates using a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) method with the probability of being listed on the NYSE from Logistic I and II as 
instruments (as suggested by Wooldridge, 2002) for the dummy variable of bonds listed on the NYSE. 
Definitions of other independent variables can be seen in Appendix F. All estimated coefficients reported 
in Panel B are multiplied by 100. P-values are reported in parentheses. 
Panel A: Propensity Scoring Matched Bid-ask Spread Difference  
Model: Logistic I Logistic II 
 
OTC-only OTC-NYSE OTC-only OTC-NYSE 
Spread-Mean (bps) 40 37 39 37 
S.D.*10
-2
 0.50 0.43 0.40 0.38 
tt-test for differences 0.01 0.01 
Wilcoxon-test for differences 0.00 0.00 
ANOVA 0.11 0.01 
Kruskal Wallis 0.00 0.00 
# of Bonds 3,574 3,265 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model:
Dependent variable
Listed on the NYSE -0.22 (0.04) -0.50 (0.00)
Prob of Beling Listed on the NYSE 64.11 (0.00)  76.86 (0.00)  
Issuers' equity is private -2.89 (0.01) 0.02 (0.17) 2.91 (0.76) -0.11 (0.32)
Issue size (log millions) 0.19 (0.00) -0.01 (0.00) 0.12 (0.02) -0.01 (0.00)
Moody's bond rating -0.26 (0.00) 0.00 (0.80) -0.17 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00)
Years to maturity 0.12 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 0.07 (0.11) 0.01 (0.00)
Global bond 3.28 (0.01) -0.01 (0.59) 1.95 (0.12) 0.02 (0.29)
Variable rate bond -10.23 (0.00) 0.05 (0.12) -7.23 (0.00) -0.05 (0.16)
Foreign bond 0.19 (0.99) -0.37 (0.17) 0.31 (0.99) -0.38 (0.20)
Senior bond -2.09 (0.14) -0.16 (0.00) -1.38 (0.41) -0.17 (0.00)
Rule144a bond -8.72 (0.18) -0.13 (0.09) -5.35 (0.55) -0.20 (0.06)
Yankee bond 2.05 (0.14) -0.23 (0.00) 1.49 (0.33) -0.23 (0.00)
Intercept 9.87 (0.00) 0.62 (0.00) 6.57 (0.00) 0.71 (0.00)
 Adj. R-square
# of Bonds
0.14 0.12 0.14 0.09
12,681 10,748
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Bid-ask Spread
2SLS-Logistic I 2SLS-Logistic II
Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bid-ask Spread Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bid-ask Spread
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Table 26. Bond Yield Differences by Propensity Score Matching 
This table reports results for the relation between a bond’s yield and whether a bond is listed on the 
NYSE for the total sample. Panels A and B report propensity score matching and regression results, 
respectively. Using the Logistic I and II models as described in Panel A of Table 4, the predicted 
probability (propensity score) for each bond is estimated and used to acquire a sample of OTC-only 
bonds with characteristics similar to bonds (based on the closest propensity score) traded both in OTC 
markets and on the NYSE in Panel A. For the missing bond yields, we use the trade price reported on 
TRACE and coupon and maturity date from FISD to compute a bond’s yield-to-maturity. For multiple 
bond trading occurring within the same day, we compute trade-size weighted average of bond yields. 
Bond yields are winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. tt-test (Wilcoxon) is used to test the difference 
of mean (median) bid-ask spreads between the two groups of bonds. Anova and Kruskal Wallis tests are 
used to test the difference of standard deviation of bid-ask spreads. Panel B reports regression estimates 
using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method with the probability of being listed on the NYSE from 
Logistic I and II models as instruments (as suggested by Wooldridge, 2002) for the dummy variable of 
bonds listed on the NYSE. Definitions of other independent variables can be seen in Appendix F. 
Estimated coefficients reported in the first stage regressions of Panel B are multiplied by 100. P-values 
are reported in parentheses. 
  
 
 
 
Model:
OTC-only OTC-NYSE OTC-only OTC-NYSE
Yield-Mean (%) 8.47 6.72 7.89 6.27
S.D.*100 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.10
tt-test for differences
Wilcoxon-test for differences
ANOVA
Kruskal Wallis
# of Bonds
Panel A: Propensity Scoring Matched Bond Yield Difference 
Logistic I Logistic II
0.00 0.00
4,236 3,752
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
0.00 0.00
Model:
Dependent variable
Listed on the NYSE -46.67 (0.00) -50.91 (0.00)
Prob of Beling Listed on the NYSE 53.44 (0.00)  63.56 (0.00)
Issuers' equity is private -1.81 (0.01) 0.20 (0.77) 4.84 (0.51) 4.43 (0.50)
Issue size (log millions) 0.49 (0.00) 0.28 (0.00) 0.39 (0.00) 0.35 (0.00)
Moody's bond rating -0.16 (0.00) 1.18 (0.00) -0.12 (0.00) 1.07 (0.00)
Years to maturity 0.21 (0.00) -0.15 (0.00) 0.17 (0.00) -0.08 (0.03)
Global bond 3.63 (0.00) 3.81 (0.00) 2.68 (0.01) 3.72 (0.00)
Variable rate bond -9.30 (0.00) -11.83 (0.00) -7.92 (0.00) -13.45 (0.00)
Foreign bond 2.69 (0.87) 0.33 (0.98) 2.45 (0.88) 1.2 (0.93)
Senior bond -3.61 (0.00) -5.74 (0.00) -2.90 (0.01) -6.06 (0.00)
Rule144a bond -11.89 (0.02) -20.73 (0.00) -8.45 (0.26) -20.19 (0.00)
Yankee bond 1.17 (0.21) 3.75 (0.00) 1.02 (0.33) 5.52 (0.00)
Intercept 5.23 (0.00) 9.70 (0.00) 4.08 (0.00) 10.55 (0.00)
 Adj. R-square
# of Bonds
Panel B: Dependent Variable: Bond Yields
2SLS-Logistic I 2SLS-Logistic II
Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bond Yield Listed on the NYSE=1/0 Bond Yield
0.16 0.13 0.17 0.23
21,533 18,221
